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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
EVOLVING TRENDS IN FORENSIC SCIENCE
Margaret A. Berger]
This address will focus on the 2009 report ("the
Report") 2 of the National Academy of Science Research
Council ("NRC"), which was commissioned by Congress
to look at evolving trends in forensic science.
Understanding what is happening in the forensic sciences is
very complicated because of the wide variations that exist
in different jurisdictions. There are federal laboratories,
state or regional laboratories, county laboratories, and
municipal laboratories. Almost all public crime
laboratories examine controlled substances, and many
examine firearms and tool marks. A majority of
laboratories also screen biological samples, usually in
preparation for DNA analysis, and examine forms of trace
evidence. Many forensic examiners do not work in a
traditional laboratory, however. They work within law
enforcement offices and primarily conduct crime scene
investigations, especially fingerprint examinations and
bloodstain pattern analyses, and sometimes perform other
forensic functions.
The fragmented nature of the forensic enterprise has
made it difficult to study and to improve its principal
product: evidence on which courts can confidently rely so
1 Trustee Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; Member, National
Academy of Sciences Committee on Identifying the Needs of the
Forensic Sciences Community.
2 COMMITTEE ON INDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC
SCIENCES COMMUNITY, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH
FORWARD (2009). All references not otherwise identified are to this
report. Any direct quotations have been cited.
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that the guilty are identified and the innocent are not
erroneously convicted. The Report found many problems.
Among the disturbing findings was that much forensic
evidence introduced in criminal trials has not undergone
any meaningful scientific validation and that many forensic
professionals are not adequately trained or funded. The
result is that faulty forensic evidence may, at times, lead to
erroneous convictions of innocent persons, leaving the real
perpetrators free to commit additional crimes.
Furthermore, improvements in forensic science would
undoubtedly assist homeland security in carrying out its
missions.
I. Lack of Scientific Validation
Two important questions must be considered in
deciding whether the conclusions of a particular forensic
technique should be admitted in a courtroom: (1) Is the
technique scientific, and (2) do practitioners of the
technique avoid interpretations that become tainted by
error, bias, or the lack of proper procedures?
Let us see what these questions mean. A large
number of the techniques used in forensic laboratories are
not informed by the culture of science. As the Report
concluded, "Many of the processes used in the forensic
science disciplines are largely empirical applications of
science-that is, they are not based on a body of
knowledge that recognizes the underlying limitations of the
scientific principles and methodologies used for problem
solving and discovery."
3
Let me give you an example. Years ago, before
9/11, I was on a committee that was supposed to investigate
whether one could add anything to black or smokeless gun
powder so that if it was used to make a pipe bomb, it would
3 Id. at 38.
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be easier to trace where the pipe bomb was manufactured.
Initially, I thought that gunpowder was a product of the
Industrial Revolution and that it was made according to a
formula. But, apparently, making gunpowder is like
making wine. It has a cellulose base, which varies
depending on the vegetable material that is used. Then
different ingredients are added to this base so that every
batch of black and smokeless powder is somewhat
different. A technician who worked for the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, a government agency that
investigates pipe bomb incidents, had the idea of collecting
samples from facilities that make black and smokeless
powder. After a pipe bomb incident, one could compare
the powder in the pipe bomb with the collected samples and
derive useful information about the vicinity in which the
bomb was likely made.
A "scientific" approach would proceed in a
different manner. It would consider how large a sample
one needed to collect, whether the sample needed certain
characteristics, and what kind of training and accreditation
are necessary for the persons engaged in collecting and
comparing the samples.
The Report examined a number of the major
forensic sciences in detail, and the NRC was disturbed to
find that many are based on "observation, experience, and
reasoning without an underlying scientific theory . ,4
Let us look at some of the fields the Report examined.
A. DNA Evidence
The profound effect of DNA 5 evidence on our
criminal justice system is a remarkably recent development.
In Great Britain, a seventeen-year-old mentally challenged
' Id. at 128.
5 deoxyribonucleic acid
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hospital kitchen porter confessed to a rape-homicide. DNA
testing showed that the same person had committed two
rape-murders. The kitchen porter could not have
perpetrated the second crime because he was in custody at
the time it was committed. DNA testing eventually
identified the person who had committed both of the
crimes. From the very beginning, DNA evidence was used
not only to convict but also to acquit. As of this writing,
the Innocence Project, which investigates allegations of
wrongful convictions, has identified 250 cases in which
DNA evidence shows that the inmate did not commit the
crime for which he or she was incarcerated.6
DNA testing differs from other forensic techniques
in a number of ways. Unlike the other forensic sciences,
which are products of law enforcement efforts and play no
role outside the legal system, forensic DNA testing is a
byproduct of cutting-edge science. From the beginning, the
scientific community has been involved in validating the
use of DNA for forensic science. By 1996, only ten years
after DNA's courtroom debut, the National Academy of
Sciences had already convened two committees to issue
recommendations on using DNA within the forensic
enterprise. Eminent scientists served on these committees
and testified at judicial hearings on the admissibility of
DNA evidence in court. The other forensic sciences had to
wait until the NRC Report was issued in 2009 before
persons in the scientific community weighed in on their
claims.
It is not only the scrutiny to which DNA testing has
been subjected that has led to its becoming the "gold
standard" for forensic evidence. It is also the nature of
DNA itself. DNA has enormous variability. Before the
forensic use of DNA, the scientific community had agreed
6 See The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last
visited May 2, 2010).
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that no individuals other than identical twins have identical
DNA profiles. Therefore, it has been possible to develop
statistical models of the likelihood that a person would
have the particular genetic pattern found at the crime scene.
That does not mean, however, that DNA evidence is
infallible. Its reliability will depend on how it is collected
and analyzed. Problems have been reported at a number of
laboratories over the handling and interpretation of DNA
and with "drylabbing" 7 -the falsification of scientific
results. In addition, there may be statistical issues, for
instance, in dealing with mixed samples when a number of
persons jointly committed a rape. Still, unlike other
forensic techniques, DNA evidence is a child of science as
compared to some of the other forensic disciplines
examined in the Report.
B. Friction Ridge Analysis
One of the most controversial aspects of the Report
is its treatment of fingerprints, palm prints, and sole prints,
the analysis of which is collectively known as friction ridge
analysis. In the United States for over a century, examiners
have claimed that when they compare prints left by a
suspect (the latent print) with prints taken from that
suspect, they can accurately conclude that a match exists
and that only the suspect could be the source of the latent
print. Indeed, fingerprint evidence is undoubtedly thought
by many to be the bedrock of forensic science. Examiners
work in laboratories or are part of police identification units
that go directly to crime scenes.
There are, of course, large databases of fingerprints.
Most of you in this audience have probably had fingerprints
taken. However, it is not true that if your latent print is
7 STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH
FORWARD, supra note 2, at 193.
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found, a computer will compare the latent crime scene print
with a print taken from you and unerringly determine
whether there is a match. Actually, friction ridge analysis
depends a great deal on subjective interpretations.
Since 1959, the technique used in friction ridge
analysis has been described by the acronym ACE-V:
"Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification.
'
"
8
Nowadays, computers are often part of this process because
they can be used to generate candidates for comparison.
The process begins with the examiner taking a detailed
look at the latent print, which is often in the form of a
digital image, and then making a visual comparison of the
latent print with the known prints. Source determination is
made when the examiner concludes based on his or her
experience that a sufficient quality and quantity of friction
ridge detail agrees between the latent and known print.
Verification occurs when a second examiner, who may be
aware of the first examiner's conclusion, agrees.
The ACE-V method does not specify a standard test
protocol for which features of the prints must be compared.
Unlike the case with DNA analyses, population statistics
for fingerprints have not been developed, and there seem to
be endless permutations of loops, whorls, arches, and
deltas.
The friction ridge community continues to assert
that the ability to see and assess the details in a latent print
is an acquired skill, which depends on lengthy experience
and training, such as working at the FBI laboratory. Some
in the community argue that the ACE-V method leads to a
zero error rate, though the claim that any human process
has a zero error rate is absurd. Consequently, when
testifying in court, examiners usually speak in terms of
absolute certainty and refuse to express their conclusions in
probabilistic terms.
8 Id. at 137.
16
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A number of recent events have undermined this
claim of absolute certainty. One is the Brandon Mayfield
case. 9 After terrorist attacks on commuter trains in Madrid,
Spain, the Spanish authorities sent the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI") digital images of partial latent prints
found on plastic bags that contained detonator caps. The
FBI determined that an Oregon attorney, Brandon
Mayfield, who was known to be sympathetic to radical
causes, made the prints. Mayfield was arrested and jailed.
After Spanish authorities alerted the FBI to additional
information, the FBI sent two examiners to Spain, and it
was eventually concluded that Mayfield had been
misidentified. He received two million dollars in
compensation.
A second development has been increasing research
on contextual bias. After the Mayfield debacle,
psychologist Itiel Dror, affiliated with a university in Great
Britain, obtained copies of latent and known prints that
fingerprint examiners had compared and found to match.
Dror sent the prints back to the examiners and told them
that they were from the Mayfield case. Most of the
examiners then changed their minds and said that the prints
did not match. The only thing that had changed was the
context in which the prints were compared. These
developments led a Maryland state court judge to refuse to
allow fingerprint evidence in a death penalty case on the
ground that the ACE-V methodology was "a subjective,
untested, unverifiable identification procedure that purports
to be infallible."' 
0
9 See Mayfield v. Gonzales, No. Civ. 04-14-1427-AA, 2005 WL
1801679 (D. Or. July 28, 2005).
10 State v. Rose, No. K06-0545 (Md., Baltimore Co. Cir. Oct. 19,
2007).
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C. Other Pattern/Impression Evidence:
Shoeprints and Tire Tracks
The hypothesis on which examiners in the fields of
pattern and impression rely is that shoes and tires pick up
wear characteristics that individualize them. Over time,
further changes take place so that elapsed time after the
crime may affect an examiner's conclusions and certainty.
Although it may be possible to identify class
characteristics, there is no consensus about the number of
individual characteristics needed in order to attribute a shoe
or tire to a specific source. Examiners who seek to testify
in terms of individualization are making experience-based
conclusions unsupported by research data. At this time,
examiners in these fields have not addressed what research
needs to be done and by whom. Much more research is
needed in this field.
D. Bite Marks
We can see the difference between a discipline that
is rooted in science and one that is not if we look at a
discipline such as forensic odontology, which is concerned
with analyzing the bite marks that are at times found on
victims of homicide, sexual assault, and child abuse. In
these often sensational cases, there is a good deal of
pressure on prosecutors to identify the perpetrator.
Evidence of bite-mark comparisons is often introduced in
these cases with the claim that the comparison shows a
conclusive and unique match. But are bite-mark
comparisons a valid forensic technique?
The Report pointed to a large number of problems.
In the first place, the uniqueness of bite marks has never
been established. No large study of large populations has
ever been conducted to establish the uniqueness of bite
18
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marks, and there is no central database. Furthermore,
human skin may not accurately register bite marks, and the
marks can be distorted by the elasticity of the skin. A final
conclusion that the bite mark allows the unconditional
identification of the perpetrator is not warranted.
Under some circumstances, bite-mark comparisons
may be useful in excluding a suspect. For instance,
suppose that a small child is covered with bites as
unfortunately sometimes happens. If evidence is available
that a very limited number of persons have access to the
child, it may be possible, by examining this small group's
bite marks, to exclude those whose bites could not have
made the marks on the child. However, this is a much
more limited use than claims that a bite-mark comparison
allows the identification of the one person in the world who
is responsible for the crime. This is clearly a field in which
additional research is badly needed.
E. Analysis of Hair Evidence
Prosecutors have, for over one hundred years,
sought to introduce hairs found at the crime scene to
identify the defendant. DNA analysis does not work unless
the root of the hair is present. Forensic hair examiners
traditionally resorted to microscopic hair analysis. They
would collect samples of hair from the suspect and then
compare these hairs microscopically with the hair found at
the crime scene. There are no studies that establish the
frequency with which hair patterns are distributed among
populations. Nevertheless, we know from transcripts of
trials that hair examiners, at times, claim that in the
thousands of examinations they have conducted, they have
never seen as close a match as with the pubic hair found in
this case. This testimony can be extremely prejudicial
when it is the only evidence that seemingly ties the
defendant to the crime scene.
19
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It is possible to subject hairs to a mitochondrial
DNA ("mtDNA") examination, but this type of
examination is of limited use because all persons with a
female ancestor in common share the same mtDNA profile.
Microscopic hair evidence may be of some use in
excluding suspects and assisting in criminal investigations,
but using it to identify a particular defendant is highly
questionable. Testimony regarding microscopic hair
analysis had been introduced in many of the cases in which
convictions were set aside based on nuclear DNA evidence.
F. Controlled Substances
The analysis of drugs rests on a strong scientific
basis. Examiners use methods of classical analytical
chemistry and best practices that have been adopted in the
United States and worldwide. Problems in this field stem
not from the science that is employed but from the
reporting of results. Often, too little information is
furnished to enable a lawyer for the accused to understand
and ask questions about what was done. Developments in
the law may resolve some of these problems.
G. Questioned Document Examination
Questioned document examiners, who are also
referred to as forensic document examiners or handwriting
experts, compare a questioned item, such as a ransom
request, a bomb threat, or a codicil to a will, with an item
that was written by the suspect. The NRC Committee
agreed that there may be a scientific basis for handwriting
comparison, at least when there was no intention to forge or
obfuscate, but that more research needs to be done.
20
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H. Explosives Evidence and Fire Debris
Analysis
Most of the analysis of explosions is based on well-
established chemistry. Arson investigations are more
troublesome. Though there clearly was a fire in which
persons may have been killed, leading to a prosecution for
murder and the possibility of a death penalty, the critical
question may be whether an accelerant was used to start the
fire or whether the fire started accidentally. The NRC
Committee heard testimony about the paucity of research to
date on reliably establishing that a particular fire was
deliberately set.
I. Summary
This brief summary of the NRC Committee's
conclusions about the scientific validity of some of the
most commonly used forensic techniques indicates that
there is a dearth of good scientific research establishing the
scientific bases and validity of many traditionally accepted
forensic disciplines.
II. Accreditation, Certification, and Codes of Ethics
The Report also found another pervasive problem
with the forensic sciences-inconsistencies and
deficiencies in accreditation, certification, and standards.
A. Accreditation
An accredited laboratory has a management system
in place that sets out acceptable practices for its various
activities. It is primarily concerned with the management
system, technical methods, and quality of the work a
laboratory produces. It cannot be self-assessing. Oversight
21
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must come from outside the participating laboratory to
ensure that standards are rigorous and not self-serving.
Only a few jurisdictions require that their laboratories be
accredited. Identification units, those forensic entities
outside crime laboratories, do not participate in
accreditation systems. This means that a forensic discipline
such as fingerprinting, which is largely conducted outside
laboratories by identification units, is for the most part not
subject to accreditation requirements.
Proficiency testing is often a part of accreditation.
Proficiency tests can be blind, meaning that the test subject
in the lab is unaware that the sample he or she is given for
analysis is a test sample and not a real case, or the tests can
be open or declared. Blind tests require a great deal of
work and expense to prepare. Instead of working on
pending cases, the examiner's time is spent preparing a test.
Furthermore, it is hard to keep the test blind. Crime lab
personnel often have relationships with law enforcement
personnel, so it is easy to find out whether there is an actual
case that corresponds to the materials the examinee is being
asked to analyze. Another problem with proficiency tests is
that they achieve very little if they are too easy, and a
number of courts have recently complained that proficiency
testing in some disciplines is not sufficiently rigorous.
B. Certification
In some fields of science, professionals, such as
doctors and nurses, must be certified before they can
practice. A certification requirement could mandate that all
forensic scientists who practice and testify must be
certified. Certification boards consisting of respected
professionals could develop standards for education,
training, and experience that would have to be met before a
forensic scientist could become certified in a particular
discipline. Passing some kind of written or oral
22
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examination would also be part of the certification process.
Certification, like accreditation, is voluntary in most states.
C. Codes of Ethics
There is no single code of ethics to which all
members of the forensic science community subscribe.
Some forensic society organizations do have codes, but
they can be enforced only against someone who is a
member of that organization. A national code and better
enforcement mechanisms are needed.
Ill. The NRC Committee's Central
Recommendation: Congress should establish an
independent federal entity: The National
Institute of Forensic Science ("NIFS")
The preceding material discusses some of the many
weaknesses of our present forensic science enterprise. The
malfunctions discussed-the lack of science in much
forensic science and the imperfections in our laboratories-
can have profound effects on lives in our country. The
wrong people may go to prison or even to death row, and
others who should be prosecuted will evade punishment.
The NRC Committee found that courts could not correct
this system and the dangers it poses by operating on a case-
by-case basis. Instead, the Committee recommended that
Congress establish a new independent federal entity. This
entity cannot be part of the law enforcement community
because forensic science must serve law enforcement
officers, prosecutors, and defendants.
The National Institute of Forensic Science ("NIFS")
would be charged with implementing the ideas and changes
previously discussed. For instance, NIFS would
competitively fund research demonstrating the validity of
forensic methods and studies measuring the accuracy of
23
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forensic analyses. It would develop mandatory best
practices and standards for laboratories and for
accreditation and certification.
Of course, this Report appeared just as the United
States entered a severe budgetary crisis. Whether NIFS
ever will be funded remains to be seen. However, its
analyses and recommendations may have an effect on how
forensic science is practiced even if NIEFS is not created.
24
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ESSAY
A SHORT PRIMER ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF FORENSIC
SCIENCE EVIDENCE IN TENNESSEE:
A CHECKLIST
Bernard A. Raum1
"[J]urors are quite capable of seeing through flaky
testimony and pseudoscientific claptrap. . . .we
should not waste our valuable time watching witch
doctors, voodoo practitioners or brujas go through
the entrails of dead chickens in a fruitless search
for the truth.",
2
For decades, aircraft pilots have been using pre-
flight and approach-to-landing checklists rather than
relying on their memory to ensure that everything has been
done in its proper sequence. The use of this tool gives
pilots the ability to fly their aircrafts safely and according
to an established procedure. Similarly, most trial attorneys
employ witness checklists during the in-court examination
of their witnesses to ensure that all of the witnesses'
evidence has been fully presented and their exhibits have
been properly marked and received in evidence. It is the
intent of this presentation to suggest the use of another
evidentiary checklist for attorneys: a forensic evidence
admissibility checklist.
When confronted with proving or disproving facts
at trial, many attorneys preliminarily conduct a mental
checklist to determine whether each individual piece of
1 Adjunct Professor of Forensic Evidence, Levin College of Law,
University of Florida
2 People v. Williams, 183 Cal. Rptr. 498, 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)
(Gardner, J. Concurring).
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evidence, either physical or testimonial, is admissible.
Often the answer is relatively simple, but finding that
answer may be rather complicated with forensic science
evidence; thus, the suggestion of a written checklist. If
annotated at each stage, checklists such as this may also
serve as the foundation for a memorandum to the court in
support of either inclusion or exclusion of the particular
evidence in question. An evidentiary checklist can be in
any form that the attorney might prefer, but it should be
short, using popular devices like talking point bullets. Each
bullet then represents an admissibility hurdle that must be
considered. The suggested bullets in this presentation are
simply the rules of evidence themselves, listed in the
logical order that the court will use to determine
admissibility. At each point in the checklist where an
admissibility issue arises, it is important to consider the
relevant case law for meeting that rule's requirements.
THE CHECKLIST
I. The Discretion of the Court
The first consideration of admissibility for scientific
evidence is the general proposition that it is the trial court
that is vested with not only the authority but also the
discretion to admit or exclude such evidence. 3 Typically,
the discussion regarding admissibility is not conducted
within the hearing of the jury. Additionally, because of the
3 TENN. R. EvID. 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject
to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination the
court is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to
privileges."). See, e.g., State v. Ellwood, 783 So. 2d 423, 427-430 (La.
Ct. App. 2001) (where Dr. William Bass was qualified as an expert
witness in the field of forensic anthropology).
26
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potential for lengthy testimony and exhibits in the case of
scientific evidence, the court's evidentiary hearing is often
completed in advance of trial by way of a motion in
limine.4 At any hearing concerning the admissibility of
evidence, including scientific evidence, the proponent of
that evidence bears the burden of proof by a preponderance
of the evidence 5 as to the underlying scientific principles
and methodologies. The decision of the trial court to either
admit or exclude evidence will not ordinarily be reversed
on appeal unless the evidence preponderates otherwise ,6
4 See, e.g., Brown v. Crown Equip. Corp., 181 S.W.3d 268, 273 (Tenn.
2005); State v. Scott, 33 S.W.3d 74, 76 (Tenn. 2000); Pimm v. Wickes
Lumber Co.. 845 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). Cf. Pullum
v. Robinette, 174 S.W.3d 124, 139 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004); State v.
Kiser, No. E2005-02406-CCA-R3-DD, 2007 WL 4207903, at *374
(Tenn. Crim. App. 2007), affd, 284 S.W.3d 227 (Tenn. 2009).
5 State v. Edison, 9 S.W.3d 75, 77 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Stamper, 863
S.W.2d 404, 405 (Tenn. 1993).
6 See TENN. R. APP. P. 13. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. TND Assocs.,
L.P., No. E2007-01073-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 1899984, at *2 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2008). ("In a non-jury case [...], we review the record de
novo with a presumption of correctness as to the trial court's
determination of facts, and we must honor those findings unless the
evidence preponderates to the contrary. The trial court's conclusions of
law are reviewed de novo and are accorded no presumption of
correctness. A trial court's decisions regarding the admission of
evidence will not be overturned absent a showing of abuse of
discretion.") (internal citations omitted). Under the abuse of discretion
standard, a trial court ruling will not be disturbed if reasonable minds
can disagree as to its propriety, and no abuse of discretion will be found
unless the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard or reached a
decision against logic or reasoning that causes an injustice to the party
complaining. Eldridge v. Eldridge, 42 S.W.3d 82, 85 (Tenn. 2001).
An abuse of discretion occurs when the lower court's decision is
without a basis in law or fact and is therefore "arbitrary, illogical, or
unconscionable." State v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 18
S.W.3d 186, 191 (Tenn. 2000); see also Edison, 9 S.W.3d at 77; State
v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1993).
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where the trial court's discretion is arbitrarily exercised 7 or
is otherwise abused.8 In addition to the science involved,
as part of this initial process the trial court will review the
qualifications of any proposed expert witness.
9
II. Relevance to the Inquiry
With this standard in mind, the next issue that a trial
court will consider is whether the proposed evidence is
relevant to the inquiry.' 0 If the evidence is not relevant, the
inquiry stops there." However, if the proposed evidence is
deemed relevant, it is admissible, subject to other
established rules of evidence and privilege. 12  The
7 State v. Ballard, 855 S.W.2d 557, 562 (Tenn. 1993); Baggett v.
State, 421 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Tenn. 1967).
8 Coe v. State, 17 S.W.3d 193, 218 (Tenn. 2000).
9 Brown v. Crown Equip., 181 S.W.3d at 274-75.
'0 TENN. R. EvID. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.").
1 See State v. Mosley, 200 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005)
(proffered testimony did not have any bearing on any fact that pertained
to the defendant's guilt or innocence); State v. Davis, No. E2006-
01450-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 3245414, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov.
5, 2007) (hypothetical question to an expert called for speculation).
12 TENN. R. EvID. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible except as
provided by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of
Tennessee, these rules, or other rules or laws of general application in
the courts of Tennessee. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible."). See. e.g., State v. Matthews, No. M2007-01755-CCA-
R3-CD, 2009 WL 2391296, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 5, 2009);
State v. Waggoner, No. M2006-00553-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL
1341770, at *8 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 8, 2007); Wicks v. Vanderbilt
Univ., No. M2006-00613-COA-R3-CV, 2007 WL 858780, at *10
(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 21, 2007); State v. Curtis, No. W2006-02347-
CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 4530821, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 26,
2007). See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-201(b), which codifies the
so-called spousal communication privilege.
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requirements of this rule must be satisfied in order to admit
the testimony of an expert witness or any scientific
evidence.13 For example, in State v. Odoy, the Tennessee
Court of Criminal Appeals found relevant the testimony of
Dr. William Bass, a forensic anthropologist at the
University of Tennessee, who described wounds on the
victim's skeleton as being consistent with the alleged
murder weapon. 14
In addition, the issue of relevance is often raised
when the prosecution attempts to introduce autopsy
photographs into evidence. In order for any photograph to
be admissible, it must first accurately depict the scene. 15 In
Tennessee, the standard relevance rule for photographs is
stated in State v. Banks: "The admissibility of photographs
is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial
court and will not be overturned on appeal without a clear
showing of abuse of that discretion." 16  Further, the
Tennessee Supreme Court held that the admissibility of
photographs of murder victims is within the discretion of
the trial court after considering the relevance, probative
value, and potential unfair prejudicial effect of such
13 State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 307 (Tenn. 2007) (admitting
expert testimony for the defendant to determine the reliability of
eyewitness identification); State v. Ayers, 200 S.W.3d 618, 622-23
(Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) (admitting expert testimony on gunshot
residue patterns [GSR]); State v. Price, 46 S.W.3d 785, 809-10 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 2000) (admitting DNA evidence). Cf State v. Campbell,
904 S.W.2d 608 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995) (denying admission of expert
testimony from a psychologist regarding sexual abuse); State v. Poole,
No. W2007-00447-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 1025868, at *11 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Apr. 14, 2009) (concluding that expert psychiatric
testimony was irrelevant and inadmissible).
14 State v. Oody, 823 S.W.2d 554, 565-66 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991).
15 Phillips v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 867 S.W.2d 316, 318 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1992); State v. Howard, No. W2008-00208-CCA-R3-CD, 2009
WL 1034506, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 17, 2009).
16 564 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Tenn. 1978). Banks is the leading case in
Tennessee regarding the admissibility of photographs.
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evidence. 17  Generally, "photographs of the corpse are
admissible in murder prosecutions if they are relevant to
the issues on trial, notwithstanding their gruesome and
horrifying character."' 18  The probative value of the
evidence must be weighed against any unfair prejudice the
defendant may suffer if the evidence is admitted, and the
evidence may be excluded only if the unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs the probative value. 9 This rule has
been applied in numerous circumstances, including
determining admissibility of photographs of homicide
victims and crimes scenes.
20
III. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence
There are occasions when evidence that is otherwise
relevant is nonetheless subject to exclusion. 2 1 For example,
17 State v. Blair, No. E2008-00073-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 Tenn. Crim.
App. LEXIS 1032, at *22 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 17, 2009)
(paraphrasing Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 950-5 1).
I8 Id. (quoting Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 950-51).
19 Id. (citing Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 951). See also State v. Vann, 976
S.W.2d 93, 102-03 (Tenn. t998) (holding that the probative value in
admitting a photograph depicting prior sexual abuse was not
substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice); State v.
Goodner, No. E2007-01048-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 605141, at *23
(Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 10, 2009) (concluding that admission of the
victim's photograph did not prejudice the defendant).
20 State v. Carter, 114 S.W.3d 895, 903 (Tenn.2003) (concluding that
photographs were relevant to establish the heinous, atrocious, or cruel
aggravating circumstance of the murder); State v. Griffis, 964 S.W.2d
577, 594-95 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) (concluding that photographs
showing the victim's injuries were "relevant and highly probative");
State v. Hullom, No. M2006-01041-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 1174904,
at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 19, 2007) (concluding that photographs
depicting injury to victim and bloody clothing were relevant); State v.
Leverston, No. W2006-02304-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 4245725, at
*14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 3, 2007).
21 TENN. R. EvID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
30
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admitting color photographs of a bruised, bloodied, nude,
infant victim where the medical cause of death was not in
dispute would be considered improper.22 The Tennessee
Supreme Court has opined on the issue, saying:
Not all logically relevant evidence is admissible.
Thus evidence, which would advance the inquiry
but would also inflame or unduly distract the jury
or require an undeserved expenditure of judicial
time or unfairly surprise the opponent may not be
admissible. The probative weight of evidence
must be balanced against those attendant costs in
determining that evidence should be admitted.23
However, under TENNESSEE RULE OF EVIDENCE 704,
testimony is not objectionable as evidence simply because
it "embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact.",24  Notwithstanding this provision, expert opinion
testimony is "not admissible on an ultimate issue if the jury
could readily draw its own conclusions on the matter
without the aid of the witness' opinion."
25
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation
of cumulative evidence.").
22 State v. Collins, 986 S.W.2d 13, 20-21 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998); see
State v. Young, 196 S.W.3d 85, 105-06 (Tenn. 2006) (holding that
photograph of victim was prejudicial and inadmissible).
Otis v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 850 S.W.2d 439, 443 (Tenn.
1992) (internal citation omitted).
24 TENN. R. EvID. 704. See State v. Shuck, 953 S.W.2d 662, 668
(Tenn. 1997).
25 State v. Turner, 30 S.W.3d 355, 360 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000)
(internal citations omitted).
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IV. Testimony by Experts26
Formerly, historical discomfort with expert
testimony centered on unscrupulous persons who were
charlatans 27 masquerading as experts. Of course, until the
twentieth century, it was often difficult to verify the
qualifications of these individuals. With a new focus on
detailed record keeping and the ability to research the
backgrounds of individuals, this evil has been substantially
confined. However, the accuracy of the so-called science
was usually left to the judgment and credibility of the
individual expert witness, as evaluated by the jury.2 ' The
difficulty with this proposition was that neither the jury nor
26 TENN. R. EVID. 702 ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.").
27 "A person who makes elaborate, fraudulent, and often voluble
claims to skill or knowledge. . . ." Dictionary.com, Charlatan,
http://dictionary.reference.comlbrowse/charlatan (last visited Apr. 24,
2010). Synonyms: imposter, mountebank, fraud, phony, quack. Id.
The term "charlatan" is apparently derived from the Italian word
ciarlatano and originally referred to a native of the Umbrian village of
Cerreto, which was known for its quacks. Id. The term later was used
to describe those persons who set up booths in town squares to hawk
remedies. See David Gentilcore, Charlatans, Mountebanks and Other
Similar People: The Regulation and Role of Itinerant Practitioners in
Early Modern Italy, 20 Soc. Hist. 297, 299 (1995) (noting that in city
squares charlatans would "appear from all comers, performing tricks
and skits, and selling trinkets and dubious remedies, all competing for
the attention of the public").
28 State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 521 (Tenn. 2009) ("The
credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, and
the reconciliation of conflicts in the proof are matters entrusted to the
jury as the trier of fact.").
32
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the judge in ruling on admissibility had any objective basis
to determine the witness's scientific credibility.
2 9
The first real attempt to create some method for the
court to gauge the validity of the science itself came in the
watershed decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia in Frye v. United States.30 The
test for admissibility in Frye was a simple creation,
implemented with no explanation by the court, and strictly
involved determining if a consensus of the experts in a
given field agreed that the science was valid.31 Thus,
instead of relying upon the word of one expert, now the
courts were asked to rely upon the words of a group of
experts without any independent evaluation by the trier of
fact.
The rapid advances and all-encompassing
expansion of the scope and spectrum of the sciences in the
last fifty years left the Frye standard behind. What the
courts needed was a methodology of their own, in the
language of the courts, that could be used to determine the
validity of any scientific principle and its application to the
particular issues in litigation. In 1993, the United States
Supreme Court penned an elegant and insightful opinion in
the case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals that
allowed a court for the first time to conduct its own
independent review of the validity of a scientific principle
before permitting a jury to hear any evidence based on the
principle.
32
It is no mistake that the process outlined in Daubert
closely mirrors the scientific method process that scientists
themselves use to verify the validity of the results of their
29 See Frye v. United States, 293 F.103, 1014 (D.C. Cir 1923)
(landmark case establishing an objective test for determining the
admissibility of expert testimony).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (1993).
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inquiries and their discoveries. 33 With this graceful leap,
the courts were now able to view the actual making of the
sausage. It was in this context that the Court in Daubert
stated its goals:
The inquiry envisioned by [Federal Rule of
Evidence] Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible
one. Its overarching subject is the scientific
validity-and thus the evidentiary relevance and
reliability-of the principles that underlie a
proposed submission. The focus, of course, must
be solely on principles and methodology, not on
the conclusions that they generate.
34
As in any endeavor involving human interaction, the
Daubert methodology is not foolproof; there are no
absolute guarantees in the process. However, with the
Daubert decision, the courts have moved much closer to
today's scientific reality. With this background in mind,
the next step is to examine the current framework for the
treatment of expert testimony.
A. The Opinion Rule
Almost one hundred and twenty years ago in
Powers v. McKenzie, the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in
commenting on the qualifications of an expert witness as
opposed to that of a lay witness, stated:
The true distinction between an expert and a non-
expert witness, says Mr. Wharton, "is that the
latter gives the results of a process of reasoning
familiar to every-day life, and the former gives the
I d. at 593.
34 Id. at 594-95 (footnote omitted).
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results of a process of reasoning which can be
mastered only by special scientists." It is obvious
that, however an "expert" may be defined, he
should, in order to give his opinion as an expert,
have some special as well as practical
acquaintance with the immediate line of inquiry.
Where the line between an expert and a non-expert
should be drawn must, under the varying
conditions of cases and their environments,
necessarily be laid down by the judexfori; and this
court will not reverse on account of the judgment
of the lower court as to whether a witness offered
[to that court] is an expert, unless we can clearly
see that he was in error in respect to the
qualification of the witness, and that his error was
injurious.35
The modern Opinion Rule is based upon the
common law "Opinion Rule," sometimes called the "Pure
Opinion Rule." The Tennessee Supreme Court stated this
rule succinctly only a few years after Powers:
While the general rule is that witnesses must speak
to facts, yet, upon questions of skill or science,
men who have made the subject matter of
investigation the object of their particular study
are competent to give their opinions in evidence.
But they will not be permitted to state their
opinion upon any point the jury has to decide.
Deductions from facts belong to the jury, and
15 16 S.W. 559, 562 (Tenn. 1891). See Otis, 850 S.W.2d at 443 ("To
give expert testimony, one must be particularly skilled, learned or
experienced in a science, art, trade, business, profession or vocation.
The expert must possess a thorough knowledge upon which he testifies
that is not within the general knowledge and experience of the average
person.").
35
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when the examination extends so far as to
substitute the opinion of the witness, upon the
very issue in controversy, for that of the jury, the
province of that tribunal is unwarrantably invaded.
Necessity alone is the ground upon which expert
testimony rests, and the moment this necessity
ceases, the exception to the general rule, which
requires facts and not opinions from witnesses,
ceases also. "Hence," say the supreme court [sic]
of Pennsylvania, in Graham v. Penn Co., 139 Pa.
149, 21 A. 151 (Pa. 1891), "whenever the
circumstances can be fully and adequately
described to the jury, and are such that their
bearing on the issue can be estimated by all men,
without special knowledge or training, opinions of
witnesses, experts or otherwise, are not
admissible."
36
Note, however, that the common law requirement of
necessity has since been relaxed in Tennessee by the
current provisions of Rule 702 of the Tennessee Rules of
Evidence. 37  The requirement now is that such opinion
testimony must substantially assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. 38
Typically, a qualified expert may render an opinion,
which is based upon his or her own training, education, and
experience. 39 Under TENNESSEE RULE OF EVIDENCE 703,
36 Bruce v. Beall, 41 S.W. 445, 448 (Tenn. 1897) (quoting Graham v.
Pennsylvania Co., 139 Ps. 149, 153 (Pa. 1891)) (emphasis added)
(internal citation omitted). See, e.g., Moon v. State, 242 S.W. 39
(Tenn. 1921); Fortune v. State, 277 S.W.2d 381 (Tenn. 1955).
37 See State v. Shuck, 953 S.W.2d 662, 668 (Tenn. 1997).
38 Id. See also State v. Campbell, 904 S.W.2d 608, 616 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1995) (ruling that testimony of a psychologist would not
"substantially assist" the trier of fact).
39 Hoy v. DRM, Inc., 114 P.3d 1268, 1282 (Wyo. 2005) ("If the
[expert] witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then the
36
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this opinion may be based on what would otherwise be
inadmissible hearsay40 if "the type of hearsay is one that
would be reasonably relied upon by experts in the
situation. '4 1 It is, of course, this "basis of opinion" that is
witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion
reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and
how that experience is reliably applied to the facts.").
40 TENN. R. EvID. 801(c) ("'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."). Hearsay is
typically not admissible unless it falls under one of the established
exceptions to the hearsay rule, delineated in TENN. R. EVID. 803, 804,
and 805. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 920 S.W.2d 247, 255-56 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1995) (admitting statements of a rape victim used in aid of
medical treatment); State v. Rucker, 847 S.W.2d 512, 516 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1992) (admitting statements to a physician by a child abuse victim
for treatment purposes). But see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
68 (2004) (creating an exception to the admission of permissible
hearsay where it would violate a criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation and recognizing the concept of
testimonial versus non-testimonial hearsay); State v. Cannon, 254
S.W.3d 287, 309 (Tenn. 2008) (holding that admission of the victim's
testimonial, out-of-court statements to an officer violated the
defendant's right of confrontation).
41 TENN. R. EvID. 703:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those
perceived by or made known to the expert at or
before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence. Facts or
data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be
disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion
or inference unless the court determines that their
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the
expert's opinion substantially outweighs their
prejudicial effect. The court shall disallow testimony
in the form of an opinion or inference if the
37
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the crux of credibility and weight of the evidence
determinations by the jury. Additionally, in forming his or
her opinion, the expert may rely upon input, opinion, or
findings from other experts, as well as facts, which are
brought to that expert's attention by investigators or are
based on the expert's first-hand knowledge.
42
If the expert's opinion is based upon facts adduced
through the employment of a scientific theory, process,
procedure, technique or methodology, then that theory or
methodology must comply with the relevant rules of
evidence that control the admissibility of scientific
evidence.43 If, however, an expert's opinion is based on a
scientific principle or methodology already judicially or
statutorily recognized for producing reliable results, then
there is no need for a trial court to determine the
underlying facts or data indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
See State v. Kennedy, 7 S.W.3d 58, 66 (Tenn. Crim. App.1999):
Clearly, Rule 703 contemplates that inherently
reliable information is admissible to show the basis
for an expert's opinion, even if the information would
otherwise constitute inadmissible hearsay. Indeed, it
is not uncommon for an expert witness's opinion to
be based on facts or data that are not admissible into
evidence, but are reliable. In determining the
reliability of the underlying information, that
underlying data must be such that experts in that field
reasonably rely on them in forming the same kinds of
opinions or inferences that the expert in this case did.
Thus, Tenn. R. Evid. 703 provides that an expert may
base an opinion upon clearly inadmissible hearsay, if
the type of hearsay is one that would be reasonably
relied upon by experts in that situation.
42 See NEIL COHEN, SARAH Y. SHEPPARD, & DONALD F. PAINE,
TENNESSEE LAW OF EVIDENCE 7-63 (Lexis Publishing 4th ed. 2000).
41 Id. at 7-32.
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admissibility of that evidence. 44 The court may simply take
judicial notice of the reliability of that science. 45
44 TENN. R. EVID. 201 states:
Judicial notice of adjudicative facts
(a) Scope of Rule. This rule governs only
judicial notice of adjudicative facts.
(b) Kinds of Facts. A judicially noticed
fact must be one not subject to
reasonable dispute, in that it is either (1)
generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2)
capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned.
(c) When Discretionary. A court may take
judicial notice whether requested or not.
(d) When Mandatory. A court shall take
judicial notice if requested by a party
and supplied with the necessary
information.
See Fortune v. State, 277 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Tenn. 1955):
Generally speaking, judicial notice may be taken of
any fact which is of common notoriety. The contrary
of this is not so, however. A judge or juror cannot, in
the name of judicial notice, substitute his own
personal knowledge for evidence. There is a real
distinction between a judge's personal knowledge as
a private person, or knowledge acquired by him as a
judge upon another trial, and his knowledge as a
judge. As a judge, he should ignore what he knows
as an individual or knowledge which has come to him
upon another trial in which evidence was given to
bring about that knowledge. Of course, no fixed rule
can be laid down declaring what will be judicially
noticed. In a general way courts will notice without
evidence all facts that are part of the general
knowledge of the country.
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Nonetheless, the expert's opinion is subject to
several challenges to its credibility: the underlying
scientific theory, methodology, or laboratory analysis was
not conducted properly; the individual laboratory analyst
was not qualified to perform the testing or did not follow
laboratory protocols; the laboratory was not certified or its
quality control was deficient; the evidence being tested was
not properly handled or stored-perhaps spoliation or
alteration occurred; or the chain of custody of the evidence
was compromised.46 These direct challenges to an expert's
opinion and thus to the expert's credibility should be
conducted by cross-examination and by the production of
countervailing evidence. 47  For the first time, jurors now
45 See Commonwealth v. Martin, 290 S.W.3d 59, 66 (Ky. Ct. App.
2008); see, e.g., United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 1993)
(the court approved the taking of judicial notice of the general
acceptance of DNA and also offered an excellent early discussion of
the analytical steps in the determination of the admissibility of
scientific evidence in general); Gordon's Transp. Inc. v. Bailey, 294
S.W.2d 313, 333 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1956) ("[C]ourts will ordinarily take
judicial notice of the operation and effect of natural laws and of
nature's powers and forces, with the limitation that such notice is
limited to those natural laws which are of universal occurrence,
invariable in their action and of common knowledge.") (internal
citation omitted).
46 TENN. R. EvID. 901(a) ("The requirement of authentication or
identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by
evidence sufficient to the court to support a finding by the trier of fact
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."). See, e.g.,
State v. Cannon, 254 S.W.3d 287 (Tenn. 2008); State v. Rome, No.
W2006-00838-CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2331018 (Tenn. Crim. App.
June 5, 2008). Cf Scott, 33 S.W.3d at 760 ("The purpose of the chain
of custody requirement is to demonstrate that there has been no
tampering, loss, substitution, or mistake with respect to the evidence.
The identity of tangible evidence, however, need not be proven beyond
all possibility of doubt, and the state is not required to establish facts
which exclude every possibility of hampering.") (internal citations
omitted).
47 See, e.g., Fortune v. State, 277 S.W.2d 381, 384 (Tenn. 1955)
("Thus when such [expert] witnesses are offered it will be a question of
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have an objective standard to employ as they examine and
gauge both the expert's credibility and the underlying
scientific evidence.
B. The Impact of Frye 48 and Daubert49
In light of the codification of Tennessee Rule of
Evidence 702, the Supreme Court of Tennessee in 1997
determined that the admissibility test for scientific evidence
announced in Frye was no longer applicable. 50 Instead, the
Court in McDaniel, without having expressly adopted
Daubert's non-exclusive criteria, established a new test
loosely based upon those considerations. 51  The Court
enumerated the new test as follows:
A Tennessee trial court may consider in
determining reliability: (1) whether scientific
evidence has been tested and the methodology
with which it has been tested; 52 (2) whether the
evidence has been subjected to peer review or
publication; (3) whether a potential rate of error is
known; (4) whether, as formerly required by Frye,
the evidence is generally accepted in the scientific
community; and (5) whether the expert's research
in the field has been conducted independent of
litigation.53
their credibility which of course is attacked by searching cross
examination as to training, etc.").
4' 293 F.1013 (D.C. Cir 1923).
49 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
50 See McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 262-64 (Tenn.
1997).
51 Id. at 265.
52 See infra Part IV-C for a discussion of the Scientific Method.
53 McDaniel, 955 S.W.2d at 265.
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The Court then offered further guidance for trial courts:
Although the trial court must analyze the science
and not merely the qualifications, demeanor or
conclusions of experts, the court need not weigh
or choose between two legitimate but conflicting
scientific views. The court instead must assure
itself that the opinions are based on relevant
scientific methods, processes, and data, and not
54
upon an expert's mere speculation....
We recognize that the burden placed on
trial courts to analyze and to screen novel
scientific evidence is a significant one. No
framework exists that provides for simple and
practical application in every case; the complexity
and diversity of potential scientific evidence is
simply too vast for the application of a single
testy.
Finally, the Court observed:
The trial court is not required to determine
whether it agrees with the evidence and should not
substitute its view for the trier of fact. It should
allow the jury to consider legitimate but
conflicting views about the scientific proof.
Provided the evidence is scientifically valid,
criticisms of it and opposing views may be elicited
on cross-examination and/or established in the
defendant's case.
56
54 Id.
55 id.
56 Id. at 266.
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However, there is no requirement that all these factors be
considered in each case before allowing expert testimony.57
C. The Five McDaniel Factors
1. The Scientific Method
If it can be demonstrated that there has been strong
adherence to the principles of the Scientific Method in the
development of any scientific principle or methodology,
then that principle or methodology can be considered
reliable and any conclusions generated by it can be
considered trustworthy.58 This is the underlying focus of
the decision in Daubert, in which the Court noted the
59
scientific method as the hallmark of science.
The scientific method, a concept dating back at least
to Sir Issac Newton's practices, is a process that is the basis
for scientific inquiry. The scientific method follows a
57 See Brown v. Crown Equip., 181 S.W. 3d at 277 ("The rigid
application of the McDaniel factors to all expert testimony is
problematic because all expert testimony may not 'fit' within the
factors."). See, e.g., Chandler v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store,
Inc., No. E2006-00956-WC-R3-WC, 2007 WL 1710572, ** 4-6 (Tenn.
Workers' Comp. Panel May 8, 2007).
58 Gentry v. Mangum, 466 S.E.2d 171, 174 (W.Va. 1995).
59 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593:
Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in
determining whether a theory or technique is
scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact
will be whether it can be (and has been) tested.
"Scientific methodology today is based on generating
hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be
falsified; indeed, this methodology is what
distinguishes science from other fields of human
inquiry."
(quoting E. GREEN & C. NEESON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS
ON EVIDENCE 645 (1983)).
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series of steps: (1) identify a problem that needs to be
solved, (2) formulate a hypothesis, (3) test the hypothesis,
(4) collect and analyze the data, and (5) make
conclusions. It is, therefore, no accident that great
deference is given to the application of the scientific
method in various disciplines within the field of forensic
science. For example, in fire and arson investigations, the
well-recognized National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA), in its authoritative Guide for Fire and Explosion
Investigations series, commences its in-depth discussion of
the topic with a chapter offering detailed instruction to
investigators on the applicability and use of the scientific
method. 61 Compliance with the procedures in the NFPA
guide has formed the basis for admissibility of scientific
fire and arson evidence in numerous cases around the
United States.62  In addition, there are various published
standards, which establish protocols and methodologies
that are generally accepted within the worldwide scientific
and industrial community.63 It has also been suggested that
where there is no scientific consensus among respected,
well-credentialed scientists as to what is and what is not
"good science," the court's responsibility might be to
60 Labwrite Glossary, http://www.ncsu.edu/labwrite/res/res-glossary.
html (last visited Mar. 2, 2010).
61 NFPA 921: GuIDE FOR FIRE & EXPLOSION INVESTIGATIONS ch. 4
(2008).
62 See, e.g., ANDRE A. MOENSSENS, ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 1274-78 (5th ed. 2007) (discussing the
scientific method as it relates to the field of behavioral sciences).
63 See ASTM International, http://www.astm.org (last visited Mar. 2,
2010). With the active participation of members of the scientific, legal,
and educational communities, including members of the American
Academy of Forensic Sciences, ASTM has established and published
standards, which are applicable to the forensic sciences as well. Id.
See also Turner v. State, 746 So. 2d 355 (Ala. 1998).
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occasionally reject such expert testimony because it was
not "derived by the scientific method.,
64
2. Peer Review or Publication
Commenting upon the concept of peer review, the
Court in Daubert observed:
Another pertinent consideration is whether the
theory or technique has been subjected to peer
review and publication. Publication (which is but
one element of peer review) is not a sine qua non
of admissibility; it does not necessarily correlate
with reliability, and in some instances well-
grounded but innovative theories will not have
been published. Some propositions, moreover, are
too particular, too new, or of too limited interest to
be published. But submission to the scrutiny of
the scientific community is a component of "good
science," in part because it increases the likelihood
that substantive flaws in methodology will be
detected. The fact of publication (or lack thereof)
in a peer reviewed journal thus will be a relevant,
though not dispositive, consideration in assessing
the scientific validity of a particular technique or
methodology on which an opinion is premised.65
It has been said that "[t]he role of peer review is 'to
promote the publication of well-conceived articles so that
the most important review, the consideration of the
reported results by the scientific community, may occur
64 Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1316.
65 Id. at 593-94 (internal citations omitted). See, e.g., 1 PAUL C.
GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 1.08,
43-44 (4th ed. 2007).
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after publication."' 66  Further, that peer review "means
publication in a refereed journal, such as SCIENCE,
NATURE, or the JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL
,,67ASSOCIATION. Note, however, that the lack of peer
review does not necessarily render an expert's opinion
unreliable. 6
8
3. Potential Rate of Error
The potential false positive rate of error of a
scientific technique or test is significant in the forensic
science context, while a false negative rate of error is
important in the overall state of the science involved.69 The
existence of a known rate of error "is not a prerequisite
under Tennessee law for the admission of expert testimony
but is one of many considerations that the court may
consider in its gate keeping functions." 70  However, the
Court advised in Daubert that "[L]n the case of a particular
scientific technique, the court ordinarily should consider
the known or potential rate of error, and the existence and
maintenance of standards controlling the technique's
operation.",71 On remand of Daubert, the Ninth Circuit
observed:
Peer review and publication do not, of course,
guarantee that an expert's conclusions reached are
correct; much published scientific research is
greeted with intense skepticism and is not borne
out by further research. But the test under
Daubert is not the correctness of the expert's
66 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 60, § 1.08, at 44-45.
67 Id. at 45-46.
68 Brown v. Crown Equip., 181 S.W. 3d at 278.
69 1 GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 65, § 1.08, at 46-47.
70 Chandler, 2007 WL 1710572 at *6.
71 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
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conclusions but the soundness of his methodology.
That the research is accepted for publication in a
reputable scientific journal after being subjected to
the usual rigors of peer review is a significant
indication that it is taken seriously by other
scientists, i.e., that it meets at least the minimal
criteria of good science. If nothing else, peer
review and publication "increase the likelihood
that substantive flaws in methodology will be
detected."
72
It should be noted that where the legislature has established
the admissibility of a particular scientific test, the failure of
the legislature to consider any known rate of error
apparently does not impinge on the admissibility of any test
results.73
4. General Acceptance in the Scientific
Community
This standard is, of course, the Frye standard.74 By
specifically adopting this standard, the Tennessee Supreme
72 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 43 F.3d 1311, 1318 (9th
Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted).
73 Cribbs v. State, No. W2006-01381-CCA-R3-PD, 2009 WL
1905454, at *40 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 1, 2009).
74 See Frye, 293 F. at 1014:
"The rule is that the opinions of experts or skilled
witnesses are admissible in evidence in those cases in
which the matter of inquiry is such that inexperienced
persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a
correct judgment upon it, for the reason that the
subject-matter so far partakes of a science, art, or
trade as to require a previous habit or experience or
study in it, in order to acquire a knowledge of it.
When the question involved does not lie within the
range of common experience or common knowledge,
47
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Court implicitly adopted all pre-existing case law in
Tennessee that interpreted and applied the Frye rule. As
observed by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert:
"[G]eneral acceptance" can yet have a bearing on
the inquiry. A "reliability assessment does not
require, although it does permit, explicit
identification of a relevant scientific community
and an express determination of a particular
degree of acceptance within that community."
Widespread acceptance can be an important factor
in ruling particular evidence admissible, and "a
known technique which has been able to attract
only minimal support within the community," may
properly be viewed with skepticism.
75
Many reported opinions discuss the testimonies of forensic
anthropologists. The subject matter of these testimonies
but requires special experience or special knowledge,
then the opinions of witnesses skilled in that
particular science, art, or trade to which the question
relates are admissible in evidence."
Numerous cases are cited in support of this rule. Just
when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the
line between the experimental and demonstrable
stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this
twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
thing from which the deduction is made must be
sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Id. (quoting Appellant's Brief) (emphasis added).
15 509 U.S. at 594 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224,
1238) (3d Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted).
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ranges over multiple factual areas, such as specific
identification of the decedent, including age, gender,
stature, and race;76 identification of a defendant from a
photograph or surveillance video, 77 using ear 78 and facial
recognition points;79 the comparison of weapons with
wound patterns,s° describing a skull fracture 8l or that a
head wound was consistent with a gunshot;8 2 method of
disposal of a body;8 3 time of death; 84 and cause of death.
85
Unfortunately, the vast majority of these opinions do not
discuss the admissibility of such testimony vel non,86 but
76 See, e.g., State v. Klindt, 389 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Iowa 1986).
77 State v. Douglas, 203 Conn. 445, 450 (Conn. 1987); Penalver v.
State, 926 So.2d 1118, 1134 (Fla. 2006).
78 United States v. McClintock, No. 05-441, 2006 WL
39241, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2006).
79 United States v. Fadayini, 28 F.3d 1236, 1240-41 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
80 Colina v. State, 634 So. 2d 1077, 1081 (Fla. 1994); People v. St.
Pierre, 522 N.E.2d 61, 64 (Ill. 1988).
8' St. Pierre, 522 N.E.2d at 61.
82 State v. Fasola, 901 So.2d 533, 537 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
83 Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 36 (Ky. 1998).
84 State v. Phillips, 659 So.2d 785, 788 (La. Ct. App. 1995).
85 See Wuornos v. State, 644 So. 2d 1012, 1019 (Fla. 1994).
86 For some recent Tennessee cases where the testimony of forensic
anthropologists was received apparently under the "Opinion Rule," see
Dellinger v. State, 279 S.W.3d 282, 289-90 (Tenn. 2009) (Dr. William
Bass's testimony regarding time of death); State v. Rogers, 188 S.W.3d
593, 600 (Tenn. 2006) (Dr. Murray Marks found no evidence of trauma
as would be expected had a car run over the victim); State v. Davidson,
121 S.W.3d 600, 606 (Tenn. 2003) (Dr. Murray Marks testified that
trauma to the body was inconsistent with animal activity and also
testified regarding the time of death); State v. Bondurant, 4 S.W.3d
662, 665 (Tenn. 1999) (Dr. William Bass "testified that he was 100
percent certain that the bones were human, 75 percent certain that they
came from a male, over 50 percent certain that blunt trauma had been
applied to the skull before it had been burned, and 90 percent certain
that the bones had been in the ground no less than one nor more than
fifteen to twenty years."); State v. Cross, No. 03C01-9810-CR-00358,
1999 WL 1076958, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 1999) (Dr.
William Bass identified the victim, trauma to victim's skull, and
49
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some cases do address this issue. 87 Needless to say, the
reports of forensic anthropologists have been used by
medical examiners and coroners to formulate their opinions
on the time of death and the cause and manner of death.88
5. Research Independent of Litigation
"The objective of the trial court's gate keeping
function is to ensure that 'an expert, whether basing
testimony upon professional studies or personal experience,
employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual
rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the
relevant field."' 89 On remand from the United States
Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit in Domingo stated, "this
court [has] explained that, if an expert did not conduct his
or her own research, independent of the litigation, on the
subject of the testimony, the district court must determine
identity of the murder weapon as a shotgun); State v. Oody, 823
S.W.2d 554, 558 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (Dr. William Bass testified
that wounds on a skeleton were consistent with a particular ax); State
v. Phillips, 728 S.W.2d 21, 24 (Tenn. Crim. App.1986) (Dr. William
Bass testified regarding the victim's time of death and two gunshot
wounds to the victim's head, whom he identified using known x-rays);
State v. Driver, 634 S.W.2d 601, 604-05 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1981) (Dr.
William Bass testified that scattered bones were that of the 17-year-old
victim, whom he identified using dental charts).
87 See. e.g., State v. Miller, 429 N.W.2d 26, 39-40 (S.D.1988). The
court addressed the admissibility of a forensic anthropologist's
testimony as to the type of instrument used to inflict certain head
wounds on the decedent, ruling that based upon the expert's experience
and education, such testimony was admissible under Frye. Id.
88 See, e.g., Linn v. Fossum, 946 So.2d 1032 (Fla. 2006).89 Brown v. Crown Equip., 181 S.W.3d at 275 (quoting Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael 526 US 137, 152 (1999)).
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whether there exists any "objective, verifiable evidence that
the testimony is based on 'scientifically valid principles."'
9 0
The Ninth Circuit explained in Daubert:
One very significant fact to be considered is
whether the experts are proposing to testify about
matters growing naturally and directly out of
research they have conducted independent of the
litigation, or whether they have developed their
opinions expressly for purposes of testifying. That
an expert testifies for money does not necessarily
cast doubt on the reliability of his testimony, as
few experts appear in court merely as an
eleemosynary gesture. But in determining
whether proposed expert testimony amounts to
good science, we may not ignore the fact that a
scientist's normal workplace is the lab or the field,
not the courtroom or the lawyer's office. 9'
The decisions in Daubert and McDaniel have given
Tennessee courts a methodology for determining the
validity and relevance of both scientific principles and the
experts who purport to know and apply them.
V. Conclusion
In summary, here is how an attorney's checklist for
the admissibility of forensic evidence might look:
90 Domingo v. T.K., 289 F.3d 600, 606 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317-18 (9th Cir.
1995)) (emphasis added).
91 Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317.
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* Admissibility is at the discretion of the court. See
TENN. R. EviD. 104.
" Proposed evidence must be relevant to the inquiry.
See TENN. R. EvID. 401,402.
* Relevant evidence may still be subject to exclusion.
See TENN. R. EvID. 403, 801, 803, 804, 805.
" Expert testimony to scientific knowledge that is not
subject to judicial notice is subject to a scientific
credibility analysis. See TENN. R. EviD. 201,901.
v" The Opinion Rule-see TENN. R. EvID. 702,
703,704.
v$ Daubert Criteria-see 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
/ McDaniel Factors-see 955 S.W.2d 257,
262-64 (Tenn. 1997).
1. The Scientific Method
2. Peer Review or Publication
3. Potential Rate of Error
4. General Acceptance in the Scientific
Community
5. Research Independent of Litigation
Every lawyer and judge should be using a
subconscious checklist in preparing and reviewing forensic
evidence, but when preparing for trial, a written evidentiary
checklist, such as the one described here, can help to ensure
that evidence vital to your case is given the credibility it
deserves.
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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTION
DEAN DOUG BLAZE: I'd like to welcome everyone to
this exceptional program on forensic evidence. I'm
particularly excited because we finally combined two of the
(what I consider, but you'll understand my bias) crown
jewels of the University-both the College of Law and
Center for Advocacy and Dispute Resolution of the law
school and Dr. Bass and the work of the Body Farm and
forensic anthropology-as the focus to pull this whole
program together. We're particularly excited that this has
happened.
I think putting these two together reflects the depth
and the level of participation that we have in this program.
We have some wonderful folks that will be with us today,
including Dr. Bass, Professor Berger, Professor Bunde, and
a whole host of folks. I will not try to list everyone.
I want to recognize the one person who is primarily
responsible for this program, and that's Professor Penny
White, the Alvin E. Overton Distinguished Professor of
Law, and also Director of our Center for Advocacy and
Dispute Resolution. It was her vision, her leadership, and
her academic and professional reputation, candidly, that
allowed this program to be put together. I just want
everyone to thank Penny for everything she has done.
She will be the first to admit that she was ably
assisted by the leadership of the TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF
LAW AND POLICY, most particularly the Editor-in-Chief,
Sally Goade, and the Symposium Editor, Monica Rice.
And before I turn it over to Monica, I would also be remiss
if we did not thank Mark Ensley for assisting in putting
together the materials, assisting Penny, Monica, and Sally,
and also Micki Fox, who is never in here to be thanked.
But Micki Fox, who is our CLE Director, puts the whole
thing together and makes sure that the folks in Nashville
approve the program.
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Welcome, it's going to be an incredible day. I'm
looking forward to it, and I will turn it over to Monica Rice
to continue with the introductions.
SYMPOSIUM EDITOR MONICA RICE: Good morning
and welcome to the 2010 TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW
AND POLICY, along with the Center for Advocacy and
Dispute Resolution's Spring Symposium: "One
Advocate's 'Junk Science' is Another Advocate's
Evidence: Forging New Paths in Forensic Science." My
name is Monica Rice, and I am the Symposium Editor for
the TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY. We are
very, very pleased to have you all here today, and we are
certain that you will enjoy the various presentations that
have been prepared.
I would like to give you a brief synopsis of how the
morning symposium will run. This morning we're honored
to have Dr. Bill Bass deliver our morning keynote address.
Dr. Bass is a U.S. forensic anthropologist renowned for his
research on human osteology and human decomposition.
He has assisted federal, local, and non-U.S. authorities in
the identification of human remains. He currently plays an
active role in the forensic anthropology research facility,
commonly known to you all as "The Body Farm." He has
written numerous works, including the best-selling books
DEATH'S ACRE and BEYOND THE BODY FARM. We are
delighted to have such a renowned expert present our
morning keynote.
To respond to the morning keynote, we are pleased
to have a panel of esteemed and highly educated scholars
deliver presentations of their own. We will hear from
Professor Bernard Raum of Levin College of Law at the
University of Florida. Professor Raum is a former
prosecutor, receiving his J.D. from the University of
Florida and his Master's of Forensic Science from George
Washington University. He currently teaches Forensic
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Evidence at Levin College of Law. Professor Margaret
Berger of Brooklyn Law School will also join the panel.
She is widely recognized as one of the nation's leading
authorities on scientific evidentiary issues, specifically
DNA evidence. She will also present our lunch keynote
address. Lastly, Dr. Terry Bunde, Professor of Chemistry
and Acting Chair of Natural Sciences at Maryville College,
specializing in Biochemistry, Organic Chemistry and
Spectroscopy.
As you can see, we have so many experts sitting on
our panel this morning that in order to give everyone an
equal chance to state their views, we are going to give each
an allotted time of twenty minutes to present. And we do
have time cards. After the panel presentations, we will
open the floor for questions. When you stand to ask a
question, please state your name for our court reporter. I
would also once again like to remind you to fill out your
evaluations and your CLE forms. So, once again, thank
you for joining us. Thank you.
KEYNOTE ADDRESS
CRIME SCENE INVESTIGATIONS:
A PRIMER FOR LEGAL ADVOCATES
Dr. Bill Bass
DR. BILL BASS: I'm really impressed that there are so
many of you that got up this early in the morning to see
death and destruction. I mean it just isn't every day we get
to see that. I really didn't know what to show you all, but I
have a series of slides. Probably some of the audience has
seen one or two of these cases before. I put these together
to show you how important science is to gather evidence
for court cases and so forth.
Now, I'm going to show you something else by the
way. This is a really different form of old technology. I'm
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going to use a Kodak carousel projector, which you cannot
buy anymore. They don't make these things anymore. I'm
not going to use a laptop and so forth. Everybody says,
"You need to use a laptop. My gosh." So, I am about 200
years out of date with what you all are doing now. But I'm
going to show you a lot better color crime scenes than what
you would see otherwise.
I want to introduce you all to yourselves really,
starting with the Tennessee Highway Patrol at the UT
Hospital. And to show you that this has been a while ago.
You know, at one time, I had dark hair. But not every case
is as good as the next case, and this is a case for teaching
you something. This is a case that starts in Clarksville,
Tennessee. Clarksville is a town Northwest of Nashville.
Fort Campbell is the closest thing to Clarksville.
This is the disappearance of a girl named Kathy
Nishiyama.1 Kathy Nishiyama's father was Japanese. He
worked at Fort Campbell. Kathy Nishiyama's mother was
an American. She was a sixteen-year-old high school girl
making a little extra money by working at the Bonanza
Steakhouse on two or three nights during the week. One
night she does not come home from work. Her mother
calls the police to state that Kathy is missing. And there is
a massive search made for Kathy, and they cannot find her.
They find Kathy Nishiyama's car pulled off the
bypass around Clarksville. If you don't know Clarksville,
it doesn't have a bypass like we talk about. It's a road that
comes down along the Cumberland River there. The car is
locked, and they cannot find Kathy. About six weeks go
by-a month and a half.
Clarksville is in Montgomery County. Now, the
county west of Montgomery is Houston County-named
1 See generally State v. Hartman, 42 S.W.3d 44 (Tenn. 2001); Hartman
v. State, 896 S.W.2d 94 (Tenn. 1995); State v. Hartman, 703 S.W.2d
106 (Tenn. 1985); Donald F. Paine, State v. Hartman: In Memory of
Kathy Nishiyama, 44:2 Tenn. Bar J. 11 (2008).
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after Sam Houston, who fought right up that way a few
miles. Kathy, when she was living, never really went to
Houston County-had no reason to. But they find a cranial
vault. Now, the cranial vault is the top of the skull. It's
this thing here without a face. It's very typical of what
happens if you die outside, not only in Tennessee, but all
throughout the United States.
If you die outside, where the animals can get to
you-the dogs, the coyotes, in East Tennessee the bears-
all of these canines are interested in decaying human
bodies. And they will eat on a body. Now, all of these
have troubles, though, with the skull because the skull is
too big to get their teeth around. But the face is easy to
break off. What you will get then is a cranial vault without
a face. As we go on, we will show you this.
By the way, I thought you all might like to see a
case of a woman who was eaten by her dogs. I thought this
would be a good one for getting the morning started right.
And you're going to find what happens to the animals when
they chew on dead people out there. They will eat the ends
of the bones. They do not eat the shaft of the bone because
there isn't any marrow, and the marrow is in the end of the
bones. Proximal means the end closest to the head. Distal
means the end farthest from the head. What you will see
then are a lot of bone splinters. I'm going to show you
what this means to you in the legal profession.
Now, the only person missing in the Northwest,
Middle Tennessee area at this time is Kathy Nishiyama.
Again, though, she never went to Houston County, so they
didn't think it was her, but they wanted to check it out.
They called Mike Dover, who was a Tennessee Highway
Patrol helicopter pilot, and they asked Mike to bring the
skull over to me to take a look.
While they are out there and while Mike is coming
from West Tennessee over to Knoxville, they go out to a
farm and find some more bones. So they call Mike and
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say, "Will you bring Dr. Bass back with you?" And so we
are getting to fly out there. Now, before I show you this, I
want to give you just a little bit more academics, so you
will understand what is going on.
If you all don't mind, take your finger and feel right
here at the edge of your nose. Run it back and forth, and
you'll feel a lump under there on both sides. What you're
feeling is the root of the canine tooth. The canine tooth has
the largest root for the size of the crown of any tooth in the
body. Now, if you come forward from that, toward the
center line, you can't feel this, but you can take your
tongue-switch from your finger to your tongue now-and
feel the back of your front teeth. This is the central incisor,
that's a lateral incisor, and that was the canine. You felt the
canine with your finger. Now feel the incisor with your
tongue. Most of you in here are going to have a flat surface
in the back.
I'm looking around now. I'm trying to find an
Asian, and I don't see that many Asians. But if you have
an Asian, Japanese, Chinese, Southeast Asian, Eskimo, or
American Indian, all five of those individuals have a
common ancestry. This common ancestry has a genetic
characteristic in the incisor teeth known as shovel-shaped
incisors. On the back of the tooth you will have the edges
coming back. If you held the tooth by the root, it would
look like a little scoop shovel. These were named in the
late 1800s when we had coal fire furnaces. It does look
like a little scoop shovel. If you've ever-most of you
have never done this-but if you've ever put coal in a
furnace, you don't want a flat shovel because the coal falls
off the edges of the shovel. What you want are edges so
that you can keep the coal in there. And this is a little
shovel-shaped incisor. The shovel-shaped incisors are
found in roughly about ninety-six percent or more of
Japanese, Chinese, Southeast Asians, Eskimos, and
American Indians. All of those in the same group.
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Now, we have no teeth here, so we can't use that
right at the moment. But they decided, "Let's bring Dr.
Bass back with you." We get out there, flying off, and we
make one pass through the woods just before it's too dark
to see. And, lo and behold, we find the crown. This is the
part above-this would be the gum line right here, above
the-on the front-on the incisor. Note the light shining off
the tooth right here. Note the light is not shining off here
on the sides. The reason for that is the sides are coming
back toward us. This is a shovel-shaped incisor. This is
why it's important to know all of these things when you're
looking at evidence, so you'll understand what's there.
Note the little arrow here is pointing to a filling in
the tooth. Most of us do not have fillings in our incisor
teeth. We have fillings in our pre-molars and our molar
teeth, but very few of us have fillings in our incisor teeth.
This again is where your education kicks in. Knowing that
Kathy Nishiyama has a Japanese father and an American
mother, I thought, "I will bet you that Kathy Nishiyama
carries the genetic traits for shovel-shaped incisors."
With this, what we need is a dental record. And so I
said, "Hey, I think that this is probably Kathy Nishiyama,
but there's a dental record. Do you know who Kathy
Nishiyama's dentist was?" One of them said, "Yes, we do."
About 8:30 that night, they called Kathy Nishiyama's
dentist and said, "Would you go down to your office? Will
you make a copy of Kathy Nishiyama's dental records, and
we're going to send a Tennessee Highway Patrol helicopter
pilot over to pick these records up." And he does. He goes
down and comes back with this record right here. Note
tooth number nine, which is a filling in the shovel-shaped
incisor.
Now, very, very seldom do you ever identify the
individual in the field. Normally, it takes weeks, months-
not like CSI where it's done in an hour. I have, in my
lab-it's about two blocks that way-I have about twelve
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to fifteen individuals that I can tell you the sex, the age, the
stature, the handedness, and all the inertia, but I can't give
them names. Sometimes-I hate to say never-but
sometimes it's years before we can make a positive
[identification] in the cases. You're looking at an
extremely rare case here.
This is about 11:00 o'clock at night by the time
Mike Dover has flown over and brought the records back.
These are some of the detectives and some district
attorneys. And this is a picture of Kathy Nishiyama-nice
looking young lady. My job is not only to identify
individuals, but it is to figure out what happened to them.
Why is Kathy Nishiyama in this rural farm in a county she
never went to?
We begin to look. This is the skull. The eye orbit
is right down here, and this is a depressed fracture. What
you're looking for is, was she shot? Was she stabbed?
Was she bludgeoned? What is the manner of death leading
up to this skull or this cranial vault that we have?
Now, going on, this is the right maxilla. That's the
little thing you were feeling just a little while ago. This is
the canine tooth, and that's the root of the canine. This was
made famous by the saber tooth tiger by the way. If you
have a dog, you want to go home and do a little homework:
get your dog, lift his lip up, look in there, and you'll see
that the canine tooth extends down below the occlusal
plane. It's the biting plane of the teeth. Or if you have a
cat, cats are the same way. They don't like this, but this is
all in the name of science, you see.
Note this is the lateral incisor. The central incisor is
missing. Let's turn that just a little: there's your canine
again. This is the lateral incisor. Note the little chip here
in the lateral incisor. Note the root here still in the bone.
This would be the right maxilla. This is the upper jaw.
This area in the bone-this is a little bit more academic, but
you all are sharp or you wouldn't be here today. This is the
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alveolar portion of the maxilla. The alveolar portion of the
maxilla and the mandible, which is now shown here,
contains the root of the teeth. Note the tip of the tooth right
there.
This situation that you see here can occur in two
cases. It can occur if you're in your car, you're driving too
fast, have a wreck, your face goes forward, your teeth hit
the steering wheel, and it breaks your teeth out, driving
them into the mouth, breaking the root off. Or it can
happen if you're in a fight where somebody kicks you in
the mouth or hits you in the mouth.
Now we're beginning to get a feel for what's going
on here. This is the back of the skull. This would be the
left parietal. This is the right parietal. And I think all of
you know that the bones of the skull come together along
jagged lines like this, called suture lines.
These jagged lines like that, they're all normal.
This is the occipital bone here. Remember, she was
missing about six weeks when we found this. Note the dry,
ligamentous soft tissue. These would be the ligaments that
were hooked onto the back of the skull. But note the little
black arrow that's pointed to a straight line going here,
going there, and going down here. That straight line runs
down through here to the right temporal bone. This would
be the ear.
Kathy Nishiyama was lying on her left side here on
the ground. The man that killed her, a man named Eddie
Hartman, who died, by the way, two years ago in the state
penitentiary in Nashville. Eddie Hartman literally stomped
on the side of her skull and broke the temporal bone out.
That's probably the blow that killed her. All these others-
the blow to the forehead, the kicking out of the teeth, and
everything like this-would not have killed her. But this is
a massive blow here.
Now, you want to write a report so that the law
enforcement agents, who are going to deal with this,
62
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1
http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol6/iss2/1
6:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 199
understand what you're saying. You want it clear enough
that they can find out what's going on. I didn't mention
that this was a notable fracture, but note that she had lost
three teeth and not just the one that we had been looking at.
Whenever you do something like this, you want to make
what's called an element inventory. You want to record
everything that is found. Note in this case that the shaded
parts are those that are present. That's what we were
looking at a little bit before. This is the maxilla that you
saw.
Look at the long bones. This is the humerus. These
are the bones of the upper arm. The shaft of the right
humerus, the proximal end, is gone. That's the end closest
to the skull. The distal end is gone. That's the farthest
from the skull. But you have the shaft of the bone. Every
bone that you see-this is the left femur, proximal end
missing, distal end missing. This-if you didn't know
anything else about this at all-your first clue there is that,
hey, this individual was attacked by dogs in the process of
the decaying period. What you get here is the evidence that
you need where the dogs have chewed the ends of the
bones off.
Note that we never found the right femur. Suppose
I go home this afternoon and the phone rings and it's the
Houston County Sheriff's Office saying, "Hey, we found
another bone out here. Is this another bone of Kathy
Nishiyama, or is this an area where you have a serial killer,
who is throwing bodies?" This is why you want to keep
these records.
By the way, records like this do come up. I testified
about three months ago in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, in a
case that I first went to in 1982-a man who was killed
along the edges of the lake in that area. We had cold case
files, and eventually the guy was convicted. I went over to
testify, and he was found guilty.
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Kathy Nishiyama had lots and lots of dental records
and dental things that we were able to match. We were
able to make a positive identification. Now, also to show
what had happened to her-I testified three times in this
case. I testified first in the criminal court case, in which
they found Eddie Hartman guilty, and they gave him the
death penalty. Now, you all know-you know this a lot
better than I do-that on all death penalties there is appeal
after appeal.
The second one I testified in was a civil court case
in which Kathy Nishiyama's mother and father sued. I've
got to bring in something else here now that I have not
brought in before-sued the Sheriff of Dickson County.
Why Dickson County? At this time, the Sheriff of Dickson
County had a nephew who wore boots, and he wore leather
jackets, and he would get drunk, and he would get in fights
and he'd stomp on people and so forth. He was in jail for
being drunk and disorderly.
There was a deputy in Williamson County, in
Dickson County, who had a farm and he needed some help.
So he goes to the sheriff and asks the sheriff, "Can I have a
trustee to go out and work on my farm tomorrow?" The
trustee said, "Well, why don't you take my nephew?" And
this is Eddie Hartman. The deputy takes Eddie Hartman
out, and they work all day. When they get done at the end
of the day, the sheriff is tired. He says, "Here, take the
keys of the patrol car and go back to jail."
In Monopoly, you go directly to jail, but in real life,
you don't have to do this. We now know from the ensuing
investigation that Eddie Hartman, on his way back to jail in
Dickson County, did not go directly to jail. He went
through Clarksville on the way. We know that he stopped
three other people who, when this broke in the newspaper,
called and said, "Hey, that guy stopped me that night."
And he stopped Kathy Nishiyama. He likes what he sees.
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He is driving a patrol car with blue lights, but he
does not have a uniform and he does not have a badge. But
Kathy Nishiyama, a sixteen-year-old high school girl, is
trusting of society. Society is going to protect me. In this
case, it did not. He puts her in the back of the patrol car.
And the next time we find Kathy, she is in this farm out in
Houston County.
How do I know this? Because it takes us six weeks
from the time Kathy disappears until we find the skeletal
material. It takes another six weeks for the police to figure
out what happened. Then they begin investigating the
situation in Dickson County. We find, when they impound
that patrol car and take the back seat out of it, there's a
necklace under the back seat that Kathy Nishiyama's
mother identifies as a necklace that Kathy had on the night
she disappeared. So you can see how these things go.
The third case I testified in was on one of the
appeals where Eddie Hartman appealed his death sentence.
To make a long story short, as I told you before, Eddie
Hartman died in the state penitentiary in Nashville about
two years, weighing over 400 pounds. He got in prison and
literally ate himself to death. I mean, that's the story. But
knowing the shovel-shaped incisor, knowing that is a
genetic tract of mongoloid individuals-Japanese, Chinese,
Southeast Asians-then you can begin to put this together.
The Dean said we're talking about the Body Farm.
I thought maybe I would show you just a little bit from the
Body Farm-something again that will help those of you
who have investigators in your office. You need to know
about this because this is an area in which an awful lot of
good, positive data for making identifications is missed
because people don't know what happens.
In the decaying process, one of the things that
happens-and it doesn't happen every time, but it'll happen
in certainly half of the cases and maybe a little bit more-is
we have what's called skin slippage. The epidermal layer:
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this is the outside layer of the skin on the finger. This is
what the print is on, the epidural layer, which will separate
from the underlying dermis somewhere between the third
and seventh day.
Now you have the dead body lying right there,
decaying away. Finally, somebody smells it and says,
"Something is dead out here." Then people start looking,
and they find this dead body. Then they call the police.
And the police-I don't know-whoever goes and picks up
your dead bodies for you, they go out. They don't know
that this occurs, but what's happened in that process is that
the epidermal layer of the hand has sloughed off. This is
called de-gloving, by the way, in the forensic area. Your
best means of identifying that individual is not on the body.
It has sloughed off and is lying at the decay scene. I won't
say the death scene because they could have been killed
somewhere else, but where they were thrown out and
decayed. The best means of telling that individual is what
you're going to see now.
I'm going to take you through this process. This,
again, occurs between the third and the seventh day of
decay, depending on the temperature. It would be quicker
in the summer than it would in the fall. It looks like your
hand does when you get in the hot tub too long. Note that
the epidermal layer right here is separating from the
underlying dermis. Although you just had breakfast and
you had all those goodies out there and so forth to eat, I
want to bring in a few more things. I want to ask you now,
so I'm going to see how good of an observer you are.
You see that little white thing right there. There's
one right there, and there's one right here, and a couple
right along in there. What are those little white things?
AUDIENCE: Maggots
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DR. BASS: Maggots. That's right-maggots. Now note
that the maggots are down underneath the epidermal layer,
in between the epidermal layer, which is here, and the
underlying dermis. Why are they down under there?
Because maggots are eaten by birds. If you're a maggot,
you don't want to be eaten by a bird. Your mother didn't
hatch you as a maggot and tell you, "Watch those birds
now. You know, you don't want to get eaten by a bird."
This is a protective mechanism for the maggot. This is a
defense mechanism, and he's down under the skin trying to
protect himself. And the skin is going away, sloughing off
now.
This was taken at night. By the way, maggots don't
like sunlight. For those of you who are in law enforcement
or those of who you are lawyers who like to get out to the
scene and you get out there in the daylight, you won't see
many maggots because maggots don't like sunlight. They
are down inside the body where it's dark. But you go out at
night, and you will see the maggots all over the head like
this. Here's our-this is our glove coming off-a little
piece here. Going a little bit further, here's our hand, and
that's the thing we've been watching. The hand you don't
see. But again, there's the hand and here's our glove, de-
gloving right over here.
How did this get from here over to there? I don't
know. That happened one night when I wasn't there. I
think the maggots decided, "Let's confuse Dr. Bass." So
they run across and they take that [the de-gloved epidermal
layer] over there and they put it there.
Now when the people come along to pick up the
body, they don't know this has happened. They take it in,
and it's very difficult to get fingerprints off this. The FBI
can do that, but it's expensive and it takes a while. But if
you know what happens in this situation, what you need to
do is have your criminal investigator go out to the scene
and take a little folding chair if he wants to. He can sit.
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It's not the most appetizing place to go. But I mean, you
know, this is science. And look for something like this.
Pick it up and see--does it feel like a leaf or ... dry skin
doesn't feel like a leaf. It feels a little different from that. I
didn't bring any dry pieces to pass around this morning, but
you just trust me. If you want me to, I will give you some
that you can play with sometime.
Anyway, bring this back. Put it in warm water
overnight. The next morning when you come in-don't you
do this, but get your investigator to do this. And have him
put on his rubber glove and you can slip this guy's finger
over your finger and you can identify him that way. I've
done about six or eight of these in my career, so, it's
something that works. And I think it would work more
often if the people involved in crime scene investigations
knew what was happening.
Now I want to take you to another case. This is a
case in Williamson County. Anybody here from
Williamson County, by the way? Oh, okay. Franklin is the
county seat of Williamson County. I had a case in
Williamson County many years ago of a confederate
colonel who was killed and who had dug up Colonel Shy.
Looking at the bones, I said, "Colonel Shy was a twenty-
four to twenty-eight-year-old white male," and I said, "who
had been dead a year." Colonel Shy was a twenty-six-year-
old white male. So far, I'm 100 percent. But Colonel Shy
was dead 113 years. I only missed it by 112 years. Every
lawyer in Tennessee knows this. They always ask me if
I've ever made a mistake. And yes, it's a good one. But I
thought, "Hmmm, that's why we have a body farm is
because we just didn't know enough about what happens to
decaying bodies." So I began to do research.
Now this is a case of a woman who had a brain
tumor. She was going to Vanderbilt, being treated for a
brain tumor. She wore overcoats in the summer, and she
talked to things in the trees and so forth. The neighbors
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hadn't seen her for about two weeks. They call up the
Williamson County Sheriffs Office, and they go out and
they find that the house is an absolute clutter. She has three
big dogs, two German shepherds and a collie. And they
have punched holes in the screen and are coming and
going. There are bone fragments on the floor, so they send
the things over to me to see if I can identify her.
I did not go at first to this case. Something else
came up, which I will show you in just a minute. We went
up and did another inspection. That would be a good term
to say. When we come back and close this gate, this will
be the end of the case. Then I hate to tell you this. You all
thought when you graduated from college, your exams are
all over and you're not going to have to worry about this.
But remember that I was-I really still am--of UT faculty
and retired. It's hard to believe I've been retired for
fourteen years, but time flies when you're trying to make a
living with no money.
Anyway, I'm going to give you a final exam
question for the lawyers. I can see people feeling all hot
palms already, but I've got an exam this morning. It's a
nice house. This, by the way, on about twelve acres and it
has fountains and a swimming pool in the back. One of the
Williamson County Detectives [in slide]. She [the victim]
has on this shirt. Now, if you are a crime scene
investigator, you're trained and you want to look at all this
good stuff and look if the zipper is up. If the zipper were
down, it would lead you to believe that maybe she was
molested. Not any indication here. But what I want to call
your attention to is this dark stain right here. That's not
blood. That is the volatile fatty acid stain. When a body
decays, the soft tissue liquefies, and it leaches out on the
ground and will kill the vegetation right around a dead
body. You go and you will see all the grass and things like
that are dead. It will stain your clothing and so forth.
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This is the normal decaying process, but the police
didn't know this when I got there. When I looked at that, I
said, "Hey, when this woman died, she fell face forward on
the floor." Well, you can't say that. Nobody saw that.
Nobody saw this death scene. We are now about two
weeks after the death. But I can tell you how she fell. Note
that the volatile fatty acid stain is on the front of the
garment and not on the back. So she falls forward; she is
decaying away. The fluids run down and stain the front of
the garment. They thought I was crazy-if you teach in an
academic institution, you really don't know anything about
crime scene investigation. But I'm going to prove my point
here in just a little bit more.
Now, she was fifty-four years old, and she loved
safety pins. As a matter of fact, if you are fifty-four-
whether you are held together with safety pins or not-
Velcro has come in since this time, so we're all held
together by Velcro now. But remember, she was crazy, so
she must have had a fetish for safety pins or something.
Now, the sum total of what we have: a cranial
vault. Have you ever seen one of those before? Yeah.
Doesn't that make you feel warm and fuzzy? You know, I
have been here for thirty minutes, and I can see what's
going on. Sometimes you take your whole course. All
semester you study; you still don't know what's going on.
And here you've been in here thirty minutes, and already
you can see what's going on.
Now, the shafts of the bone-what's that tell you?
Run over by a truck? No, eaten by dogs or eaten by
animals. It could be coyotes, but in this case, it's dogs.
Add a tooth. We'll go ahead and look at this a little bit
more-a painted toenail. How do I know that's a toenail?
Because I'm a forensic anthropologist. I know these
things. Bear with me. I'm going to show you. I mean, I'm
going to give you evidence to show you that this is a
toenail.
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She has on an apron. What's that stain on the
apron? Volatile fatty acid stain. Do women wear their
aprons on the front or the back? The front. You see how
you can reconstruct a death scene, even though nobody was
there? But you've got to know the process that occurs
when a body decays in order to be able to figure these
things out.
Going on down, she had on pants and so forth-
dyed hair, rubber band around the hair. We've seen
another view of that. We know she was eaten by dogs
because you've got a cranial vault again, and these are the
tooth marks right here. Tooth marks on the edge. Since
this case, by the way, we've been able to tell you-we
can't tell you the species of dog-but we can tell you how
big the animals were. In this case, the dogs were contained
in a house where they could come and go. But if you're
outside and just visited by any kind of critter that comes
along, what we have done-and this is done in gray here-
we have measured the tooth marks on the skull. Obviously
big dogs have a bigger mouth, and smaller dogs have a
smaller mouth. The teeth are going to be different. We can
tell you what size animal frequented that individual.
Remember two weeks became material down here
in the bottom. Let's see-there's another maggot right
there. We'll show you a couple of other things here as
we're going along. This is the forehead here. That's the
frontal sinus. The skull has three layers: a hard outer layer,
a middle layer known as diploe, and a hard inner layer. So
you can think of the skull as a sandwich. In some areas of
the middle layer of the diploe, you have air spaces. These
are called sinuses, and that's a frontal sinus. This is the
dura mater, the rubbery sack that goes around a skull. This
is the mastoid process. We felt-by the way, remember-
we felt our teeth. If you want to, you can feel right back
through here and you'll feel a lump that goes out. It will be
bigger in males than it is in females. It's going to be
71
et al.: Vol 6 No 2
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2014
6:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 208
difficult to-ask her, when you get done, if you can feel her
mastoid process. This is a good way of getting to know a
lot more people in the audience. By the end of the day,
you'll go, "Great, great," and so forth.
Now, the reason the mastoid process is gone here is
because it sticks out. And if it sticks out, the dogs can bite
it off. The dogs get their teeth on this and bite off the bone
that sticks out. This would be one here, and this is the
other over there. There's your right ear hole, mastoid
process chewed off. Remember, two weeks dry soft tissue
here, tooth marks, and so forth. We won't get there. A fly
comes along. I doubt any of you knew Steve Symes, who
was one of my doctoral students. Steve worked for the
medical examiner's office over in Memphis for about
twenty years and then teaches up at Mercer College now.
Steve took the best crime scene photographs of any student
I ever had. This fly comes along. This is a female blowfly,
and she smells this decay down in here and she wonders if
this is a good place to lay her eggs. Instead of shooing her
away, he took a picture of her. That's not a stick-on fly for
the lawyers to see. Now, again, the shaft [of the bone in the
slide].
Now, we made a positive identification of her. Not
too difficult because remember, she was a patient at
Vanderbilt and had a brain tumor and lots and lots of CAT
scans of the skull. And so what we did was a skull here.
We can take more CAT scans, more x-rays, and you can
compare the after-death CAT scans and x-rays with the
before death. And we made a positive identification.
Write a report and send it in. About two weeks go
by; the phone rings one day, and there's this woman on the
other end of the phone from a bank in Nashville. She says,
"I hear you've identified Ms. " and so forth. I said,
"Yes." And she said, "Did you find a $7,000 diamond
ring?" I said, "Well, no. How do you know she had a
$7,000 diamond ring?" She said, "Well, she had a diamond
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ring valued at $7,000 by her bank. If our bank can't find it,
we have to pay the estate $7,000." You all kind-of know
my personality already. I kind-of laughed, and I said,
"Well, you know, she was eaten by her dogs." And there's
deathly silence at the other end of the phone, like, how did I
get mixed up in this thing? We talked a little bit, and I said,
"I tell you what I'll do. I'll call the Williamson County
Sheriffs Office, and I will have them send some deputies
out to pick up all the dog feces that they can find." Three
days go by. The phone rings, and the Williamson County
Sheriffs Office has thirteen pounds of dog feces. They
have six pounds in one plastic bag and seven pounds in
another. Can you bring it over? Yes, they can bring it
over.
Now, this is a big deal in the Anthropology
Department. It just isn't every day we get thirteen pounds
of dog feces coming into the Anthropology Department,
you see. We're all excited, and Deputy Barney arrives, you
know. Deputy Barney is bent out of shape. I mean you can
look at him and tell that he is bent out of shape. You know
he's been out there for three days picking up dog turds, and
that's not in his job description.
I thought, "I've got to make this deputy feel better."
I turned around to the class, and I said, "You know, Deputy
somebody brought in thirteen pounds of dog feces. Now,
tonight what we've got to do, we have to soak these. And
tomorrow when you come in, we have to squeeze each one
of those to see if there's a ring in there." You should have
seen Deputy Barney's face light up. I mean there's
somebody else in the world worse off than Deputy Barney,
and they are graduate students in anthropology.
Now, when you all go home, when you go back to
Williamson County and your boss asks you, "What did you
see up there in the law school at UT?" you can say, "For
the first time in my career, I saw a color slide of dog turds."
How many of you have ever stopped to take a look at a dog
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feces? Oh, well, good. We've got one person. We will
give you an A. You can tell a lot from looking at this, as I
will show you.
Note right here you can see-see right down here
[on slide]. You see those little parallel lines there, and
there are some here. Let's get another few. Let's do this
one right here. You can see the little parallel lines right
through there and right through here. Now, those parallel
lines-this woman had on pantyhose when she died, and
the dogs didn't take the pantyhose off when they ate her
toes-ate her legs. This is the impression of the pantyhose
into the dog feces. Note this one right here. That is a
painted toenail. The reason I know is because it's hooked
to a toe bone. Isn't that logic? I mean, those damned
anthropologists. They can figure these things out, you
know.
That's how I knew when I showed you that that was
a painted toenail. I can show you where it came from. The
second thing that you probably have never seen before,
instead of putting the material in water and squeezing the
dog feces, I should have asked you, "What's a good thing
to do?" You all would have said, "Oh, x-ray," and I would
have said, "Right." So, probably the first time you've ever
seen an x-ray of thirteen pounds of dog feces [on slide].
Let's start with a paper clip. This is a bobby pin, a
hair curler-all kinds of nuts, screws, bolts-look down
here in the lower left-hand comer. I didn't know what this
was when I first saw this, but this is a screw. There's some
threading right there, right at the edge. Now, to make a
long story short, we did not find the diamond ring in the
thirteen pounds of dog feces. Where is it? I don't know.
Well, we thought, let's just go out there and take a
look. Not that we could find it any better than can the
deputies. This is when I went back and took the picture
opening the gate, going up to this house. We're going to
close the gate in just a minute, and remember we have an
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exam question coming up. Let's see if you've learned
anything this morning.
I found out what this was-where this came from.
This woman, when she was living, had fallen down and
broken her ulnar. This is the bone at your elbow here. The
break was fairly bad. She went to the hospital and had an
orthopedic surgeon put in a plate. He was afraid that the
end of the bone would break off, so he drove a hole through
the end of the bone and put the screw in to hold the end of
the ulnar into the plate that he put in the arm. To show you
how powerful a dog bite is, the dog not only bit through the
bone, but bit through the screw there. One more view of
this. You can see that there's a tooth there.
We never did find the $7,000 diamond ring. For
years, I lectured to a third-year vet school class over at the
Veterinary College. And they asked me if I x-rayed the
dogs. I said, "Well, no. They put the dogs up for adoption
in the dog pound in Williamson County." But there wasn't
anybody-this was front page news in Williamson County
and in Franklin for a while-there wasn't anybody in
Williamson County that wanted to adopt those dogs
because every time they looked at you and wagged their
tails, you would think they were sizing you up for a meal.
This was a case literally of, you know, she dies and
the dogs get hungry. The dogs simply ate her in the
process of going on. Now, there will be some of you in
here that have cats and say, "Why, I don't have a dog
because I love cats." Cats love lips though. I mean when
you decay, the bacteria on the inside of the body builds up,
and your lips begin to bubble, and cats just love that.
We're going to close the gate now and close this.
I'm going to give you a quiz question. I want to show you
this. Now, this is a death scene. I want you to tell me the
sequence of events that occurred at this death scene. What
you have is a nice East Tennessee possum-high legal
authorities, and lawyers, and so forth. That's his tail down
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here like this. Now, he's crossing an East Tennessee road.
He's going too slowly, and he's hit. He's certainly called
now "road kill." He's two inches thick and about three feet
long, and along comes a Tennessee Highway Department
and stripes him on the rear.
See, you have learned something. I have one
question I want to ask you. Very seldom do you get this,
but I'm going to see if you are interested in this. I have
another set of slides. I'm supposed to go until ten minutes
after 10:00, so you've got about another fifteen minutes.
Do you want to see these? All right.
I want to ask you one question. How many of you
know who the Big Bopper was? Oh, good. Great. I'm
impressed. This is an age thing, which I will tell you, I'm a
little bit older than some of you people. I was up at Webb
School about three or four months ago, and I asked them,
"How many of you know who the Big Bopper was?"
There were two biology classes of twenty-five students in a
class, and one person raised his hand. So, it is an age-
related thing.
The Big Bopper, for those of you who didn't raise
your hand, is the man who wrote Chantilly Lace. Most of
you will know Chantilly Lace, and maybe some of you will
know that the Big Bopper died on February the 3rd of 1959
in an airplane crash just outside of Clear Lake, Iowa with
Buddy Holly, Ritchie Valens, and the pilot. The four
people were in a Beechcraft Bonanza that crashed in the
middle of the night. They took off in a blinding
snowstorm-should not have been flying. The pilot got
confused and did what the Kennedy boy did off Nantucket.
He literally flew the airplane into the ground, and the Big
Bopper died.
The Big Bopper was not autopsied. He was
embalmed and brought back to Beaumont, Texas. The Big
Bopper was a disk jockey in Beaumont, Texas. Beaumont
is a town between Houston and the Louisiana border, so it's
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right down about twenty miles in from the gulf. And the
Big Bopper was buried.
He was buried in the horizontal marker section of
the cemetery. This is where you had the flat gravestones so
that they could mow the grass, but about three years ago,
the Texas Historical Commission commissioned a life-
sized statue of the Big Bopper to be placed on his grave,
and the family had it delivered. If they accepted the
monument, they were going to have to move the Big
Bopper from the horizontal section of the cemetery to the
monument section. His son called me.
When the Big Bopper died, Mrs. Bopper was seven
months pregnant. Two months after her husband was
killed, she had a son, Big Bopper-this is the Third. Big
Bopper was a junior, and he called me and asked me two
questions. He wanted to know two things. When they find
the plane-the plane crashes, skids across an Iowa field and
stops at a fencerow. The only person to exit the plane is the
Big Bopper. He was sitting in the left rear seat of the
aircraft, and he is thrown out of the plane. He is thrown
across and over on the other side of the fence.
The family had often wondered whether their loved
one had survived the crash and if he was going for help.
The son was calling me to see whether if I did an autopsy
for them, I could determine this. I said, "Yes, I think I can
determine that." Now, something else had occurred in the
history of this case, and this was about two months after the
crash. An Iowa farmer is out picking up airplane parts out
of his field so he can plant his crop, and he finds a pistol.
It's a .22 caliber pistol. It was owned by Buddy Holly, and
it had been fired a couple of times.
I don't know how rumors get started, but in the
Richardson family, you know, Aunt Suzy has watched CSI
and she's a crime scene investigator. She likes to tell these
stories, and she said, "You know what, I'll bet you that our
loved one was shot." Everybody is gathered around Aunt
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Suzy and Uncle Frank sitting over there. Nobody is talking
to him, so Uncle Frank has to get in. He comes over and
he's supporting Aunt Suzy. So over the years, the rumor in
the Richardson family was that their loved one had been
shot.
The Big Bopper asked me two questions: "Did my
father survive the crash, and was he going for help?" And
number two, "Was he shot?" I said, "I think I can cover
both of those." Now, in the next sixteen minutes, do you
want to see the autopsy pictures? I will tell you that this is
an x-ray autopsy. He was in remarkably good condition. I
went down to look at little bones and fragments, and as you
will see here, I get down there, and we open his casket. I'm
not going to show you a likeness because the family asked
me not to if you see this. Don't hold up your hand yes
because you want to see what the Big Bopper looked like
forty-nine years later. They wanted to know, "Was our
loved one shot?"
Now, do you all want to see the x-rays of this? All
right. I'm not going to tell you the answers to either one of
these. I'm going to let you look at this, and I'm going to let
you do a forensic anthropology examination this morning.
Two questions that I want you to decide when we get done:
Was the Big Bopper shot, and two, did the Big Bopper
survive the crash and was he going for help?
You want to see these then? It just isn't every day
you get a speaker that comes and offers what you want to
look at, you know. I mean they show you on the stand
most stuff you don't care anything about anyway. The Big
Bopper is buried in the Forest Lawn Cemetery in
Beaumont, Texas. If you want to stay as much like you are
right now as far into the future as you can, you do not want
to be buried in a wet environment. A wet environment is
not conducive to preservation.
I looked up the water level in Beaumont, and it's
twenty inches. That will be good. I mean, he's been buried
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in water and so forth. Now, lots of media coverage of this.
This is the horizontal marker section. There is his-
Charles Perry Richardson, Jr., The Big Bopper. Note he
was only twenty-nine years old. By the way, if you go
back and look at his history, he wrote four or five other
songs that were in the country western top ten in his career,
so he wrote some songs that people listened to.
Lots of media coverage-ABC, NBC, FOX, all that
group. The family didn't want them to take pictures of this,
so the funeral director gave them some tents. What do you
do when you don't want people to see what's going on?
You all who are in law enforcement and the legal field are
wonderful about this. You know, you have a wreck out
there and people are lying on the edge of the Interstate.
You cover them with a tarp, you know, so nobody can see
them.
The Big Bopper's coffin is inside of a metal vault.
Note the water down there. We've got water dripping
out-and I thought, "This is not going to be good." It was
so bad that they had to put in a sump pump to pump the
water out so I could get down and run this chain underneath
the vault so that we could lift it up.
Now, we get it [the coffin] up. We've got the water
down, and we're lifting it up. We need to take it from here
over to a work area in the back of the cemetery. To get
there, we've got to go by all the news media-ABC, CBS,
NBC, all these. And so we're going to put this on a little
tractor-a trailer on the back of a tractor. You don't want
people to be able to see this, so what do you do? You
cover it with a blue tarp. I'm going to write a book one of
these days, "Death is Under the Blue Tarp."
We get back there, and we're cleaning this off now.
We're going to clean this all off. I'm not going to have
time to talk about the difference between concrete vaults
and metal vaults, but if you have questions, I'll see if I
can't answer them for you. This is the casket; it's a
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Batesville casket. I'm not selling Batesville caskets, but it
was in such a good shape, they could have used it over,
although Batesville gave them a new casket. This casket is
now in a music museum somewhere south of Dallas,
between Dallas and San Marcos, I think. I don't know my
Texas landmarks that well, but anyway, we're going to get
that out.
This is one-you have the fat bottom of the vault
here. The casket sits on that. The principle of this is that if
water gets in down here and it rises, this acts as a fail. As
the water rises, the air in the top compresses and pushes the
water back down. Remember your physics. I'm sure all of
you remember that. Anyway, now this is a forty-eight-
year-old casket. It has a little handle here that you use an
Allen wrench on to open the top. The funeral director
didn't have a wrench that would fit a forty-eight-year-old
casket, and so, what do you do? You're about ready to get
there, and all of a sudden you're astounded by this problem.
Well, vice-grip pliers, they'll open anything.
We're going to start on the skull and then x-ray our
way down. This is a skull. Note the fractures to the top of
the skull-three fractures here. Note the right temporal
bone is fractured, and there are multiple fractures of the
face, which you can't see here.
I want to show you something else so you'll
understand what's going on. You see this zipper handle
right there. Can you see that? Okay. Am I in your way?
I'll sit on the floor here if you want me to. You see that
little dark area there and dark area here. In the funeral
industry, when you have people like this that are so badly
damaged that you put embalming fluids in the body, they
will leak. And they [industry personnel] want to keep their
embalming fluids in, so they have a rubber garment called a
uniroyal. They put the uniroyal on the body, and they zip it
up. But remember, this is the Big Bopper. The Big Bopper
weighed about 270 pounds. This was not big enough to fit
80
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 1
http://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol6/iss2/1
6:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 217
the Big Bopper. It's the only one they had, and they
couldn't get it zipped all the way up, so it's gapped at the
top.
Now, going on down, this is the thoracic area. This
is a typical deceleration fracture. This is where you're
going forward at a rapid rate of speed and what you're in
stops, but you keep going. And you start pushing in on
your ribs here in the front. Where do they break? They
break in the back, here along where the ribs attach to the
spinal column.
Let's start up here. There are your handles of the
garment. Note the fracture of the clavicle. Now, note a
fracture here, all the way down. A little displacement
there-fracture, fracture, fracture all the way down. Let's
look at the other side. This would be the right, and this
would be the left-fracture, fracture, fractures all the way
down-displacement, displacement. We have twelve pairs
of ribs, or twenty-four ribs, and every one of the twenty-
four ribs is fractured.
Now, let's look at the spinal column. Going down
the spinal column, your vertebra in the neck are known as
the cervical vertebra. Those to which the ribs attach are
called thoraces, and the five at the bottom are lumbar. This
is the ninth thoracic vertebra, and that's the tenth. Note the
displacement-it's fractured through the spinal column
right there.
Going on down to the leg, this would be the right
femur. This would be the knee. This is the tibia. Note the
compound fracture of the tibia and the fibula. By the way,
this is a sheering fracture that is often seen in people that
jump off of buildings, or if you jump off a bridge, miss the
water, and hit the ground. You literally sheer the end of
your femur off, and that's what that is right there.
Then this is looking at the left-hand side. This is
your femur, and that's your patella. That's the knee cap.
The tibia and fibula fracture there. Now, this one-you
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normally don't see this view of the foot. We now have a
pretty good idea of what happened to the Big Bopper. But
when you have your legs broken like that, when you are
buried, your feet don't stick up. Your feet fall over on the
side. We have a pretty good idea of what's happened to the
Big Bopper, so instead of holding this and getting more x-
rays-because we have to hold these things to get the
mobile x-ray unit in there to get these pictures-[we can
see] that's got a lump right there. That lump is the
osteological evidence of a fracture through all five
metatarsals of the foot. Every one of the foot bones is
fractured across there.
Now, going on, this is where the Big Bopper is
buried now. This is the plaque that the State has put up.
They have not put up the monument yet, but there is that.
Now, one of two questions. Did the Big Bopper survive
the crash and was he going for help?
AUDIENCE: No.
DR. BASS: Okay, great. Now, was the Big Bopper shot?
AUDIENCE: No.
DR. BASS: No. I should have talked to you a little bit
about being shot, but those of you with law enforcement
and those of you in the legal field have probably dealt with
gunshots. There's no indication of that [a gunshot wound]
at all. No, he did not survive the crash. He was thrown out
because of the momentum. When the plane crashes, he just
keeps on going and goes through either the windshield of
the plane or the cockpit of the plane. You see what you can
do. If you go back and look, you can find things that
somebody didn't think anybody needed to know before we
got there.
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Now, it's about eight minutes after 10:00, And at
10:10 1 self-destruct, so we can take one question.
UNIDENTIFIED AUDIENCE MEMBER: What's the
hardest thing you've been asked to do in forensic
anthropology?
DR. BASS: What's the hardest thing people have asked
me to do? Said a little bit differently, the hardest cases are
those that you can't identify. They mainly occur with
young females. We're in a period of culture now where
children get on drugs. You get the young girl who gets on
drugs-she's just, say, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, in
that area. She runs away from home. She does not write
home. She needs to eat, so she gets into prostitution.
When you and I got our jobs, we had resumes. We had all
the good things that you've done and so forth. But if
you're a prostitute, if you go to Memphis and you're the
new girl in town, your business goes up. Everybody wants
to have sex with Suzy.
As time goes by, people don't frequent Suzy as
much, so Suzy's income begins to decrease. So she leaves
Memphis and goes to Nashville. When she leaves
Memphis, she doesn't go to Frank and Tom and say, "Hey,
will you write me a letter of recommendation? Best sex
I've ever had, you see." She goes to Nashville, and there's
no paper trail. The same thing happens in Nashville, and
then she moves to Knoxville. So she is here in town, with
no paper trail to follow her at all. She is killed, and the
Knoxville newspaper will write about it, but wherever she
came from, they don't know she's dead. She's not writing
home to her family, and so she's lost.
The next thing you go to is what the FBI has: a
forensic data bank known as the National Crime
Information Center, the NCIC. If you have a loved one that
is missing, you give information on that individual, and you
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send it in-but in this case now, the family doesn't know
that this woman is missing-so there's nothing in the
system. Now, I'm on the other end. I have this skeleton. I
know who it is, and I send my data in, but it doesn't match
because there's nobody that's put the information in on the
other side. It's not that the system is wrong or anything
like that. It's just that it's incomplete the way the culture is
set up right now. I promise not to answer all of them so
long.
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF SALLY GOADE: Dr. Bass will also
be with us after the panel presentations when both the panel
members and Dr. Bass will be able to answer your
questions. I think he can sign a few books, but he may
need a break. His books are for sale in the front also.
Thank you, Dr. Bass.
DR. BASS: Thank you.
[Break]
MS. RICE: We're going to get started. Now is the time in
the program when we will begin our panel reactions to the
morning keynote. Starting that panel discussion will be Dr.
Terry Bunde. I would like to let the panelists once again
know that we are going to have an allotted time of twenty
minutes for you each.
PANELIST'S RESPONSE
Dr. Terry Bunde
DR. TERRY BUNDE: Thank you for inviting me. I do
appreciate the invitation, but I feel I must give you a
disclaimer. I think Bryan [Hathorn] told someone about
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my proclivity to long-winded speeches, so I'll keep an eye
on the sign.
I was asked to look at this, and I have heard Dr.
Bass many, many times. I knew probably what he was
going to say, but he still surprises me every time I hear him.
I want you to know that I am a biochemistry and organic
chemistry professor. Make sure that doesn't say something
dealing with stereochemistry, and you'll know you're in the
right place.
I have spent the last eleven years of my career at
Maryville College. I've been teaching for over thirty-five
years, but I've spent the last eleven years teaching a science
class to non-science majors in forensic science. I'm
probably not responsible for turning out lawyers or judges,
or turning out scientists, but I hope I'm turning out better
jurors for you in your courtrooms. That's my goal at least
for the next fifteen or so minutes.
This is a quotation probably many of you have seen
from Donald Shelton's article on the CSI effect, 2 one of
many that have come out since the popularity of those
programs really began. If you don't know the statistics,
70,000,000 people in the United States on any given week
watch at least one episode of CSI.3 These are people who
are going to wind up in your juries. What Shelton observed
is, as you can see, that people claim their science
knowledge came not from their background in high school
or college, but from the media. What they see on TV and
what they see in the newspapers and magazines. 4 And this
so-called-what I would call-pseudoscientific knowledge
2Donald Shelton, The 'CSJ Effect': Does it really exist?, 259 NAT'L
INST. JUST. J. 1, 6 (2008) ("Every week, the ever-evolving scientific
and informational age comes marching through the courtroom door in
the psyche of almost every juror who takes a seat in the box.").
3 Id. at 2.
4Id. at 1, 6.
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comes marching into the courtroom any time juries are
seated and a trial begins. That preconceived notion of what
science is, is out there in the general public.
What it really comes down to, and why I spend so
much of my career teaching non-science majors science, is
that we have a serious problem in this country for science
literacy. I told the organizers when they asked me to come
and participate that that is what I could talk knowledgeably
about. This is the definition that the National Academy of
Sciences came up with a little over fourteen years ago for
science literacy. I think it's really important to see that
you can sum this definition up in a few words. We want
people to be able to be consumers of scientific information.
The last sentence really speaks to the folks you're going to
see in a jury box. 6
Scientific literacy also implies the capacity to pose
and evaluate arguments based on evidence to apply
conclusions from such arguments appropriately. When we
begin to assess science literacy in the United States, or any
other country, we have to think about this background.
This is from the AMERICAN SCIENTIST over twenty years
Scientific literacy implies that a person can identify
scientific issues underlying national and local
decisions and express positions that are scientifically
and technically informed. A literate citizen should be
able to evaluate the quality of scientific information
on the basis of its source and the methods used to
generate it. Scientific literacy also implies the
capacity to pose and evaluate arguments based on
evidence and to apply conclusions from such
arguments appropriately.
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NATIONAL SCIENCE EDUCATION
STANDARDS (1996), available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook/
0309053269/gifmid/22.gif.
6 Id.
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ago. 7 It told about an accident on a San Diego freeway
where a fifty-pound bag of industrial pigment, iron oxide,
fell off a truck and spilled onto the Interstate.
A hazardous response team was brought out in their
hazmat suits, the full body armor. It took them eight hours
to clean up the spill. Hively wrote about this, suggesting
that anybody who has some knowledge of science, maybe
even rudimentary knowledge, knows that iron oxide is
rust.8 It's used in red barn paint. And that iron oxide posed
absolutely no threat whatsoever. So while people were
chilling their heels on this Interstate for eight hours waiting
for them to open the Interstate back up, no one posed that
question.
What Lienhard really said in this comment is that
no one stepped up to say that there was more rust coming
off the structural steel in the bridge a few miles up the road
than ever came out of this bag. But it was knowledge that
iron oxide is a chemical-all chemicals are "bad."
Therefore, we have to treat it as a hazardous spill.
I'm not going to ask for a show of hands. I won't
give a final exam question as Dr. Bass proposed, but these
are a few questions-there were many more-posed by a
basic science literacy quiz given to Canadians. I always
tell my students, "I use Canadian studies as an example
because we can feel good about those dumb Canadians." I
hope I didn't offend anybody, but I'm sure my counterpart
in Ottawa is doing the same thing with a study of
Americans in science literacy.
One of those questions is particularly vexing for me
as a chemist and a biochemist. It's not on the screen. The
7 John H. Lienhard, Engines of our Ingenuity, at
http://www.uh.edu/engines/epi341.htm (citing William Hively, How
Much Science Does the Public Understand? 76 AM. SCI. 439-44
(1988)).
8 id.
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question said, "Radioactive milk can be completely
rendered harmless by boiling." Eighty-six percent of the
people called in the poll-l,000 people randomly chosen,
without background and education necessarily, thought that
was a true statement. Over half of them responded to the
question that the Earth is at the center of the universe and
not the other way around. We had people burned at the
stake defending that one 500 years ago. This is the
knowledge that the general public has about science. The
last one is particularly interesting to my colleagues and my
former students who are medical doctors when we go
demanding an antibiotic for a viral infection. That
misunderstanding of a basic sort of biomedical principle is
rampant in the population.
This is a diagram I'm going to spend some time
with and then go through the remainder of it and talk pretty
quickly. This diagram gives me a chance to tell students
something that most of us can't get after we leave an
educational institution and move on in our careers. That is,
how is scientific information gathered? It is based on
observation, followed by a deductive process going to a
model. From that model, we propose by deduction some
hypothesis. Think of that as the "If, and" statement that
you had in your life. And that "If, and" statement allows us
to do meaningful experimentation. It depends on what
branch of science you are in, but that experiment could be
everything from physics, to chemistry, to biology, to
medical science. You name it, and we get another
observation.
At this point, either that observation verifies the
model that we're working with, and that model notices
upstairs in the world of ideas in our brain, not the world of
facts around us, or it could be that the observation now
suggests that we need a new model for the way in which we
hold all this information, these observations, together. It
was Thomas Kuhn, in his very famous book, THE
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STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION, who proposed
that this is the point where you have revolutionary science.
9
You have two competing models, two competing
camps, and that must be resolved for a science to proceed.
In many ways, creation science and evolution are good
examples of this. That crisis of contradiction, Kuhn called
it, leads to a paradigm shift. He wrote that word first and
now it's used for everything. The idea is that we've got to
move from the old model to the new one, so we can then do
meaningful experimentation.
Now, why is this relevant and why am I teaching
you science? Well, if you summarize that page in some
way, you summarize it by saying that scientific statements
are probabilistic and subject to change based on new
observations, new experimental results, and new
interpretations-I mean, new models. Scientific models
and conclusions are based strongly on experimentation,
statistical interpretation of results and the fit, if you will,
with a particularly accepted model in some discipline.
That's how scientific information is produced.
This verification step is really, really important. I
can't go out today and publish a paper on something I
dreamed up yesterday without some meaningful
verification from previously existing facts or new
information that I gather in my laboratory.
The term paradigm shift in Saks and Koehler's
famous article in SCIENCE MAGAZINE in 2005 suggested
that there is currently a paradigm shift in forensic science
with sort-of small Fs and small Ss.1° Because DNA
9 THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION (Univ.
of Chicago Press 1996) (1964).
10 "Converging legal and scientific forces are pushing the traditional
forensic identification sciences toward fundamental change. The
assumption of discernible uniqueness that resides at the core of these
fields is weakened by evidence of errors in proficiency testing and in
actual cases. Changes in the law pertaining to the admissibility of
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evidence and DNA technology have moved from
biomedical and sort-of molecular biological research
applications into the courtroom, allowing us to identify
someone and individualize completely a DNA source, then
this has caused the other forensic sciences to begin to be
reexamined in a new light.
You've got changes in the law that occurred about
the same time that you know much more about than I do in
terms of allowing someone to testify in the courtroom.
That scientifically based model of DNA evidence means
that those jurors, who watch CSI, the 70,000,000 of them a
week, are coming into the courtroom demanding DNA
evidence in a burglary case and demanding DNA evidence
in an auto crash case because they can understand that
because someone on the TV explained it to them.
What they explained to them, as I tell my students,
and I've taught about 300 of them in the last ten years, I tell
them that the instruments that you see on the CSI shows
came from companies that provide them free of charge so
that you can see the eye candy with Perkin Elmer,
Bechman instruments, and Agilent Technologies, and yet
they don't necessarily use them the correct way. They
don't get the answer in five minutes, but that eye candy
attracts attention. My wife refuses to watch any of those
shows with me because I make disparaging comments:
"Oh, yeah, right. That's the right way it's done."
The point is that other forensic sciences are now not
being called on the carpet. We're asking them to consider
the scientific basis for those various techniques. Why is
this a problem? Well, I think Robert Bohrer sums it up
expert evidence in court, together with the emergence of DNA typing
as a model for a scientifically defensible approach to questions of
shared identity, are driving the older forensic sciences toward a new
paradigm." Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming
Paradigm Shift in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCIENCE
MAGAZINE, Aug. 5, 2005, at 892.
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better than I could.' I could just leave this slide up and
leave, and I think the case is made. We have two different
disciplines that have two very different ways of looking at
the world. Science is very digital and focuses on
measurement. Law is analogical and depends on precedent.
Science is predictive, general, and replicable. Law is
retrospective and particular. Science is objective and
universal. The law is normative and contingent. That's the
nature of the two beasts, and we're trying to resolve this in
a courtroom with expert testimony.
The National Research Council ["NRC"] book 12-if
you haven't read it, I highly recommend that you do. It is
an enormous undertaking of scholarship over the period of
three years, looking at the state of forensic science; a
pathway to the future was the topic. [The Report] came out
last summer. The National Research Council gathered
together many experts from all the different disciplines they
could get to look at the forensic science that we use
currently in our courtrooms and we use in criminal
investigations. Some of those disciplines-because they
come from a research scientific background like nuclear
and mitochondrial DNA analysis and light toxicology and
drug analysis, both of which had a valid research base
before they were ever applied in courtrooms-those
disciplines, because they come from this experimental
background, have a very strong statistical population
database to draw from to make comparisons.
11 "Science is digital-it focuses on measurement; Law is analogical-
it depends on precedent. Science is predictive, general, and replicable;
Law is retrospective and particular. Science is objective and universal;
Law is normative and contingent." Robert A. Bohrer, Law Professor,
California Western School of Law, San Diego.
2 COMMITTEE ON INDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC
SCIENCES COMMUNITY, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH
FORWARD (2009).
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As some of my former students who have gone on
to work in the local TBI [Tennessee Bureau of
Investigation] lab, one of whom testified in all of the trials
so far in the [Shannon] Christian murder case, that when
she was sitting in my classroom, she learned how science
was done. She went off and got her Master's Degree in
DNA molecular biology and then got a job with the TBI
and has done a great job in hiring former graduates of
Maryville College. I have a toxicologist there and two
other DNA technicians there, all of whom are graduates of
the college.
They went into this field because they liked the
science, and notice they went into the toxicology and DNA
areas. But there are other forensic sciences, as Dr. Bass
alluded to, that depend on expert interpretation of patterns.
These are things like fingerprints, writing samples, tool
marks, fibers, hair, and fire debris. Just add to the list. It
requires an expert like Dr. Bass with his many years of
experience to be able to interpret that for you, as the
counsel, and for the jury so that everyone understands that
it's his expertise he is bringing to bear.
Now, Dr. Bass doesn't fall into that second category
because of his many years of research in osteology;
bringing together a database of human skeletons allows him
to identify the gender, the age, the height, and the
approximate handedness of that individual when presented
only with bones. That experience is based on scientific
research, but there are many things, like fingerprints, that
have never been tested. How many times have any of you
who practice law for a career heard someone testify, "The
prints are an exact match"?
In order for that to be true, we have to get one basis
statistic. How do we know there are not two people with
exactly the same fingerprints? It would require an
enormous amount of research to do that kind of study, but
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it's never been done. The biggest study I know of is about
1,000 individuals who were looked at.
What's the basic information we're trying to exact
from the scientific testimony? Well, we want whatever we
use to be reliable and established in a systematic and
scientific manner. Go back to the diagram. We've done
model building exercises. It should be precise. That the
method has been applied broadly by trained scientists. To
me, that's somebody educated in the sciences. We look at
the probative value of that method. Then, of course, in this
day and age, we have to look at the admissibility of that
evidence in a courtroom. All of you know Frye and
Kumho Tire14 and Daubert15 and McDaniel v. CSX. 16 But
that's going to tell you whether or not the person doing that
forensic science can testify as an expert in a trial. All of
that depends on that evidence.
The probative value of that evidence gets more and
more important as we're able to individualize that
evidence. The National Research Council's study devoted
a great deal of discussion to this very issue of moving from
identification of evidence at a crime scene by some crime
scene investigator-I collect the white powder-to the
classification of that white powder in the field,
provisionally, and then in the lab by scientifically based
toxicological techniques like gas chromatography and mass
spectrometry to classify it as a particular narcotic, let's say.
The idea would be, for probative value, to
individualize that white powder to another white powder
found on some individual to be able to say beyond any sort
of scientific hesitancy that those two powders are the same.
13 Frye v. United States, 298 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
14 Kumho Tire, Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
15 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
16 McDaniel v. CSX Transp., 955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1997).
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The irony, of course, as many of you know, is that it isn't
the cocaine that identifies those two powders. It's the other
stuff that's there in vanishingly small amounts that allows
us to make that individualization assessment, but that step
from classification to individualization means that the
probative value of that scientific evidence goes up a lot.
What the NRC questioned in their study were some
of the forensic sciences that make that step without having
the scientific background and statistics to back it up. They
questioned whether we can say that in terms of a
courtroom. Their conclusions were-and I'm taking 100
pages and boiling it down to one slide-that many methods
result in class evidence. That's as far as you can go. Some
DNA can result in associated uncertainties, the level of
scientific development, and statistical relevance.
Let me get to the conclusions since I have thirty
seconds. What do I, as a scientist, not a forensic scientist,
think? Well, the improvements are going to come from
publicly funded research. We have to pay for these studies
as a country-not a company-as a country. We have to put
money where our thoughts are. We give thousands upon
thousands of grants through the NIH [National Institute of
Health] and the NSF [National Science Foundation], but
only about eight of them ever wind up as forensic
investigation. We need that research to be done.
Two, the ability to individualize evidence must be
based on strong scientific principles and not past precedent.
I am a fingerprint expert. I've done it for thirty years. I
can individualize two prints. The science literacy of the
population, from my perspective, from which you draw
your jurors and will continue to draw your juries, has to be
improved. That means I've got to do a better job educating
college students, but our high schools have to do a better
job educating high school students for people who don't go
any further. Thank you very much.
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MS. RICE: We're now going to move on to the next
presentation with Professor Bernard Raum. Also, we're
going to save time at the end of all presentations for a
couple of questions.
PANELIST'S RESPONSE
Professor Bernard Raum
PROFESSOR RAUM: Good morning. It's a pleasure to
be here. He's a UF [University of Florida] graduate.
DR. BUNDE: We're in hostile territory.
PROFESSOR RAUM: No, no, no. I start with the premise
that we have to keep it in the SEC. 17 We don't worry about
the rest of the country. That includes sports. Hopefully,
that's a comforting thought. Before I get into my talk,
there are just a couple of things that, as I listened to the last
presenter, I wanted to take note of very quickly.
First is the education of the people. A couple of
years ago there was an individual who went around county
fairs and big events. He was signing up people to petition
for the banning of hydrogen hydroxide. People who signed
the petition would walk away thinking, "Oh, my God. It's
in everything. It's in the water we drink. It's in all-oh,
my God." Of course, hydrogen hydroxide is a hydrogen
atom with a hydroxyl. Okay, HO. It's water. H 20.
Hydrogen hydroxide. Try that some time to see what
17 SEC is an acronym for the Southeastern Conference. The
Southeastern Conference is a college athletic conference headquartered
in Birmingham, Alabama, which operates in the southeastern part of
the United States. See generally http://www.secsports.comthesec/.
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reaction you get. I recommend Thomas Kuhn's text. 18
He's written a couple of books on this phenomenon, and
he's a fantastic thinker if you really want to get into the
mindset.
What else did I remember? Just a couple more
things. With respect to the exact match, a conundrum. I
always found it useful to take both fingerprints, put one up
on the screen or on a chart and just overlay the other one.
This way you can let the jury see for themselves. They
make the final call. We don't worry about eleven points or
nine points. There's the print. You figure it out. There it
is, ladies and gentlemen. You can do this. That's where
the problem may lie in fingerprints. If the jury is shown a
good print and overlay, we don't need expert opinion.
Also, from my observation, the application of
forensic science doesn't point to an individual. It excludes
the rest of the population. That's what we really do. It's an
exclusionary technique. Whatever is left, according to Sir
Arthur Conan Doyle and Sherlock Holmes, must be the
truth. 19  And that's where we are. Also, the National
Research Council and the American Academy of
Scientists' Report is an excellent source, and I suggest you
take a look at it.20 I bring it up because in the chapter
discussing education in the legal system, on page 236, they
18 See, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED
STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE (1977).
19 "It is an old maxim of mine that when you have eliminated the
impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth."
SIR ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, The Adventure of the Beryl Coronet, in
THE ADVENTURES OF SHERLOCK HOLMES (1892).
20 COMMITTEE ON INDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC
SCIENCES COMMUNITY, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH
FORWARD (2009).
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mention my Florida Bar CLE2 1 as the kind of program that
should be used to educate lawyers and judges. If you want
to take the course, go ahead. It's online, but don't do it
until June because we're putzing around with it. It's been
there for a couple of years, but we're changing some stuff.
Anyhow, I wanted to point that out to you.
Let me get to the meat of what I want to say here. I
learned an interesting thing from Dr. Bass this morning.
Well, let me show you something. We'll get expert
witnesses and their evidence. What I have given in terms
of the written materials to the law school for the journal is a
checklist. This is an evidentiary checklist that every lawyer
uses subconsciously or should be, every judge uses
subconsciously or should be, to assess the admissibility of
evidence. This one is particular to forensic evidence. It
works every time and will ensure that you don't overlook
anything. I suggest keeping this checklist with you at trial.
Okay, I'll show you.
This is a great quote; I love it. "Jurors are quite
capable of seeing through flaky testimony and pseudo
scientific claptrap. We should not waste our valuable time
watching witch doctors, voodoo practitioners, or brujas go
through the entrails of dead chickens in a fruitless search
for the truth." 22 That's a great quote, and I understand now
that apparently we can get the truth out of dog turds. I
wasn't sure until today. Wait 'till I tell my wife. "What is
this?" "Don't ask."
I'm going to jump ahead because I don't have a lot
of time to talk. For the evidentiary checklist, the first thing
to remember is that the trial judge is the referee.
21 See University of Florida Forensic Science Distance Education,
http://www.forensicscience.ufl.edu/Index.php?/programs/noncred-lawy
ers (last visited May 4, 2010).
22 People v. Williams, 183 Cal. Rptr. 498, 502 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)
(Gardner, J. Concurring).
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You need to know that. They make the call. They won't
be reversed unless it's the abuse of discretion or they're
plainly wrong. Judges aren't plainly wrong. Right?
They're in an area that they know about. I mean, most of
them don't know what we're talking about here, but they
also get to decide who is an expert and judge the expert's
qualifications. On a credibility assessment, the jury gets to
do that ultimately, but it's the judge that likes to hear the
testimony first.
Relevant evidence: Well, we don't need to go over
that stuff. I don't have a lot of time. Okay, Rules of
Evidence: Scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will substantially assist the trier of fact to
understand what's going on.
This [slide] used to be where you got expert
testimony. These road show guys, the snake oil sellers.
These were the people, who for several generations and in
Europe forever, touted their magical cures around. They
were the experts, or the status, or the quality of the experts
that we have. Out of these people came the term
"charlatan."
It's derived from an Italian word, and it describes an
Umbrian Village, which was known for its "quacks" in the
street. I can't say it any plainer than that. Okay, that's
where the word charlatan comes from. If you don't think
there are charlatans in the practice of law, you haven't been
in a courtroom. They're out there. Fortunately, a lot of
people know who they are. But the juries don't; the judges
don't. It's very problematic sometimes.
These rules are designed to improve that. The
average forensic anthropologist is a little bit of a quirky
guy, but basically, he's the truth. By the way, my paper
was based on physical anthropology, forensic anthropology
here in Tennessee. You know, that is actually me. You
didn't recognize me. But there he is, and these are the kind
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of experts that you see. The jury takes a look at that, and
remember, the jury can see your experts too.
First impressions are critical in this situation. When
jurors look at a witness, they make an initial determination
as to whether they are going to give this person credibility
within fifteen seconds. They either identify or they don't.
That's from the time the witness is called to get to the
witness stand. You have to remember how your witnesses
are going to present themselves.
Some of them, like this person [slide], may say,
"Oh, he's a little quirky guy. But yeah, okay." Now, this
one, on the other hand, is going to cause you some
problems, especially note the dead chicken. We don't want
him on the witness stand going through the entrails of that
chicken. That's what you're going to get out of Dr.
McGootoo, who is the noted psychiatric expert. For those
of you who have dealt with psychiatrists on the witness
stand, it takes one to know one. Sorry, some of my best
friends are psychiatrists and psychologists.
With respect to expert witnesses, what we start out
with is difficulty in determining their qualifications. At
least it used to be because information just wasn't
available. The accuracy of the so-called science was left to
the credibility and the judgment of the jury, and they had
no tools or information with which to operate. The U.S. v.
Frye23 case is the first one to try to set some kind of rule.
Basically, you read the case, there's nothing supporting it.
There are no conclusions. It's like the D.C. Court of
Appeals just said, "Well, this is what we think it is." That's
typical for the D.C. Court of Appeals, for those of you who
do practice there. There used to be not a lot of support for
some of the things they used to do.
23 Frye v. United States, 293 F.1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir 1923) (landmark
case establishing an objective test for determining the admissibility of
expert testimony).
99
et al.: Vol 6 No 2
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2014
6:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 236
Even after Frye, there was no evidentiary test that a
court could use to conduct its own independent review of
the validity. Then here comes Daubert. Daubert is a
really great case. I think it's the best opinion in a long time
to address any of these kinds of issues, primarily because
the emphasis in the Daubert decision was scientific
validity. You already heard something on the use of the
scientific method. I can tell you right now, Ladies and
Gentlemen, for those of you who are new to the forensics
area, that's going to be your first area of inquiry. How did
these experts, your witness, and the other side's [reach
opinions] because you want to prepare your witness to
testify. Right? How did they apply the scientific method to
produce the results that they're testifying from? If they
can't answer that question and they can't demonstrate it
and walk you through the process, there's a problem with
their testimony and a problem with their methodology.
NFPA 921 is a guide put out by the National Fire
Protection Association.25 I can tell you right now, it's the
Bible for fire and explosion investigation-the Bible. It
focuses on procedures and describes the steps that need to
be followed. Following the protocols that are established in
here for investigative purposes will get your stuff in very,
very quickly. Judges look at it. They don't want to do the
hard work, so you give them this and say, "Well, we
followed this procedure and protocol that are generally
accepted in the relevant community."
Chapter Four, basic methodology-what do they
start out with? A two-pae explanation of the scientific
method and how it applies. 6 There it is right there. We're
not making this stuff up. This is the bedrock of all
scientific and forensics evidence. It's no mistake that the
Daubert decision tracks this very, very closely.
24 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (1993).
25 NFPA 921: GUIDE FOR FIRE & EXPLOSION INVESTIGATIONS (2008).
26 Id. at ch. 4.
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The focus is on the principles and methodology, not
the conclusions that the evidence generates. The true
distinction between an expert and a non-expert is that the
non-expert witness gives the results of a process of
reasoning similar to everyday life. The expert gives a
process of reasoning that can be mastered only by special
sciences.
Now, I'm going to talk to you for just a couple of
minutes about something you think you know. It's called
the Opinion Rule or the Pure Opinion Rule in some states.
Witnesses usually are required to speak to facts. Rule 7.02
says not necessarily. 27 Experts can rely upon questions of
skill or science, and those who have made the subject
matter of investigation the object of their particular study
are competent to give their opinions in evidence.
If the jurors can draw their own conclusions, the
expert testimony is not needed. And, of course, under the
Tennessee rule, it has to be of substantial assistance.
Otherwise, it's what? Not relevant under Rule 4.01 .28
Okay. These rules are very, very well intertwined.
Typically, qualified experts render an opinion based
upon their own training, education, and experience. In
addition, an expert, in drawing that opinion, may rely on
input, opinion, or findings from other experts, as well as
other facts, which were either brought to the expert's
opinion by investigators or are based on the expert's
firsthand knowledge. This is from Tennessee court
opinions, so I'm talking about the law that is applied here.
If the expert's opinion is based upon facts deduced
through the employment of a scientific theory, process,
procedure, technique, or methodology, that theory, process,
or methodology must apply within the relevant rules of
27 FED. R. EVID. 7.02.
28 FED. R. EVID. 4.01.
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evidence. We take a look at the McDaniel factors, 29 which
very closely track the Daubert opinion. Scientific method?
As I said, that works, and I'm not going to go into the
details of it, except to say that there is a completely defined
process here. This is already in the slides that you saw here
this morning, and you're going to see it again this
afternoon.
Let's take a look at [McDaniel factor] number two:
peer review or publication. There's the scientific method,
which is the first process; then comes peer review or
publication. The importance of peer review is that it gives
other people in that discipline an opportunity to see what's
out there and respond to it. The significance of peer
review-and the usability of it-is only if it's published in
what's called a refereed journal. If you have somebody
that's publishing something out of the back of their pick-up
truck, forget it. It's got to be a refereed journal, which
means there's a process for the submission of documents. I
belong to the American Academy of Forensic Scientists.
It's a rigorous pre-publication review of experts in the
particular field that the paper addresses. They will accept
it, reject it, talk about it, tell you to make changes, or
whatever. The end product has been peer reviewed before
it even hits the press.
In the back of those journals, there are always
responses. If somebody has a legitimate disagreement with
a paper, they send it in to the editor-I disagree with this
and here is why. It's published in the next edition. Peer
review is not dispositive, and it doesn't automatically get
you through the door. It's only the little added factor as we
deal with circumstantial evidence in the accumulation of
little disparate factors that would pull together to make a
common sense decision.
29 See McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 262-64 (Tenn.
1997); see also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94.
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Nowhere in the federal Constitution or in the state
constitution of any state in the United States does it require
the suspension of common sense when the court gives you
a judgment. You can always make a common sense
argument.
The potential rate of error-most disciplines aren't
subject to that unless it's a scientific lab-type presentation.
As a consequence, you're not going to see this in most
cases. In chemistry, physics, yes. There are rates of error,
percentages, those types of things. If they're published, if
they're known, then we need to know about those.
Scientific significance or forensically significant means
about ninety-five percent, and that's what we shoot for.
Whether it comes in will not be a concern. The only thing
we're really concerned about in potential rate of error is the
existence of false positives. Does the test permit the
occurrence of a false positive? If it does, how often? We
need to know that.
False negatives don't usually bother us in forensics.
It's just passed right over, but it is important in scientific
research and in doing your analysis under the scientific
method. It's a different thing, and you bring it in through
the scientific analysis angle.
The general acceptance in the scientific community
is Frye.30 Okay, also NFPA.31 There are a couple of others
you're going to hear about today. ASTM: American
Society for Testing Materials. It's been around for over
100 years and [includes] manufacturers, scientists,
researchers, and forensics. I'm a member of the ASTM
E30 Committee, which is the forensic science committee.
There are a whole bunch of ASTMs that are recognized as
authoritative with respect to procedures and methodologies.
If you can go into court and say, "We've complied with the
30 See Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
31 See NFPA 921, supra note 9.
103
et al.: Vol 6 No 2
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2014
6:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 240
ASTM, and here it is." Wham-you're right there under
Frye to begin with.
Qualification under the ASTM also does something
else for you. It brings in the scientific method qualification
too because that's how all these things are reviewed to
begin with and how they're created. It also brings in peer
review because there are people from all over the world in
ASTM who participate in the formulation of these
procedures. We get stuff all the time. Somebody's
proposed a change, modification, or a whole new
procedure. It may take a year or two before everybody
exchanges information by e-mail. They "Tweet,' ' 32 and do
all kinds of stuff, and finally there's a consensus that is
good.
By the way, I'm going to depart for just a second.
With respect to psychiatric diagnoses, the psychiatric DSM
Manuals,3 3 they were created by a majority vote of people
present and voting at whatever current meeting of the
American Psychiatric Association. It's not a unanimous
vote by any stretch of the imagination. This is just
something to think about when you're talking about an
example of peer review.
Widespread acceptance works, and I suggest that
you try to ferret it out of what you're doing. Also, there's
something called ASCLD. ASCLD is an organization
called the American Society of Crime Lab Directors, and it
is now the gold standard for crime labs because it conducts
intensive review and certification processes for crime labs.
Not all the crime labs in the United States are ASCLD
certified. That's a question you need to ask your own
32 Tweets are text-based posts used on the social networking website
Twitter. They can be up to 140 characters displayed on the author's
profile page and delivered to the author's subscribers, who are known
as "followers." See generally www.twitter.com.
33 DSM is an acronym for Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders. See generally http://allpsych.com/disorders/dsm.html.
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expert and the experts on the other side. "Is your lab
certified by ASCLD?" "No." "It's not?" ASCLD is the
gold standard because it does periodic reviews, proficiency
testing of the bench people, and they report the results. All
this stuff is available. If you're ASCLD certified, you're
going to have a good chance for getting it into evidence.
Research Independent of Litigation: This is also a
keystone that ties back to the scientific method. Is this
generally done, or is this done specifically for this case?
There's only one instance that I know of in a reported
opinion where an expert was allowed to create his own test,
analyze the evidence, and get it into evidence. That was
John DeHaan, a national fire expert who wrote [the latest
editions of] KIRK'S FIRE INVESTIGATION. 34 The evidence
was admitted because of who John was. It stood on his
national and international recognition as the expert in this
area. Otherwise, it wouldn't have been permitted. They
figured, well, if anybody can do it, he can. And it came in,
subject to cross-examination of course.
Is there anything else? The other thing is that you
can forget all of this if the appellate courts in your
jurisdiction have already ruled and said it's admissible.
You can just ask the court to take judicial notice of the
process.
Oh, a couple of other things. Here are three texts.
They're not in the materials here, but I would suggest you
write them down. You need to know statistics and how
they're created for scientists for research purposes. These
two-I don't own interests in any of them-this one is
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH. 3 5 It's an older book.
It's probably out of print, but it's on the bookshelves. This
34 JOHN D. DE HAAN, KIRK'S FIRE INVESTIGATION (6th ed. 2006)
(PAUL L. KIRK 1969). See also DAVID J. ICOVE & JOHN D. DEHAAN,
FORENSIC FIRE SCENE RECONSTRUCTION (2d ed. 2008).
35 See MICHAEL CROTTY, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH:
MEANING AND PERSPECTIVE IN THE RESEARCH PROCESS (1998).
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[statistics book] is my textbook at George Washington
University on statistics. It walks you through the process
of testing design and biases of how a test is put together
and how the questions are assembled. This is really, really
valuable.
I can assure you that most of the newspapers don't
use this kind of procedure when they put out these
questionnaires to people. You get 700 people who are the
only ones who are going to respond. It's not an unbiased
search, so you're getting people who are focused on the
issues anyhow. But this book will get you through it.
I recently had a case I was in the middle of, and
there was a doctor on the witness stand the next day. He
was asked on direct, "Well, how often does this happen in
your experience?"
"Oh, about seventy-five percent of the time."
I'm sitting there like an idiot savant, thinking,
"What can I do with this number?" I didn't ask him on
cross about his diagnosis. I went right to it. "You
mentioned a number, Doctor, seventy-five percent. Where
did you get that number?"
Oh, my God, about fifteen minutes into that
presentation he said, "I'm guessing."
"So, you were telling the jury information that you
were just guessing. Is that correct?"
"Yes."
"Thank you. No further questions." I'm not going
to give him a chance to rehabilitate. Of course, his lawyer
had no idea how to clean it up.
MS. RICE: Our final panelist responds. This is Professor
Margaret Berger.
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PANELIST'S RESPONSE
Professor Margaret A. Berger
PROFESSOR MARGARET BERGER: Well, I feel that I
just wandered into an alternative universe perhaps. I mean,
I'm from New York, and I think we think of ourselves as
tough and able to handle anything. But I must say I have
never heard a presentation before 9:00 o'clock in the
morning that was as gory and graphic as we heard from Dr.
Bass this morning. I must say that my students, I don't
think, are really exposed to that kind of presentation, but it
was certainly fascinating. I've learned some things, and I
guess I will find dogs a little more worrisome than I ever
did. I love dogs. Anyway, I will take some of these
lessons home with me.
I am supposed to comment on Dr. Bass's
presentation, and I find it difficult to do. As I said, this is
really a very different world. One thing, the CSI effect has
been mentioned by both speakers-the 70,000,000 who are
watching what's going on and thinking that they now are
experts in forensic science. That, of course, is a very
troubling problem. I think that, at least in my neck of the
woods, one of the things that compounds that problem is
that it's getting more and more expensive to have jury
trials. We very often, in my area of the country, don't have
them because people plead guilty because the sentencing
rules really make it easier for those who agree to plead
guilty. Therefore, we have far fewer trials than we used to,
at least where I come from. A good deal of what happens
occurs outside of the courtroom and also happens because
of various decisions that people make that they may do
better if they plead guilty than if they continue to insist
upon their innocence.
One of the things also said this morning was about
the fact that scientific statements are probabilistic. I think
107
et al.: Vol 6 No 2
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2014
6:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 244
that this is something that scientists would agree on and
that many evidence professors would agree on. The only
problem is that if there is any field that seems to cause
people trouble, it's statistics. I don't know how all of you
do with statistics at this law school, but statistics are
absolutely a nightmare for many of the people who go to
most law schools. We know that many people go to law
school and not medical school because they hate math, and
here they are being told that what you really need to know
is statistics. Teaching statistics really seems to be a
nightmare for most law schools that do not have required
statistics courses. It's one of the things that has always
been advocated, and it just doesn't happen because it's so
difficult.
As a matter of fact, math is really very, very
difficult for law students. I remember trying to do
something in a classroom with something mathematical,
and everyone got into a fight as to what you do in
multiplying fractions. The people just started shouting at
each other as to the way we should do this. Well, if that's
the level of comprehension that you have in a law school
class, you can imagine what happens when one is trying to
examine expert testimony in a scientific way.
Daubert 6 has been floating around, but Daubert
has been attacked in many ways. I'm going to talk about
that some more when I give my talk.37 The question of
whether a test permits false positives or just false negatives
is a very complicated question, and also one that is not easy
for lawyers to handle.
Lawyers simply have not been trained to deal well
with mathematical concepts. I don't know to what extent
this is treated any differently at this law school, but at most
36 See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993).
37 Professor Berger's lunch keynote address, Evolving Trends in
Forensic Science, is printed separately in this issue.
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law schools, it is a very, very difficult issue to raise with
students. And it takes time. You cannot teach a statistics
course in the midst of teaching a law school course and
manage to get very far with it. So, I think one of the real
problems for lawyers is: How do we manage to resolve
these statistical kinds of problems? What do we need to
know? How can we put it together? Is a checklist going to
help us with asking the right questions? Well, what you
really have is sort-of a clash of two very different cultures.
We certainly heard that before from Dr. Bunde.
You have a legal culture that thinks there's an
answer out there and wants some kind of a formula. And
you have a scientific culture that says, "But wait a minute.
You really have to observe. You really have to look at this
and decide whether or not this is going to apply to this
particular form of evidence." The answer is not always
very clear, which is why the National Research Council
Report about forensic science, 38 which I'm going to talk
about later, is so important. It brings to the floor the kinds
of questions that ordinarily lawyers do not necessarily want
to raise and have not raised in the years in which they have
been dealing with evidence.
We have sort of a weird timeframe, which you have
to remember, which is that most of forensic evidence came
into being really before we had some of the rules of
evidence that we now have. We have a mismatch, not only
in terms of culture, but in terms of timing. The real
question is how then do we resolve these issues?
For instance, I heard Dr. Bass talk about getting
fingerprints off what is left behind in the cases that he gets,
and I really was curious as to-he said the FBI knows how
to do that. How does he know that the FBI knows how to
38 COMMITTEE ON INDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC
SCIENCES COMMUNITY, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH
FORWARD (2009).
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do that? That's really one of the questions that we have at
the moment where fingerprint evidence is really under a
good deal of attack: How does one determine whether
something has really been made valid? What are the
scientific methods that need to be applied? How do we
verify that we are really dealing with a scientific truth and
not just something that somebody in some discipline has
decided to go and talk about?
One of the other things mentioned before was fire
investigation. I'll talk more about this later too, but that is
one of the areas where a good number of questions have
been raised lately. Not about whether there was a fire-of
course, there was a fire. And, of course, perhaps people
died in the fire. But how do we know really that when the
expert says an accelerant was used, that is actually the
case? What proves that that accelerant was used? There
have been a number of suggestions lately that a good deal
of this testimony is absolutely not necessarily true. That
yes, one can see patterns, but that there are other things that
can cause the pattern, rather than an accelerant. How do
we test these things? This is a very troublesome area.
The entire area of forensics is a very troublesome
area because, as you know, it's the forensic evidence that
often sends a person onto death row. We have had a fair
number of cases as of late, over 250, where convictions
have been overturned on the ground that the forensic
evidence was wrong. That should give everyone some
pause. In addition, it's not just that when the forensic
evidence is wrong, you have someone going to prison or
maybe death row. It also means that somebody is out there
who hasn't been put into prison, who is the person who
really committed the crime. That, in a way, is even more
worrisome. You've got the wrong person, and therefore
the right person, who wasn't identified, is still wandering
around.
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Forensics, at the moment, seems to me really one of
the more troublesome disciplines around. I found it
interesting to hear what all of you are saying or thinking
about what is needed to correct this situation. I'm going to
talk later about this report, which you can see lying there,
and some of it contains very, very troubling findings that
really affect everything that happens in a courtroom when
one is depending on forensic interpretations.
What can I say that I think? I think that statistics
are getting more and more important. I think it's
understood that you need some kind of a statistical,
probabilistic basis for the kinds of statements that people
make in the courtroom, and it's very hard to figure out how
to manage that in a law school. Obviously, colleges don't
require statistics as something needed for graduation, and
neither do law schools. Certainly, it would seem to me that
that's one of the most important things that all of you really
have to think about, unpleasant as it may be to think about.
It is very difficult to teach a good statistics course. To
teach a good statistics course embedded in an evidence
course is really virtually impossible.
How does one get this information across to
lawyers? A good trial lawyer sort-of intuitively knows
statistics often without being able to explain exactly what it
is that he or she is seeking to achieve. But to really manage
to survive an active cross-examination, you may have to do
something about statistics, whether you like it or not. As I
said, there's no question that most law students hate
statistics. I mean that's really not why they went to law
school, to deal with math. Statistics, unfortunately, really
is grounded in math.
One of the things to think about is whether you
should forget about your ideas when you went to law
school that it had nothing to do with this subject and to
nevertheless see if you can't get some kind of a grounding
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in how statistical thinking works-very, very helpful to a
good lawyer.
I think I'm just about to the end of my time. Two
minutes. Well, I don't know that I even want to use my
two minutes. I'd really rather hear from all of you and
whether you have some questions.
QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
MS. RICE: Before you ask a question, if you would, state
your name for our court reporter. We will now open the
floor for questions for all of our panelists.
JESSICA VANDYKE: My name is Jessica VanDyke, and
I'm a second-year student here at the law school. Dr.
Bunde, as well as all the panelists, discussed the CSI
effect. 39 Do any of you have thoughts, as future trial
attorneys, about what we can do in the legal profession to
try to correct the CSI effect? Because the shows are
becoming more popular; they obviously aren't going off the
air. There are like twelve of them now, so what can we do
to correct that in our profession?
PROF. BERGER: I think that's an excellent question, and
I think it's a very difficult question. Obviously, one needs
more science education, but people are very resistant to
more science education. Science is not easy. It's hard, and
it takes time. I think it is very difficult to overcome the CSI
effect. I don't know whether really the problem can be
dealt with at a law school level or if it's just part of the
problem with American education altogether. It should be
dealt with in elementary school or high school, but it is
very late to start dealing with it in law school.
39 See generally Shelton, supra note 2.
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I guess the most that you can do is keep saying that
the show is not real, but why people would believe you
when these shows have millions of viewers is really very
difficult. Judges could help a little if they were more
sympathetic at times and gave better instructions to jurors
as to what they should do. The ingrained thinking of
Americans as to what science is, even though they're
completely wrong about it, certainly isn't an easy problem
to deal with.
PROF. RAUM: Can I take a stab at answering that
question? You have to anticipate the issues that may come
up in your individual case. I'm a former prosecutor, and I
tend to approach things from the prosecutorial point of
view, that is, in terms of framing a case. So you've got a
basic idea. I think they always want DNA. They always
want fingerprints. Very few crime scenes actually give you
reproducible, forensically significant fingerprints. DNA is
a little better, depending on how it's processed and who
does the reading of the results because therein lies the
devil. The devil is always in the details of the DNA
analysis.
What you do is you've got your expert on the
witness stand, your crime scene person, or the detective
who led the investigation, and you ask him several
questions. "Well, did you find any usable fingerprints?"
"Yes."
"Well, what does that mean?"
"Well, no, we didn't and here's why." Basically
you have him explain in advance all the issues you'd
anticipated.
Typically, I don't encourage anticipating defenses
for issues, but this isn't a defense. This is anticipating a
question that the jury is going to have because they're
going to go in the jury room. At some point, they're going
to write a question to the judge, and the judge is going to
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say, "You have to decide the case on the testimony at trial."
That's all the help the law can give them. But you, as the
attorney, can get your witnesses to do that when you
present your case. You can say, "Well, I know what these
people are thinking about, so I'm going to deal with it."
You could ask, "How long does it take to get a fingerprint
back from AFIS? ' '4 Well, certainly not in five minutes on
the computer with the guy's picture and his criminal record.
You know, does anybody know how that AFIS fingerprint
process really works? Nobody?
First of all, the local guy, he's got to digitize the
print so the FBI can read it. They still use the old FBI
designation system. They're going to send that digitized
print and that descriptive designation to the FBI. They will
run it through their IAFIS database. 41 That will kick out
twenty to thirty, maybe fifty possible matches.
That information is going to be sent back to the
local police investigator. They have to get copies of each
one of those individual sets of fingerprints and do a hand
comparison. The FBI will not do that unless it's one of
their own cases. They used to, but they won't anymore
because they had too many requests. When I was a
prosecutor, the FBI did virtually everything we wanted, so
it was great. We just interfaced with them, and they did the
kind of tests we wanted. Whatever we wanted, we'd ask
them to do this special stuff.
Juries come in with expectations. You have to
answer those expectations. They want to know, did we find
any usable DNA? Was it degraded? Of course, now we
40 Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS). Law
enforcement agencies use AFIS to identify unknown fingerprints. The
acronym can refer to automated fingerprint systems in general or the
United States national AFIS: Integrated Automated Fingerprint System
(IAFIS).
41 CJIS, Integrated Automated Fingerprint System, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/hq/cjisd/iafis.htm (last visited May 5, 2010).
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have the mini-STRs that are revolutionizing DNA in terms
42
of degraded samples. They're starting to work quite well.
John Butler up at the National Institute of Science and
Technology pulled all that stuff together. It's a great
website there.43 NIST and John Butler. John is probably
the international expert on this stuff now, and John has a
huge website there. Go to it and start looking, and it will
give you jumping off points.
Let me tell you something else: PUBMED.44 How
many of you have heard of PUBMED? Do you use it? All
right. P-U-B-M-E-D. It will take you to the National
Institute of Health Reference Library in Bethesda. It's all
online. You will get extracts. It's a huge database like
Lexis. Okay, I use Lexis instead of Westlaw. You can
come up with the current writings, the current issues. You
can sift through the literature and bring yourself up to date
on specific, really small issues: a great source of
information. Because remember, you don't have to know
everything there is to know about a particular science. You
only need to know for that day the background that the
expert is going to be using for that case. You can just chop
your research right down for the most part. You need an
42 See DNA Diagnostic Center, DNA Diagnostics Systems: Forensics,
Mini-STR Testing, http://www.forensicdnacenter.com/dna-ministr.html.
(last visited May 5, 2010) (Mini-STR is "a testing system that exploits
the ability of specially designed primers that preferentially target the
larger STR loci. While standard STR primers target longer sequences
that include the STR loci, mini-STR primers 'zoom in' on the STR
locus so that the resulting DNA product is smaller, thereby increasing
the chances of successful amplification of the larger loci."); See also
Leonard Klevan and Lisa Lane Schade, Identifying Degraded DNA,
FORENSIC MAGAZINE, available at http://www.forensicmag.com/
articles.asp?pid= 131.
43 See Mike Coble, et al, National Institute of Science Technology,
http://cstl.nist.gov/div831/strbase/miniSTR.htm (last visited May 5,
2010).
44 United States National Library of Medicine, PubMed.gov,
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/PubMed (last visited May 5, 2010).
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overall course in forensics to have an idea of what is
actually out there and what you can and cannot do with the
various sciences, and you cannot get that from television.
KATHY MORANTA: My name is Kathy Moranta, and
I'm a prosecutor. I guess I'm interested in hearing from the
panel. I've read the National Institute of Science Report,
but in everyday practice there have been challenges by
defense attorneys so far to things like fingerprints. That's
what I'm most concerned about. None of our judges have
upheld any of those challenges. In terms of real practical
handling cases, what would you have to say about
fingerprints and using them. I think you suggested putting
them on top of each other, and we do that. But what about
allowing an expert to say something like, "Yes, I've
excluded. Yes, this is a match"?
PROF. RAUM: Exclusions are easy to do with
fingerprints. Inclusions aren't. As I said, forensic science
is all about excluding. Everything we do in terms of
analyzing, "Well, am I going to do this, or am I not going
to do this? Am I going to drive this way today, or am I
going to go that way?" Traffic is or isn't bad at these
times. These are all shifting sands of knowledge. Juries do
this too. They come to the court with their own
background, and so do you in formulating your questions,
views, and your opinions.
Keep in mind this is probability in action, but it's a
very loose probability. Sometimes there is really bad
statistical evidence for this particular probability statement,
so keep in mind that's what jurors are going to do. "Well,
this probably happened or didn't. Well, beyond a
reasonable doubt-preponderance of the evidence." How
do you quantify that stuff?
I came from a county where we had the Johns
Hopkins Applied Physics Lab, and we had all kinds of
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PhDs, chemists, and mathematicians. I never put them on
my juries if I possibly could, because they don't think in a
statistical basis. They think in absolutes. It either is or it
isn't. Its 100 percent or it's zero. That's kind-of hard. Of
course, there are a lot of people out there now, especially
with all the political stuff that's going on in this country,
that are coming out of the closet that have those ironclad
opinions one way or the other. We know who they are
now.
DR. GOADE: Thank you, Professor Raum. Professor
Berger was asking about how Dr. Bass would know that the
FBI could get the fingerprints in. We didn't have Dr. Bass
at that time. We have him back, and I wonder if we could
maybe get that and then see if we have any more questions.
DR. BASS: You want me to....
DR. GOADE: Did you hear Professor Berger's question?
DR. BASS: I heard her question. That's right. I'm sorry
to disturb your morning, by the way, with the gruesome
pictures before 9:00 o'clock. They usually call you Friday
night with a case, and they want you to come immediately.
I have trouble with that in that I said, "Look. Why don't
you just secure the crime scene until tomorrow because
there's nothing better than sunlight to do a case?" I don't
care how many lights you set up, it doesn't work as well as
the sun, and you get animal activity where it's scattered all
over. So, I say, "Just secure the scene and tomorrow will
be . . . ." I mean, look, if the guy is already dead, it's not
going to hurt him to be dead one more night, you know,
until we can get there and do it right the first time.
The comment on the FBI doing fingerprints from
the underlying dermis actually comes from Arthur
Bohanan, who was a senior criminalist for the Knoxville
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Police Department here in Knoxville. Art is a fingerprint
expert. You say, "Whatever that means." He has done his
research and worked in the fingerprint area, and he has
designed this super-glue method of recovering fingerprints.
He told me that when you have cases in which the
epidermal layer is missing, the FBI does have the
technology to recover prints from the underlying dermis.
Although this, I gather, is very difficult. I have never done
this, and I'm passing along information from people in the
area. I'm not a fingerprint expert. I would rather go see if I
can find that skin and get a better print.
MANAGING EDITOR MEREDITH RAMBO: Could you
expand some more on what an ASTM is and how those
function? You mentioned that there was more than one that
existed, and you would need to circle in on one.
PROF. RAUM: Hundreds and hundreds of ASTMs exist.
45
They're out there to control just about every form of
manufacturing and plant operation in the world. If you
want to know the correct and accepted way to construct and
operate an iron, there's an ASTM on it under that particular
isolated section. There's a series of forensics ASTM
standards. They're in the science library here. You can go
onto the ASTM site and see if any of them have been
corrected, changed, or modified. If they have and it's
important to your case, you can buy that one. That
information is available, but it's spotty in a lot of areas.
Now the big focus is on handwriting and document analysis
the last couple of years, but they're all out there. The
standards are accepted because everybody on the forensics
subcommittee has agreed on them-not everybody, but
45 The American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) sets
standards that govern many industries in the United States. See
generally http://www.astm.org (last visited May 5, 2010).
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people who have a vote, and that's a lot of people. 46 It's
about 800 people who have a vote on the forensics
subcommittee. It's constantly looking at the sites and the
analysis.
DR. BUNDE: These are equivalent to what is referred to in
the forensic science world as SOPs. 47 They're the standard
operating procedure for this particular test, and it has stood
the test of time. People have contributed to it and as Dr.
Bass said, have come back and changed it to apply to new
technology, new methods, and new equipment that come
out. The latest standards will be the ones that most of the
individuals agree to. It is a scientifically based technique,
but it's not used just in forensics. As they said, it's used
everywhere. If I have a student who wants to look for
steroids, birth control steroids in urine or in a sewage
treatment plant, there is a standard operating procedure
from either the ASTM or other equivalent organizations
that will tell you step by step what you must do to make
this a scientifically defensible result
PROF. RAUM: There are also EPA [Environmental
Protection Agency] standards ....
DR. BUNDE: Yes, exactly.
46 See The American Society for Testing and Materials, Timothy
Brooke, Staff Manager, Committee E30 on Forensic Sciences,
available at http://www.astm.org/COMMIT/COMMITTEE/E30.htm
(last visited May 5, 2010).
47 Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) are guidelines that govern
participants in a given field. In the present case, SOP refers to the
ASTM standards set by the forensic subcommittee that govern the
forensic sciences. See The American Society for Testing and
Materials, supra note 7.
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PROF. RAUM: Same concept. A lot of that is in mass
48
spectroscopy and gas chromatography analysis. A lot of
that is coming to the courtroom. There are procedures for
capturing that evidence, for packaging it, for taking it out of
the box, for distilling it, and for loading it into the
machines. There are procedures for all this different stuff,
and they're out there. Lawyers don't know anything about
these things, but I keep telling you they're critical in cases.
I'm working on a case right now where the application of
ASTMs and EPA standards are critical. And I can tell you,
other than the experts and myself, nobody else in the case
yet knows about these things--don't even know they exist,
much less how they're applicable.
Can you imagine how surprised they're going to be?
Because none of this is in writing. The experts get on the
witness stand, and they start talking about this stuff. Then
lawyers are like, "Oh, my God. I don't speak Chinese. We
need an interpreter here." That stuff is out there, and it
controls the process. You need to know about it. Oh, by
the way, there's a statistics course you can take that I think
you can get for like thirty bucks or forty bucks from the
Great Classes. 4 9 Go online and Google that stuff. You can
get a DVD that's got thirteen, sixteen lectures for like
ninety-nine bucks. It will walk you through it. The stuff is
out there. You've just got to find it. First of all, you have
to know it exists.
There's an excellent textbook on forensics. I use it
in both of my courses. It's INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC
48 See generally Douglas Frederic, GC/MS Analysis, SCIENTIFIC
TESTIMONY, available at http://www.scientific.org/tutorials/articles/
9cms.htmi (last visited May 5, 2010).
See The Teaching Company, www.theGreatCourses.com (last
visited May 5, 2010).
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SCIENCES, third edition, by James and Nordby.5 ° It is, for
our purposes, the best surveyed forensics book in existence
anywhere. It's out of Florida CRC Press. It's inexpensive,
about eighty bucks. It's excellent.
DR. BUNDE: I feel I must defend my institution. Every
student at Maryville College takes a statistics course-four
hours-even English majors.
MS. RICE: Are there any more questions? We have time
for one more, and please remember to state your name.
PHILLIP SMITH. Phillip Smith. I was wondering if
you've heard of this. If it would be any help to jurors for
judges-when the jury goes into deliberation-to ask those
jurors to submit any questions concerning CSI-related
matters to the court that pertain to that particular case?
Then the court could get them information on whether it is
true science or false science.
PROF. RAUM: Oh, God, that's a mine field, an absolute
mine field. I'm sorry, but no. I mean, I wouldn't champion
that in any respect whatsoever because you're going to
have to try the Daubert trial.51 After the jury has heard all
the evidence in the case, any additional information given
is x-record.52 The appellate court is going to slam that one
back on you really, really fast. It's completely flawed, but
it's up to the lawyers to prepare and present their case.
Keep in mind, the judges depend on the lawyers. They
50 Stuart H. James and Jon J. Nordby, FORENSIC SCIENCE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO SCIENTIFIC AND INVESTIGATIvE TECHNIQUES, (3d
ed. 2009).
51 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
52 Professor Raum's reference to "x-record" means that any
information given to the jurors once they retire would not be a part of
the record.
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depend on the lawyers to do a lot of the work for them.
That's part of your responsibility as counsel. You come to
court knowing what you're doing and prepared to make the
presentation that the court needs to reach a fair and just
judgment. This is all part of it. You can anticipate this
stuff, and you can address it. The time to do it is when
you've got witnesses on the witness stand because once
they're gone, you can't make an argument. You can't take
a position that's not supported by the evidence in the
record, right?
PROF. BERGER: I think the question is more general as to
whether you would allow jurors to ask questions after they
hear a witness.
PROF. RAUM: That wasn't my understanding.
PROF. BERGER: No?
MR. SMITH: Well, I was just thinking, after these
comments, are you saying that it would be worthwhile for
the prosecution to do that-to try and identify those
questions while in court?
PROF. RAUM: Oh, absolutely.
MR. SMITH: And bring all that out in court?
PROF. RAUM: Oh, absolutely. You've got your expert.
You've got your questions: "Why didn't you take
fingerprints? Why didn't you submit them?" Because they
weren't readily visible. They were smears. They were
there. But have somebody say, "Well, you know, we only
get usable prints about 25 percent of the time." They need
to know that, and you can do it with a witness. There are
some states that do permit questioning by jurors of
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witnesses on the witness stand. I don't prescribe to that at
all because you wind up getting fishing expeditions, which
pull away from the issues involved in the case. Also, you
get improper questions, which require hearsay answers or
further expert opinions. It's a nightmare. That's an
absolute nightmare. Our system is clunky, but it's still the
best out there. I don't want to toy with something that
fundamental to the process.
MS. RICE: Let's give our panelists another round of
applause. Also, if Dr. Bass will come forward . . . on
behalf of the TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY and
the Center for Advocacy and Dispute Resolution, we would
like to present you a token of appreciation for presenting
our morning keynote.
DR. BASS: Thank you, thank you all very much.
MS. RICE: Also, to each of our panelists, we would like to
present you with an additional token of appreciation.
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STUDENT ESSAY
INTENTIONALLY INFLICTED:
THE BAZE PLURALITY PAINFULLY "EXECUTED"
THE PURPOSE OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
Michelle Lynn Veronica Consiglio]
I. Introduction
On April 16, 2008, the United States Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of lethal injection as a
method of execution. In its analysis, the Court recognized,
as it had in prior cases, that the government's choice of a
particular method of execution did not violate the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment. As a
result, the Court upheld the constitutionality of lethal
injection in Baze v. Rees,2 rendering a seven-to-two
plurality decision.
3
1 J.D., pending May 2011, Univ. of Tennessee; B.A., International
Relations, Boston Univ., summa cum laude. Prior to attending law
school, Ms. Consiglio worked at the Tennessee Legislature during the
105th General Assembly as the Research Analyst for the Senate
Judiciary Committee.
2 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008).
3 Id. at 1521 (noting that Chief Justice Roberts authored the plurality
opinion with Justices Kennedy and Alito joining). Justice Alito also
filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 1538. Justice Stevens filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 1542. Justice Scalia filed an
opinion concurring in the judgment, which Justice Thomas joined. Id.
at 1552. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
which Justice Scaliajoined. Id. at 1556. Justice Breyer filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment. Id. at 1563. Justice Ginsberg filed a
dissenting opinion, which Justice Souter joined. Id. at 1567; see also
Harbison v. Little, No 07-6225, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 14742, at *8
(6th Cir. July 2, 2009) ("The Court issued several opinions in that case,
including Chief Justice Roberts's plurality opinion (writing for two
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Because no single rationale explaining the result
gained the assent of five justices, "the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.
..., In other words, because the plurality opinion does
not act as authority, no controlling principle or justification
for the ultimate decision emerged from the case.
Nonetheless, because the rationale behind the decision was
a point of contention among the justices, it warrants
exploration here. Lastly, issues surrounding the death
penalty have been analyzed and debated for centuries;
however, an important distinction must be noted between
the general death penalty debate and the instant matter: the
issue presented in Baze concerned the execution method of
lethal injection and not the controversial issue of the
existence of the death penalty itself.5
In Baze, the Court addressed the issue of whether
lethal injection as a method of execution is unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment's ban on "cruel and unusual
punishments." 6 According to the two Petitioners, Ralph
Baze and Thomas Bowling, a chance existed that the
method's protocol might not be followed or administered
correctly, thus resulting in the infliction of pain during their
executions.
7
other justices), one concurring opinion, four other opinions concurring
in the judgment, and one dissenting opinion. Under those
circumstances, Chief Justice Roberts's plurality opinion is
controlling.") (citations omitted).
4 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976).
5 See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1542 (Alito, J., concurring).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. VHI.
7 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1526. The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari to the Supreme Court of Kentucky's decision on the
issue, stating the constitutionality of the method of lethal injection.
Baze v. Rees, 217 S.W.3d 207 (Ky. 2006). The only issue decided by
the Supreme Court of Kentucky was the manner in which the
Commonwealth of Kentucky can carry out the death sentences on all
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The Baze decision is currently important and
relevant because thirty-six jurisdictions (thirty-five states
and the Federal Government) have adopted lethal injection
as their primary or exclusive means of carrying out a
sentence of death. Accordingly, lethal injection is "by far
the most prevalent method of execution in the United
States." 8 Further, thirty of the thirty-six jurisdictions that
use lethal injection, including Kentucky (where Baze
originated) and the Federal Government, employ a three-
drug protocol. 9  In Baze, the Court analyzed the
convicts. Id. at 209. The convicts argued that the lethal injection
method was cruel and unusual punishment, making it unconstitutional
under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Section 17
of the Kentucky Constitution. Id. The Court explained that "[p]rior
interpretation of Section 17 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that
a method of punishment is cruel and unusual if it shocks the moral
sense of reasonable men as to what is right and proper under the
circumstances." Id. at 210 (citations omitted). After analyzing the
findings and conclusions of the trial court and examining the history of
executions in Kentucky, the Court stated that "[t]he prohibition [of the
Eighth Amendment and Section 17 of the Kentucky Constitution] is
against cruel punishment and does not require a complete absence of
pain." Id. at 212 (emphasis added). The Court ultimately held that
"[t]he lethal injection method used in Kentucky is not a violation of the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Section 17 of
the Kentucky Constitution's ban on cruel and unusual punishment." Id.
8 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1526-27, 1527 n.1 (citing statutes from the
twenty-seven of thirty-six states that require the use of lethal injection
as the sole method of execution) (citations omitted).
9 Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 896, 902 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted). The three drugs used in the protocol are sodium thiopental,
pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride, administered in that
order. Id. (citation omitted).
The dose of sodium thiopental, a barbiturate that
"reduced oxygen flow to the brain and causes
respiratory depression" . . . quickly anesthetizes the
inmate and is sufficient to cause death in the absence
of the two additional chemicals in the protocol.
Pancuronium bromide is a "muscle paralytic" that
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constitutionality of lethal injection in the context of this
particular methodl ° and held that Kentucky's execution
method satisfied the Eighth Amendment."'
The Court's grant of certiorari in this case garnered
national attention and subsequently brought about an
unofficial national moratorium on executions pending the
Court's consideration of the Eighth Amendment issue.12
Therefore, in analyzing the constitutionality of lethal
injection, the Court sought to provide clarity and to
"assist[s] in the suppression of breathing and
ensure[s] death." The amount of pancuronium
bromide that the State administers also proves fatal
on its own, and the State selected the drug because it
hastens death, and "prevents involuntary muscular
movement that may interfere with the proper
functioning to the IV equipment," thus
"contribut[ing] to the dignity of the death process."
Potassium chloride, a salt, interferes with heart
function, causing "cardiac arrest and rapid death." If
administered properly, the sodium thiopental
anesthetizes inmates before they receive the
remaining two drugs.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
10 Originally, the dosage was "2 grams of sodium thiopental, 50
milligrams of pancuronium bromide, and 240 milliequivalents of
potassium chloride." Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1528. Now, Kentucky's
protocol consists of 3 grams of sodium thiopental, 50 milligrams of
pancuronium bromide, and 240 milliequivalents of potassium chloride.
Id. (citation omitted).
I Id. at 1538.
12 Linda Greenhouse, Justices Uphold Lethal Injection in Kentucky
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2008, at Al ("Dozens of executions have
been delayed around the country in recent months .... The Supreme
Court itself had not imposed a general moratorium, instead granting
individual stays of execution in cases that reached the court."); Adam
Liptak, Does Death Penalty Save Lives? A New Debate, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 18, 2007, at A32 ("The Supreme Court now appears to have once
again imposed a moratorium on executions as it considers how to
assess the constitutionality of lethal injections.").
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establish a workable standard for the lower courts to apply
to the influx of litigation challenging lethal injection.
In his plurality opinion, Chief Justice John Roberts
distinguished the petitioners' claim of an "unnecessary
risk" standard' 3 from the stated "substantial risk" standard1
4
as the standard that must be met in order for an execution
method to violate the Eighth Amendment. Time and time
again, the Court had opportunities to rule on the
constitutionality of a state's chosen method of execution.
1 5
Each time, however, the Court refused to take what would
have amounted to an unprecedented step because the
justices did not perceive such a determination to be within
the purview of the Court's role in the justice system.' 6
The Baze plurality determined that Kentucky's
lethal injection protocol not only conformed with Eighth
Amendment requirements but also recognized that the
"substantial risk" standard acted as an acknowledged
13 See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1529.
[Petitioners] contend that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits procedures that create an "unnecessary risk"
of pain. Specifically they argue that courts must
evaluate "(a) the severity of pain risked, (b) the
likelihood of that pain occurring, and (c) the extent to
which alternative means are feasible, either by
modifying existing execution procedures or adopting
alternative procedures."
Id. (citations omitted).
14 id. at 1531 ("We have explained that to prevail on such a claim there
must be a 'substantial risk of serious harm'....") (citations omitted).
"5 Id. at 1530 ("This Court has never invalidated a State's chosen
procedure for carrying out a sentence of death as infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment."). In support of this contention, the Court
discussed its previous decisions on the matter. See id. Such cases will
be described in detail later in the Case Note.
16 Id. at 1562 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("We have neither the authority
nor the expertise to micromanage the States' administration of the
death penalty in this manner.").
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limitation on the Court's ability to dictate execution
methods to the states. Nevertheless, it can be argued that
the substantial risk standard that the Court established in
this case is not the governing Eighth Amendment standard.
Instead, as set out in previous majority opinion cases, the
test is much more direct: A method of execution violates
the Eighth Amendment if it intentionally inflicts or
enhances pain. This note will show that although the Baze
plurality was correct in its ultimate judgment, the plurality
opinion complicated the underlying intent of the Eighth
Amendment by asserting a questionable and historically
unsupported risk-based standard as the test of determining
the constitutionality of a method of execution.
II. Case Summary of Baze v. Rees
Baze arose in Kentucky after two death row
inmates, Ralph Baze and Thomas Bowling, "completely
exhausted all of the legitimate state and federal means for
challenging their convictions and the propriety of [their]
death sentences." 17 Baze was convicted by a jury on two
counts of murder for shooting two law enforcement officers
with an assault rifle as the officers attempted to serve him
with five felony fugitive warrants. 18 Bowling was likewise
convicted by a jury on two counts of murder for killing a
husband and wife as they sat in their automobile outside a
dry cleaning store. 
19
The convicted felons first filed suit in the Franklin
County Circuit Court in Kentucky, seeking a declaratory
judgment that the lethal injection method of execution
violated their state and federal constitutional rights because
17 Baze, 217 S.W.3d at 209.
18 Id. (citing Baze v. Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1997)).
19 Baze, 217 S.W.3d at 209 (citing Bowling v. Commonwealth, 873
S.W.2d 175 (Ky. 1997)).
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such a method was cruel and unusual punishment. 20 After
a thorough bench trial, consisting of seventeen depositions
and twenty witnesses, the Circuit Court denied relief, after
which the defendants appealed to the Kentucky Supreme
Court.2 1 After "careful review of this matter," that tribunal
determined that there was "no reason to believe that the
circuit judge was clearly erroneous in any of his findings of
fact," ruling, "the decision of the trial judge was not clearly
erroneous nor was there any abuse of discretion." 22 The
court stated that "[a] method of execution is considered to
be cruel and unusual punishment under the Federal
Constitution when the procedure for execution creates a
substantial risk of wanton and unnecessary infliction of
pain, torture, or lingering death."23  Using that standard,
and after a detailed examination of lethal injection as a
method of execution, the court held that "[t]he lethal
injection method used in Kentucky is not a violation of the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or
20 Baze, 217 S.W.3d at 209 (citing Woods v. Commonwealth, 142
S.W.3d 24 (Ky. 2004)).
21 Id. The Supreme Court of Kentucky briefly summarized the
conclusions of the trial judge: 1) the inmates did not show by a
preponderance of the evidence that the lethal injection method was not
normal in capital punishment; 2) the method was not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence to degrade the dignity of the felons; 3)
no evidence proved that lethal injection inflicted unnecessary pain and
suffering; 4) no evidence supported the contention that lethal injection
caused unnecessary psychological suffering; 5) the method does not
deprive the prisoners of their due process rights; and 6) the actual
physical administration of the method did not create a substantial risk
of unnecessary infliction of pain and suffering to violate the Eighth
Amendment. See id. at 210-11 (citations omitted).
22 Baze, 217 S.W.3d at 210.
23 Id. at 209 (emphasis added) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976)).
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Section 17 of the Kentucky Constitution's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment."
24
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari
and affirmed the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision.25
The Court first confirmed that "capital punishment is
constitutional" 26 and pointed out that there must be some
means of carrying out such punishment. 27  Further, the
Court agreed that "the Constitution does not demand the
avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out executions,
28
and, likewise, the petitioners did not claim that all pain
must be avoided. 29 Rather, the petitioners contended that
"the Eighth Amendment prohibits procedures that create an
'unnecessary risk' of pain."30 The petitioners argued that
the courts must consider "(a) the severity of pain risked, (b)
the likelihood of that pain occurring, and (c) the extent to
which alternative means are feasible, either by modifying
existing execution procedures or adopting alternative
procedures."31
The Court, however, rejected this contention and
explained that the petitioners failed to meet their "heavy
burden," 32 stating that "to prevail on such a claim there
must be a 'substantial risk of serious harm,' an 'objectively
intolerable risk of harm' [by the current procedure] ....
24 Baze, 217 S.W.3d at 212. "Baze and Bowling have not met their
burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence as necessary in a
declaratory judgment action. The findings of fact by the trial judge are
not clearly erroneous. The conclusions of law are correct." Id. at 212-
13.
25 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. at 1529 (citation omitted).
26 Id. (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177).
27 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. at 1529.
28 id.
29 id.
30 id.
31 Id. (citation omitted).
32 Baze v. Rees, at 1533 (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175).
33 Baze v. Rees, at 1531 (citation omitted).
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Accordingly, the Court asserted that "a condemned prisoner
cannot successfully challenge a State's method of
execution merely by showing a slightly or marginally safer
alternative." 34 To be successful, a challenger must not only
prove that "the State's lethal injection protocol creates a
demonstrated risk of severe pain [but must also] show that
the risk is substantial when compared to the known and
available alternatives."
35
The petitioners argued that the actual protocol for
administering the three-drug combination could create
opportunities for error, which was a claim that relied on the
improper administration of the first drug, sodium
thiopental.36 The Court, however, found that the petitioners
did not prove that the risk of administering an inadequate
dose was a substantial risk of serious harm. 37 The Court
34 id.
35 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. at 1537 (emphasis added).
36 Id. at 1533.
Petitioners contend that there is a risk of improper
administration of thiopental because the doses are
difficult to mix into solution form and load into
syringes; because the protocol fails to establish a rate
of injection, which could lead to a failure of the IV;
because it is possible that the IV catheters will
infiltrate into surrounding tissue, causing an
inadequate dose to be delivered to the vein; because
of inadequate facilities and training; and because
Kentucky has no reliable means of monitoring the
anesthetic depth of the prisoner after the sodium
thiopental has been administered.
Id. (citing Brief for Petitioners at 12-20, Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520
(2008)).
37 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. at 1533.
We cannot say that this finding is clearly erroneous,
particularly when that finding is substantiated by
expert testimony describing the task of reconstituting
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also established that "Kentucky's failure to adopt
Petitioners' proposed alternatives" did not "demonstrate
that the Commonwealth's execution procedure [was] cruel
and unusual., 38  This view rejected the petitioners'
contention that Kentucky could switch to a one-drug
protocol "by using a single dose of sodium thiopental or
other barbiturate." 39  The Court concluded that "the
Commonwealth's continued use of the three-drug protocol
cannot be viewed as posing an 'objectively intolerable risk'
when no other State has adopted the one-drug method and
petitioners proffered no study showing that it is an equally
effective manner of imposing a death sentence. 4 °
In summation, the holding of the Court indicated
that the Eighth Amendment sets a rigorous requirement,
even when using a risk-based standard: "Simply because
an execution method may result in pain, either by accident
or as an inescapable consequence of death, does not
establish the sort of 'objectively intolerable risk of harm'
that qualifies as cruel and unusual" under the Eighth
Amendment.4'
powder sodium thiopental into solution form as
"[n]ot difficult at all... You take a liquid, you inject
it into a vial with the powder, then you shake it
up until the powder dissolves and, you're done. The
instructions are on the package insert."
Likewise, the asserted problems related to the IV
lines do not establish a sufficiently substantial risk of
harm to meet the requirements of the Eighth
Amendment. Kentucky has put in place several
important safeguards to ensure that an adequate dose
of sodium thiopental is delivered to the condemned
prisoner.
Id. (citations omitted).
38 Id. at 1534.
39 Id. (citation omitted).
40 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. at 1535 (citation omitted).
41 Id. at 1531 (emphasis added).
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III. Development of the Law
The United States Supreme Court considered
challenges to the methods and circumstances of
implementation of executions. Each time the Court
rejected the challenge, holding that either the method of
execution or circumstances surrounding its imposition did
not violate the Eighth Amendment. As in Baze, the
constitutionality of the death penalty itself was not at issue
in any of the preceding cases. Rather, the Court focused on
the constitutionality of specific methods and circumstances
42
surrounding the implementation of capital sentences.
Before proceeding, recall that the "cruel and unusual
punishments" provision for the Eighth Amendment was not
"incorporated" in the Fourteenth Amendment and thus
applied to the States until 1962. 43 Therefore, prior to that
time, all Supreme Court cases arising from the States
focused on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in assessing cruelty, and not on the Eighth
Amendment's provision.
First, in Wilkerson v. Utah, the Court addressed
whether the Federal Territory of Utah's method of death by
firing squad violated the Eighth Amendment.44  A jury
convicted the prisoner of first-degree murder, and he was
sentenced to death.45 At the time, Congress provided that
42 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 170 (1976).
43 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding that a
California statute making it a criminal offense to be addicted to the use
of narcotics constituted cruel and unusual punishment within the
meaning of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution).
44 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879). Also, for historical
reference, the Supreme Court was referring to the Federal Territory of
Utah and not the current State of Utah. Id. Utah was not admitted to
the Union until 1896; therefore, no issue of incorporation of the Eighth
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment appears in Wilkerson. Id.
41 Id. at 132.
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"[d]uly organized Territories are invested with legislative
power, which extends to all rightful subjects of legislation
not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States.' '4 6  Further, "Congress organized the
Territory of Utah on the 9th of September, 1850, and
provided that the legislative power and authority of the
Territory shall be vested in the governor and legislative
assembly., 47  In accordance with Congress's grant of
power to the territories, the Complied Laws of the Territory
of Utah stated that "'when any person shall be convicted of
any crime the punishment of which is death . . . he shall
suffer death by being shot, hung, or beheaded, as the court
may direct,' or as the convicted person may chose.",48 The
Court recognized that the laws of the Territories must not
violate the Constitution, analyzing the comments of several
prominent authors on the meaning and application of cruel
and unusual punishment.49 After such consideration, the
Court concluded that it would be difficult to "define with
exactness the extent of the constitutional provision which
provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be
inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture
... and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty
are forbidden by [the Eighth Amendment] to the
Constitution. Describing its understanding of the
meaning of "cruel and unusual punishments" as instances
where pain was "superadded, '' 51 the Court referenced cases
"where the prisoner was drawn or dragged to the place of
execution; or where he was emboweled alive, beheaded,
and quartered ... ,52 In light of its statements, the Court
46 Id. at 130 (citing Rev. Stats., sect. 1851).
47 Id. (citing 9 Stat. 454).
48 Id. (quoting 1852 Utah Laws 61; 1856 Utah Laws 564)).
49 See generally Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 134-37.
50 Id. at 135-36 (citations omitted).
"' Id. at 135.
52 Id.
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did not conclude that death by firing squad was
"unnecessary cruelty, ' 53 rather it held that Territory of
Utah's method of execution did not inflict cruel and
unusual punishment.
54
Second, in In re Kemmler,55 the Court, without
hesitation, refused to declare New York's execution
method of electrocution unconstitutional.56 The petitioner
challenged the execution method on Fourteenth
Amendment due process grounds, meaning that the Court
did not specifically reach the issue of Eighth Amendment
interpretation. 57 Instead, in light of Wilkerson, the Court
simply examined the meaning of "cruel" in the Eighth
Amendment, stating that "[p]unishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of the
word used in the Constitution. It implies there is something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.",58  Because such extreme
punishments would be cruel and this distinction was
"common knowledge," 59 the Court did not assume that
electrocution was "cruel" in this instance because "it was
for the legislature to say in what manner a sentence of,,6 0d e e m n d t a t h
death should be executed. The Court determined that the
decision to use electrocution as its means of execution did
not violate "any title, right, privilege, or immunity specially
set up or claimed by the petitioner under the Constitution of
53 Id. at 136 (citation omitted).
54 Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136 ("Concede all that, and still it by no means
follows that the sentence of the court in this case falls within that
category, or that the Supreme Court of the Territory erred in affirming
the judgment of the court of original jurisdiction.")
55 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
56 Id. at 449.
51 Id. at 446.
58 Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
59 id.
60 Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447.
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the United States." 6 1 Therefore, the decision as to which
method should be used "was almost wholly confided" 62 in
the legislature of the State. The Court further clarified the
role of the judiciary in determining the constitutionality of
an execution method by stating that "if the punishment
prescribed . . . were manifestly cruel and unusual, as
burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, or
the like, it would be the duty of the courts to adjudge such
penalties to be within the constitutional prohibition."
63
Such was not the case in Kemmiler, and the Court rejected
the Fourteenth Amendment challenge to electrocution
because "the legislature of the State of New York
determined that [electrocution] did not inflict cruel and
unusual punishment, and its courts have sustained that
determination." 64 Therefore, the Court could not "perceive
that the State has thereby abridged the privileges or
immunities of the petitioner, or deprived him of due
process of law."
65
Lastly and in a different context (circumstances of
the actual implementation of the death penalty) in
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,66 a plurality of the
Court refused to find that a second attempt at electrocution
violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment "on the ground that an execution under the
circumstances detailed would deny due process to [the
petitioner] because of... the cruel and unusual punishment
provision of the Eighth Amendment." 67  The Court
reasoned, however, that because the first attempt was an
61 Id.
62 Id. at 446.
63 Id. (emphasis added).
64 Id. at 449.
65 Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 449.
66 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
67 Id. at 461.
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"unforeseeable accident" 68 and a second attempt would not
"add an element of cruelty." 69 The initial attempt failed
because "[t]he executioner threw the switch but,
presumably because of some mechanical difficulty, death
did not result."70 Although it was not the holding of the
case, the plurality explained its interpretation of the
intention of the Eighth Amendment in light of the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause: "[t]he cruelty
against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is
cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not the
necessary suffering involved in any method employed to
extinguish life humanely.",7' The plurality used such an
interpretation to support its decision that the second attempt
at the execution did not violate the petitioner's Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights because of cruelty because
"no purpose to inflict unnecessary pain" existed.72
Although Wilkerson and Kemmler represent
precedent-setting cases that distinctively addressed the
constitutionality of specific methods of execution, it must
be noted that by no means are those cases the only Supreme
Court cases addressing the issue of the death penalty. A
plethora of cases have been argued before the Court
regarding the different aspects of the death penalty and its
interplay with the Eighth Amendment. For example,
although not dealing with specific methods of execution,
the Court, in Gregg v. Georgia,73 discussed the meaning of
"cruel and unusual" as an evolving concept, warranting
interpretation in "a flexible and dynamic manner.",74 The
Court rendered the Gregg decision when the tide of public
68 Id. at 464.
69 id.
70 Id. at 460.
71 Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464 (emphasis added).
72 Id. at 464-65 (emphasis added).
73 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
74 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171.
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opinion seemed to be shifting back in support of the death
penalty, following an unofficial moratorium on the death
penalty from 1967-1976.7 5  During the nine-year
moratorium, the courts and much of society grappled with
the question of whether "the U.S. reached the point at
which the death penalty affronts the basic standards of
decency of contemporary society. ' '76 Although the ultimate
answer to that question was "No," the debate and its
resulting court decisions had a broad impact on the nation.
As evidence of the effect of that debate, the Court
issued an opinion during the moratorium years that
continues to be considered by many, especially by anti-
death penalty activists, as the landmark decision on the
issue: Furman v. Georgia.7 7  The Court held that the
imposition and implementation of the death penalty in
cases where it is used in a discriminatory manner upon
racial minorities "constitute[s] cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
75 See The Clark County (Indiana) Prosecuting Attorney, Capital
Punishment Timeline, http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/htmi/death/
timeline.htm (last visited January 17, 2010) ("1966: Support for the
death penalty reaches an all time low. Gallup Poll shows nationwide
death penalty support only at 42%."); Gallup, http://www.gallup.com/
poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2010) (showing a
42% approval rating in 1966 by poll participants to the following
question: "Are you in favor of the death penalty for a person convicted
of murder?"); see also The Clark County (Indiana) Prosecuting
Attorney, Capital Punishment Timeline, http://www.clarkprosecutor.
org/html/death/timeline.htm (last visited January 17, 2010) ("1967:
After Luis Jose Monge is executed in the gas chamber at Colorado
State Penitentiary, an unofficial moratorium on executions begins.").
Luis Jose Monge was convicted for the 1963 first-degree murders of his
wife and three of his ten children. He was the seventy-seventh person
to be executed in Colorado. THE NATION: Colorado: No. 77, TIME,
June 9, 1967 at 33.
76 Jose M. Ferrer, III, The Death Penalty: Cruel and Unusual?, TIME,
Jan. 24, 1972 at 54.
77 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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,,78
Amendments. The Furman decision itself was a one-
paragraph statement that invalidated the death penalty as it
was to be administered on the three petitioners. 79 Despite
this Eighth Amendment ruling, no uniform and decisive
argument emerged from the decision because each of the
five justices in the majority wrote his own concurring
opinion, with no justice joining any other concurring
opinion. 8° Also, no uniform standard was established
78 Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-240 (Prisoners successfully challenged the
imposition of the death penalty because the punishment had been
applied in Georgia in an overly discretionary and discriminatory
manner).
79 Id.
Petitioner in No. 69-5003 was convicted of murder in
Georgia and was sentenced to death pursuant to Ga.
Code Ann. § 26-1005 (Supp. 1971) (effective prior to
July 1, 1969). . . . Petitioner in No. 69-5030 was
convicted of rape in Georgia and was sentenced to
death pursuant to Ga. Code Ann. § 26-1302 (Supp.
1971) (effective prior to July 1, 1969) .... Petitioner
in No. 69-5031 was convicted of rape in Texas and
was sentenced to death pursuant to Tex. Penal Code,
art. 1189 (1961). Certiorari was granted limited to
the following question: "Does the imposition and
carrying out of the death penalty in [these cases]
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?" [. .]
The Court holds that the imposition and carrying out
of the death penalty in these cases constitute cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The judgment in each
case is therefore reversed insofar as it leaves
undisturbed the death sentence imposed, and the
cases are remandedforfurther proceedings.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
80 Id.; Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts:
Reflecting on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital
Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 362 (1995).
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because two of the five justices in the majority favored
outright invalidation of the death penalty 8 1 and the other
three left the door open on the issue.8 2 Further, each of the
four dissenting justices wrote his own dissenting opinion,
although unlike the justices in the majority, some of the
dissenting justices joined the opinions of other dissenters. 83
As a result, despite the length of the Furman
decision (the longest decision ever to appear in the U.S.
REPORTS), lower courts have not been able to identify the
precedent Furman intended to advance and ultimately have
not used the opinion to deem the death penalty
84
unconstitutional. Nonetheless, Furman did have a broad
impact on the country: "[t]he practical effect of the
decision was to strike down existing statutes in all states,
and removing approximately 629 inmates from death row
[. .. ] 35 states responded immediately by enacting new
death penalty statutes, providing either for a mandatory
death sentence, or carefully guided jury discretion." 85
Although officials reconsidered and restructured death
penalty laws on both national and state levels in order to
accommodate the concerns stated in Furman,86 the
amended statutes that emerged did not lighten the amount
of death penalty litigation. Because problems arose with
81 Furman, 408 U.S. at 305-06 (Justice Brennan's concurrence and
reasoning for invalidation of the death penalty); Id. at 371 (Justice
Marshall's concurrence and opposition to the implementation of the
death penalty).
82 Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Justice Douglas's concurrence); Id. at 310
(Justice Stewart's concurrence); Id. at 314 (Justice White's
concurrence).
83 See generally Furman, 408 U.S. at 375-470 (exhibiting all the
dissenting opinions).
84 Steiker, supra note 73, at 362.
85 The Clark County (Indiana) Prosecuting Attorney, Capital
Punishment Timeline, http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/
timeline.htm (last visited January 17, 2010).
86 Steiker, supra note 73, at 363 (citation omitted).
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the wording in a number of the new statutes, litigation
ensued to determine whether the new statutory
constructions should be upheld or struck down.
87
Although the litigation leading up to and including
Furman demonstrated changing times and a temporary
surge toward the complete abolition of the death penalty,
the pendulum started to move the other way in Gregg.
Chief Justice Warren expanded upon the notion that
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment should be fluid by
stating in a pre-Furman case that "[t]he Amendment must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society."88 In Gregg,
the Court agreed generally, stating that "an assessment of
contemporary values concerning the infliction of a
challenged sanction is relevant to the application of the
Eighth Amendment."8 9 However, the Court continued and
ultimately stated that the power to determine these
"evolving standards of decency" 90 is limited because "in a
democratic society, legislatures, not courts, are constituted
87 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (challenging the
imposition of the death penalty under the amended, post-Furman laws
of Georgia, but ending with the Court upholding Georgia's statutes);
Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 331, 336 (1976) (striking down a
statute that allowed for a mandatory death penalty in various
situations); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (also
striking down a mandatory death penalty statute); Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262, 276-77 (1976) (upholding a statute that provided sentencer
discretion through the use of "special issues"); Proffitt v. Florida, 428
U.S. 242, 259-60 (1976) (upholding a statute that guided sentencer
discretion through the use of mitigating factors.).
88 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (highlighting the general
notion that the Constitution is a living document, although Trop is not a
death penalty case).
89 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173.
90 Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
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to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of
the people."
9
'
Therefore, in assessing a punishment selected by a
democratically elected legislature against the
constitutional measure, we presume its validity.
We may not require the legislature to select the
least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty
selected is not cruelly inhumane or
disproportionate to the crime involved. And a
heavy burden rests on those who would attack the
judgment of the representatives of the people.92
As evidenced above, the Court has varied on the
extent to which it will review the punishment selected by
the States in cases that do not deal directly with specific
methods of execution. However, when indeed faced with
determining the constitutionality of specific methods of
execution, as it was charged to do in Baze, the Court has
historically confined its powers and arguably remained
within established bounds of judicial review.93
IV. Current Policy
History supports a conclusion that methods of
execution and circumstances surrounding the
implementation of execution have been challenged for
centuries; with each challenge, a precedent was set.
94
91 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 175-76 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 383 (1972)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
92 Id. at 175 (emphasis added).
93 See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 449; Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136-37.
94 Wilkerson upheld death by firing squad as a constitutional method of
execution. Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136-37. See also Kemmler, 136 U.S.
at 449 (upholding electrocution as a constitutional method of
execution); Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464 (upholding the constitutionality
144
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Likewise, Baze set a standard, albeit in a plurality opinion,
for a judicial challenge of the method of lethal injection,
undoubtedly affecting current policy on the subject.
Oklahoma, in 1977, was the first state to adopt lethal
injection, 95 but the United States Supreme Court did not
directly address the method in light of the Eighth
Amendment until Baze. Numerous states voluntarily issued
moratoriums on executions by lethal injection while the
Supreme Court considered Baze. Several states juickly
resumed executions after the release of the decision. 9
Since Baze and as of June 1, 2009, sixty-six
convicted felons have been executed by lethal injection in
the United States.97 Such executions went forward because
under the Eighth Amendment of a second attempt of death by
electrocution).
95 See The Clark County (Indiana) Prosecuting Attorney, Methods of
Execution, http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/methods.htm
(last visited July 20, 2009) ("In 1977, Oklahoma became the first state
to adopt lethal injection.").
96 See Bill Mears, Inmates in Two States Have Dates with Executioner,
CNN, May 2, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/05/02/
execution.preview/index.html ("Mississippi and Georgia plan
executions next week, moving quickly after the Supreme Court ruled
April 16 that Kentucky's lethal injection procedures were
constitutional."); Bill Mears, Georgia Killer Executed After Lethal
Injection Moratorium, CNN, May 6, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/
CRIME/05/06/georgia.execution/index.html ("William Earl Lynd was
the first inmate to die by injection since September, when the U.S.
Supreme Court agreed to consider whether the three-drug combination
represented cruel and unusual punishment.").
97 See generally Associated Press, Ohio Performs 1,000 Execution in
U.S., FOX NEWS, July 21, 2009, http://foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,534254,00.html (reporting the 1000th execution in the United
States since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976); The Clark
County (Indiana) Prosecuting Attorney, U.S. Executions since 1976,
http://www.clarkprosecutor.org/html/death/usexecute.htm (last visited
July 20, 2009) (providing a chronologically organized chart with the
names of convicts executed since 1976 and by what method the
executions were carried out).
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most of the states that employ lethal injection as the method
of execution follow the three-drug protocol addressed in
Baze.98 The Court specifically commented on its probable
treatment of future challenges to methods that mirror
Kentucky's protocol: "A State with a lethal injection
protocol substantially similar to the protocol we uphold
today would not create a risk that meets this standard." 99
"This standard" refers to what a convict must prove to
successfully show that a lethal injection protocol violates
the Eighth Amendment: that the method "creates a
demonstrated risk of severe pain. He must show that the
risk is substantial when compared to the known and
available alternatives."'
00
The most recent decision that applied Baze came
from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals on July 2, 2009, in
Harbison v. Little. l0' Harbison, a death row inmate, argued
that "the lethal injection protocol utilized by [Tennessee]
violates his Eighth Amendment rights because it involves
the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."'
0 2
However, the Sixth Circuit rejected the argument because
Tennessee, like Kentucky, employs a three-drug protocol
for carrying out lethal injection. 0 3 As a result, the court
held:
Given the direction in Baze that a protocol
substantially similar to Kentucky's would not
98 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1527 (2008) (noting that "at least 30
[States] (including Kentucky) use the same combinations of three drugs
in their lethal injection protocols") (citation omitted).
99 Id. at 1537 (emphasis added).
1oo Id.
'01 Harbison v. Little, No 07-6225, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 14742, at
*1 (6th Cir. July 2, 2009).
102 Id. at *3.
103 Id. at *4 ("The three drugs utilized are sodium thiopental,
pancuronium bromide, and potassium chloride.") (citation omitted).
Kentucky uses the same three drugs.
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create a risk that violates the constitutional
standard set forth in the Court's opinion,
Tennessee's protocol must be upheld because
Baze addressed the same risks identified by the
trial court, but reached the conclusion that they did
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. 104
The Sixth Circuit's actions demonstrate the policy impact
of Baze. Like many other states that halted and examined
lethal injection protocols while Baze was pending,
Tennessee ultimately retained its three-drug protocol
because the method did not violate the Eighth Amendment
ban on "cruel and unusual punishments."'0 5 As this recent
action demonstrated, the lower courts have employed Baze
to uphold the lethal injection protocols used by the states,
building on the foundation of policy that has historically
recognized the states' abilities to choose a specific
procedure for carrying out death sentences.
V. Analysis and Evaluation
10 6
The Court in Baze correctly held that the lethal
injection method of execution did not violate the Eighth
Amendment. However, the substantial risk standard
approved by the plurality significantly broadened the
original intent of cruel and unusual punishments because no
substantial risk standard is stated within the text of the
Constitution nor has one been previously contemplated by
1' Id. at *I 1-12. The court referred to the Supreme Court's statement
in Baze: "A State with a lethal injection protocol substantially similar
to the protocol we upheld today would not create a risk that meets this
standard." Id. at *8-9 (citation omitted).
'0' See id. at *5
'06 Before proceeding to the Analysis Section, I want to state that the
analysis is based upon my research and understanding on the topic as a
first-year law student. The conclusions stated in this section reflect my
opinion.
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the Court. As a result, the addition of a substantial risk
assessment (requiring the petitioner to prove that "the
State's lethal injection protocol creates a demonstrated risk
of severe pain [and] ...that the risk is substantial when
compared to the known and available alternative") 10 7 only
complicates the purpose and intention of the Eighth
Amendment and adds an unnecessary and arbitrary element
of analysis. Further, the establishment of a substantial risk
standard departs from the holdings of previous cases that
sustained other methods of execution. 10 8 Those holdings
were direct and to the point, concisely explaining the
purpose of the Eight Amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishments. 0 9 In summary, the basic purpose of
the Eighth Amendment is simple and was accurately and
succinctly stated by Justice Thomas in his concurring
opinion: "[A] method of execution violates the Eighth
Amendment only if it is deliberately designed to inflict
pain."' 10
As an example of this simple purpose, in Wilkerson,
the Court rejected the argument that death by firing squad
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause
protection from cruelty because it did not fall into the
category of punishment in which pain and suffering were
"superadded" to the execution. 1 Similarly, the Court
explained in Kemmler that the meaning of "cruel," as used
in the Eighth Amendment, referred to punishment
involving "torture or lingering death."" 1
2
In both of these precedent-setting cases, the Court
relied on Fourteenth Amendment Due Process to declare
the methods of execution constitutional and consistently
107 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1537 (2008).
108 See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 449; Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136-37.
109 See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 449; Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 136-37.
110 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1556 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
..' Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135.
112 Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447.
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understood the Eighth Amendment as "forbidding
purposely tortuous punishments.""11 3  Interestingly, the
plurality opinion in Baze briefly cited those important cases
in the context of its discussions of the purpose of the Eighth
Amendment: the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments intended to guard against the infliction of
additional pain. The plurality, however, did not actually
incorporate the Court's previous holdings and instead left
the discussion as an isolated historical overview on the
subject. 114 Had the Court truly used the cases for its
examinations of the Eighth Amendment, the Court would
have realized that the establishment of a substantial risk
assessment scheme could not be reconciled with the
analysis in these long-revered and respected cases.'
15
Therefore, just as Justice Thomas reasoned in his
concurrence, the substantial risk standard has no basis in
the historical understanding of the Eighth Amendment or in
the applicable method-of-execution cases previously
discussed.1 16
The Eighth Amendment originated from a similar
provision in the English Bill of Rights of 1688,' 17 and its
subsequent history can be succinctly described as follows:
The path by which the phrase "cruel and unusual
punishments" has come into our law is well
known. It first appeared in the English Bill of
" Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1560 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
114 See Baze, 128 S.Ct. at 1530.
115 See Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 436, 449; Wilkerson, 99 U.S at 130, 136-
37.
116 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1556 ("This standard.., finds no support in the
original understanding of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause or
in previous method-of-execution cases. .. ").
117 Resweber, 329 U.S. at 463. See generally William H. Danne, Jr.,
Annotation, Prison Conditions as Amounting to Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 51 A.L.R.3d 111, 130-34 (1973) (reviewing the history of
"cruel and unusual punishments").
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Rights of 1688. It formed a part of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights adopted in 1776. James
Madison placed it in the constitutional
amendments he drafted in 1789 and it was
approved by Congress with little debate. It was
incorporated into the Constitution in 1791 as part
of the eighth amendment." 18
Although there appeared to be little debate on the
amendment, the Framers of the Constitution intended to use
the Eighth Amendment to limit legislative bodies from
imposing torturous punishments.1 9 "Like other parts of the
Bill of Rights, this amendment was intended to allay the
doubts of those who feared that the new federal
government, unchecked by specific constitutional
limitations, might ride roughshod over personal
liberties."' 120 Therefore, the inclusion of the amendment in
I18 Joseph E. Browdy & Robert J. Saltzman, Note, The Effectiveness of
the Eighth Amendment: An Appraisal of Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 36 N.Y.U. L. REV. 846 (1961) (footnotes omitted).
119 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1557-58 (Thomas, J., concurring).
120 Browdy, supra note I 1, at 846 (footnote omitted); see also James
S. Campbell, Revival of the Eighth Amendment: Development of
Cruel-Punishment Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16 STAN. L. REV.
996 (1964).
That the eighth amendment prohibits, at a minimum,
the infliction of "inhuman and barbarous"
punishments is clear from the few clues we now have
about the purpose of including it in the Bill of Rights
.... At the Massachusetts convention Mr. Holmes
pointed out that under the Constitution the Congress
was "nowhere restrained from inventing the most
cruel and unheard-of punishments and annexing them
to crimes; and there is no constitutional check on
them, but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the
most mild instruments of discipline."
Id. at 997 (footnotes omitted).
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the Constitution had the specific purpose of curtailing the
torturous and barbarous punishments that were inflicted
upon the people by English monarchs. 12'
Accordingly, "[e]xpressions in the first congress
confirm the view that the cruel and unusual punishments
clause was directed at prohibiting certain methods of
punishment."'' 22 These were to be prohibited because they
were unquestionably torturous and clearly meant to inflict
unnecessary pain and suffering. No risk assessment
scheme was contemplated as a necessary part of the
analysis because the prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishments was simply implemented by the Framers of
the Constitution to prohibit "that which is excessive."
123
Returning to the plurality's opinion in Baze, the
cases that the plurality cited in support of its substantial risk
standard do not address the constitutionality of the
execution methods; rather, the cases discuss the Eighth
Amendment in relation to the risk of injury to an inmate
while imprisoned. 124 Although such situations warrant the
application of the Eighth Amendment, the deprivation of
water or food differs significantly from the slight prick of a
sterile needle during the administration of lethal injection.
The plurality made no attempt at distinguishing the two
situations, but instead simply stated that "[o]ur cases
recognize that subjecting individuals to a risk of future
harm-not simply actually inflicting pain-can qualify as
cruel and unusual punishment."' 125  In neglecting to
distinguish the situations, the plurality delivered a decision
121 See Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Inflicted": The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 840-41
(1969).
122 Id. at 842 (emphasis added).
123 Id. (citing O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 340 (1892) (Field, J.,
dissenting)).
124 See e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993).
125 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1530.
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with an unsupported and unjustified substantial risk
standard because the cases used to support the standard do
not coincide with the situation in which the standard will
actually be applied (during the implementation of the death
penalty). In essence, the Court compared apples to
oranges. Because the plurality then proceeded to establish
a standard based on these incompatible scenarios, the
substantial risk standard is neither correct nor appropriate.
To further show how the plurality supported the
substantial risk standard, consider the main case cited:
Helling v. McKinney. 126 The case concerned an inmate's
exposure to tobacco smoke and the potential health risk
caused to the inmate by such exposure.' 27 The Court held
that a claim for relief for this health risk could be sought
under the Eighth Amendment.' 28 However, to apply the
concept of substantial risk to the instant matter, the Court
banked on the statement in Helling statement that a risk
must be "sure or very likely to cause serious illness and
needless suffering."' 129  The standard, as applied to the
prison condition situation in Helling, adequately resolved
the issue. When applied to the method-of-execution
context, however, the holding expands the original intent of
the Eighth Amendment. It does so because it requires the
courts to assess the execution methods of states for any
potential risk of harm.
The difficulty with using Helling is that the case
made reference to a condition of confinement, not to the
126 Helling, 509 U.S. 25 (1993).
127 Id. at 27-28.
128 Id. at 35 ("We affirm the Court of Appeals that McKinney states a
cause of action under the Eighth Amendment by alleging that
petitioners have, with deliberate indifference, exposed him to levels of
ETS that pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future
health.").
129 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531 (quoting Helling, 509 U.S. at 33)
(emphasis in original).
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punishment of confinement itself. 130  This is problematic
when one recalls that the Eighth Amendment bans cruel
and unusual punishments, not conditions of punishments.'
3
'
"At the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the word
'punishment' referred to the penalty imposed for the
commission of a crime."' 132 "Punishments" include fines,
penalties, confinement, and sentences imposed. 133  No
historical evidence indicates that the Framers of the
Constitution intended to consider anything other than
punishments for Eighth Amendment purposes. 1
34
Therefore, no evidence proves that the Framers considered
conditions as a possible subject of cruel and unusual
punishments.
135
In this context, the Court's application of such a
standard is troublesome, especially considering that the
instant matter involved a method of execution, not a
condition of confinement or even confinement itself. In
essence, the Court disregarded the simple intent of the
Eighth Amendment, as alluded to in the prior method-of-
execution cases: "[T]he Eighth Amendment is aimed at
methods of execution purposely designed to inflict pain." 3 6
Further, because of the plurality's opinion, two
conflicting standards to assess the constitutionality of
methods of execution now arguably exist: 1) An
assessment of whether punishments clearly involve a
purposeful infliction of pain or "something more than the
"0 Helling, 509 U.S. at 37-38 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
131 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 38 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
133 See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1234 (6th ed. 1990)).
134 See id. at 38-39 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
135 Helling, 509 U.S. at 38-39 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).136 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1559 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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mere extinguishment of life"'137 as described in historical
case law and 2) the "substantial risk" assessment as stated
in Baze. The task of assessing whether a method purposely
inflicts pain is completely different from determining
whether a method of execution "creates a substantial risk of
wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, torture, or
lingering death"' 13 8 or provides "a 'substantial risk of
serious harm,' an 'objectively intolerable risk of harm."",139
This second method only serves to confuse and complicate
an assessment that was intended by the Framers of the
Constitution to be simple.
Further, an assessment of a "substantial risk" of
harm is far from an objective standard because one
person's definitions of both "substantial" and "risk" will
almost always differ from the next person's definition. On
the other hand, a determination of whether a method of
execution purposefully inflicts unnecessary and excessive
pain is much more black and white. In fact, it could be
argued that lethal injection itself was designed for the very
reason of ensuring that the convicted felon would not feel
any pain during the execution process, thereby eliminating
the argument that any purposeful or unnecessary pain is
inflicted.
Finally on this point, the plurality in Baze admitted
that some levels of pain are inherent with various execution
methods. 14  The plurality also said that this inherent
possibility (a "risk" of pain) is not grounds for qualifying
137 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
138 Baze v. Rees, 217 S.W.3d 207, 209 (Ky. 2006) (emphasis added).
139 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1531 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
140 id. at 1529 ("Some risk of pain is inherent in any method of
execution-no matter how humane-if only from the prospect of error
in following the required procedure. It is clear, then, that the
Constitution does not demand the avoidance of all risk of pain in
carrying out executions.")
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an execution method as cruel and unusual. 141 Therefore,
that very admission by the plurality severely complicates, if
not completely contradicts, its substantial risk assessment
scheme.
Additionally, the plurality opinion in Baze may only
exacerbate the lethal injection debate as it will most likely
give rise to yet more litigation on the subject.142  The
opinion inadvertently opens the door for frivolous claims
from convicts for the possible causes of substantial risk,
including human error, lingering death, and the actual act
of administering lethal injection. In essence, the creation of
a substantial risk standard complicated the much simpler
standard established by previous cases and litigation will
quickly ensue to take advantage of the expanded standard.
The substantial risk standard unwarrantedly confuses the
original purpose of the Eighth Amendment, which is
simply to prohibit punishments that are clearly excessive. 
143
Further, the Baze plurality gave no definition of
"substantial," nor did the plurality give any instruction on
how to address such inquiries.' As a result, if the
standard is followed, the lower courts will have to establish
their own definitions for the substantial risk standard,
actions which will undoubtedly be challenged by yet more
litigation.
141 Id. at 1531 ("Simply because an execution method may result in
pain, either by accident or as an inescapable consequence of death, does
not establish the sort of 'objectively intolerable risk of harm' that
qualifies as cruel and unusual.").
142 See id. at 1562 (Thomas, J., concurring).
143 Granucci, supra note 121, at 842 (citing O'Neil v. Vermont, 144
U.S. 323, 340 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting)).
144 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1562 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Farmer
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 n.3 (1994) (referring to Helling's
holding regarding the risk of injury, this subsequent case said that "[a]t
what point a risk of inmate assault becomes sufficiently substantial for
Eighth Amendment purposes is a question this case does not present,
and we do not address it").
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Consequently, rather than following the precedents
set out in Wilkerson and Kemmler, the Court stretched an
obscure, risk-based standard and forced it to fit the method-
of-execution issue in Baze. The plurality almost seemed to
intentionally avoid writing a simple opinion that would
express the true, concise, and historically established
standard of analysis used to determine whether a
punishment is cruel and unusual. That standard simply
prohibits the purposeful infliction of pain. As a result, the
plurality's substantial risk standard does nothing more than
open the door to future litigation on methods of execution
and the implementation of the death penalty in general,
"encumber[ing] [the death penalty] with unwarranted
restrictions neither contained in the text of the Constitution
nor reflected in two centuries of practice under it."
' 14 5
VI. Conclusion
Baze correctly held that Kentucky's lethal injection
protocol did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The
plurality's implementation of a substantial risk standard for
measuring a violation of the Eighth Amendment, however,
severely complicates the Eighth Amendment's intent to
prohibit torture and "inhuman and barbarous"'
146
punishments that involve "something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.' 47 Although the plurality opinion
in Baze is not authoritative and did not infringe on the
states' abilities to choose a specific procedure for
administering a method of execution, the opinion will
undoubtedly affect the method of execution policy
decisions of the states.
Thus, the substantial risk standard adds unnecessary
elements to the analysis of the constitutionality of a method
145 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1555 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
146 Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447.
147 id.
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of execution, requiring the courts to assess any proffered
alternative procedure and further justify the reasons for
adhering to any current method of execution.1 48 The Baze
plurality effectively diluted the standard of cruel and
unusual punishments as intended by Framers of the
Constitution, stated in the text of the Eighth Amendment
and supported by the Court's previous decisions in method-
of-execution cases. Simply, punishments must be
intentionally designed to inflict pain worse than death itself
in order to violate the Eighth Amendment. In consideration
of this straightforward purpose, a more complicated
standard only misinterprets the Framers' original intention
for the amendment, opening the door to a never-ending
influx of unnecessary and costly litigation.
148 See Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1532.
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STUDENT CASE COMMENTARY
CRAWFORD MEANS WHAT IT SAYS:
THE BIRTH OF THE MELENDEZ-DIAZ
OBJECTION
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
Danielle Greer]
I. Summary
In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, with Justice
Scalia writing the opinion, the Supreme Court considered
the issue of whether affidavits reporting the results of
forensic analysis connecting the defendant to an illegal
substance are testimonial and therefore subject to the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Court
held in Pointer v. Texas that the Confrontation Clause
applies to all criminal prosecutions. 3 The statute derives its
authority from the Fourteenth and the Sixth Amendments.
4
This Clause ensures defendants the right to confront
adverse witnesses.5 The Court's holding in Crawford v.
Washington established the rule that testimonial statements
are subject to the Confrontation Clause. 6 Therefore, the
defendant has the right to confront any witness "who
1 J.D., pending 2011, Univ. of Tennessee; B.A., Sociology with
Criminal Justice concentration. Prior to attending law school, Ms.
Greer worked as a case manager for developmentally delayed children.
2 U.S. CONST., amend. XI.
3 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (holding that a defendant
should enjoy the right to confront all the witnesses against him).
4 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2529 (2009); see
also Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404. See generally U.S. CONST., amend. VI.
5 See generally U.S. CONST., amend. VI.
6 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61-63 (2004).
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'bear[s] testimony' against him.",7  If the witness is
unavailable for trial and the defendant has not had an
opportunity to cross-examine that witness, the testimony is
deemed inadmissible.
8
In Crawford, the Court explicitly stated that "ex
parte in-court testimony" that "would lead an objective
witness to reasonably believe that the statement would be"
used later at trial is considered a testimonial statement.
9
The Court listed certain statements that it considered
testimonial, including affidavits, but explained that these
statements can come in various forms. 0  However, the
testimonial issue became unclear when the Massachusetts
Court of Appeals in Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz,
bound by precedent of the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts, held that authors of certificates of forensic
analysis are not subject to confrontation under the Sixth
Amendment."1 The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts denied review, and the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari. 12  In a five-to-four
plurality decision, the Court reversed and remanded
Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, and held that certificates
containing forensic analysis are testimonial and the
admission of such evidence without the ability to cross-
examine the author violates the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment. 13
7 Id. at 68-69.
8 Id. at51.
I d. at 51-52.
10 Id.
11 Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 69 Mass. App. Ct 1114 (2007).
12 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2529 (2009).
13 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2529 (hereinafter "Melendez-Diaz").
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II. Background
This case began as a Massachusetts state court drug
trial. 14 Three men were arrested after police received a tip
that an employee at Kmart frequently exhibited suspicious
activity. 15 Following up on this tip, the police monitored
Kmart until they witnessed the reported activity. 16 The
activity suggested that the employee was leaving Kmart to
sell drugs and often returned a short time later.' 7 Working
under this assumption, the police searched the employee
when he returned to Kmart and found drugs in his
possession. 18  Believing the substance was cocaine, the
officers arrested all three men. 19 During transit to jail, the
officers noticed two of the three men were moving and
fidgeting in the backseat of the car.2 ° They ordered the
men to stop. 21 After the men were booked at the police
station, the officers found a plastic bag with nineteen
smaller bags of cocaine in it inside the police car.
22
Because he was one of the two men fidgeting in the
backseat of the police car during the transport, the officers
assumed that Melendez-Diaz hid the drugs in the police car
to avoid additional charges. 23 The officers charged the
defendant, Melendez-Diaz, with distributing and trafficking
24cocaine.
During trial, the prosecution sought to admit three
certificates of forensic analysis that identified the substance
14 Id. at 2530.
15 id.
16 id.
17 id.
18 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 id.
23 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2530.
24 Id. at 2531-32.
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found at the scene as cocaine.25 The defendant objected to
the admission of these certificates absent an opportunity to
26
cross-examine the author, citing Crawford. The trial
judge overruled this objection, and subsequently the jury
found Melendez-Diaz guilty.
27
III. Court's Conclusions and Rationale
The outcome of this case turned on whether the
certificates of forensic analysis were testimonial statements
within the meaning of Crawford. However, the Court also
spent considerable time addressing each of the State's and
the dissent's arguments. Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, explained that in Crawford the Court listed
affidavits in the "core class of testimonial statements." 28
Although the State argued that a certificate is different from
an affidavit, Justice Scalia referred to Black's Law
Dictionary and rejected this argument. 29 In Black's Law
Dictionary, certificates are defined as "declaration[s] of
facts written down and sworn to by the declarant before an
officer authorized to administer oaths." 30  Justice Scalia
further explains that under Crawford, these certificates are
a "solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose
of establishing or proving some fact.",3 1 The Court also
relied on its decision in Davis v. Washington, finding that
the certificates would do "exactly what a witness would do
25 Id. at 2532.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
29 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.
30 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 62 (8th ed. 2004).
31 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.
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on direct examination. ' '32  On those facts, the Court
concluded the certificates were testimonial statements.
33
The State advanced many arguments, some of
which Justice Kennedy reiterated in his dissent.
34
However, each was unpersuasive to the majority of the
Court. Nevertheless, six of the State's arguments deserve
notice. The first was that the certificate was not an
accusatory witness. 35 Citing the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment, Justice Scalia asserted that the
Clause only contemplated two classes of witnesses: a
beneficial witness and an adverse witness.36 The certificate
certainly was not beneficial; therefore, it was adverse and
subject to the Confrontation Clause.37
The second argument was that neither the
certificates nor their authors were conventional witnesses
for three reasons: the forensic analysts only observed near-
contemporaneous events; they did not observe the crime or
anything related to it, and the certificates were not provided
in response to interrogation.3 s The State argued that only
conventional witnesses are subject to the Confrontation
Clause and explained that the forensic analysts are not
conventional witnesses. 39 In analyzing the confrontation
issue, the focus is on the substance of the testimony, not the
40
actual witness. Therefore, the Court rejected the
argument that only witnesses who observe non-
32 Id. at 2542 ("It is unlikely that defense counsel will insist on live
testimony whose effect will be merely to highlight rather than cast
doubt upon the forensic analysis.")
31 Id. at 2523-26.
34 See Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543-61 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(accepting some of the State's arguments).
35 129 S. Ct. at 2534.
36 Id. at2535.
37 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2534.
38 Id. at 2534-36.
39 id.
40 id.
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contemporaneous events are subject to the Confrontation
Clause.4 1  Additionally, nothing about the fact that the
certificates were completed almost a week after the tests
were conducted cures the statement of its testimonial
nature.42
The fact that the forensic analyst did not observe the
crime adds nothing to the issue of whether the statement is
testimonial. The proposition that only witnesses who
directly observe the crime are subject to the Confrontation
Clause is without supporting authority and if implemented,
would also exempt expert witnesses.43 The State further
argued that the forensic analysts' certificates were not
testimonial in nature because the certificates were not
provided in response to interrogation. 44 This argument was
also rejected by the Court, primarily because implementing
that rule would exclude another important class of
witnesses: all witness who voluntarily gave their
statements to police.45 In the interests of creating a
workable rule, the Court had to reject the State's argument
that only conventional witnesses are subject to the
Confrontation Clause.
The State's third argument was that the
Confrontation Clause does not apply to scientific testing.
46
The State argued that because the Clause was designed to
prevent manipulation and distortion prone to recollection
testimony, it did not apply to a purely neutral, scientific
testing.47 However, the Court provided extensive evidence
that scientific data is prone to human error and suggested
that forcing the analyst to testify will deter other analysts
41 id.
42 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2534-36.
43 Id.
44id.
45 id.
46 Id. at 2536.
47 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2536.
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from committing fraud or making careless mistakes. 48 The
Court also noted that of all criminal convictions eventually
overturned, sixty percent of the defendants were convicted
with incorrect forensic evidence that was later proven
invalid.49
The State's fourth argument was that at common
law these forensic analysts' certificates were considered
business records and accepted without objection. 50  The
Court insinuated that this argument misses the issue. 51 It is
not the document's status as a business record that is
dispositive, but the qtuestion of whether it was made in
anticipation of trial.: In the dissent, Justice Kennedy
agreed with the State's argument that analysts' certificates
in general have customarily been accepted without
objection and cites one situation where a clerk certificate,
prepared in anticipation of trial, was admitted without
being subject to the Confrontation Clause. 53 However, the
Court distinguishes the clerk's certificate from that of the
forensic analyst: the clerk's certificate only certifies that a
document is correct.54 The clerk has no authority to add
anything substantive or opine in any way on this
certificate.55 This is in contrast to a forensic analyst's
certificate that is used as prima facie evidence of a
defendant's guilt. 56 The Court did not accept the State's
argument that these cases are analogous.57 In fact, these
cases are easily distinguishable.
58
48 Id. at 2536-37.
49 Id. at 2534.
50 Id. at 2538.
51 Id. at 2838-41.
52 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2538-41.
53 Id.
54 id.
51 Id. at 2539.
56 id.
57 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2539.
58 id.
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The fifth argument asserted by the State was that
the Confrontation Clause should not apply because the
defendant could have subpoenaed the analyst.5 9  The
subpoena power derives from the Compulsory Process
Clause, but the Court retorted that this Clause is no
substitute for the Confrontation Clause. The latter
imposes on the prosecution to present its witnesses, but
requiring the defendant to present adverse witnesses would
leave him with no remedy if those witnesses refused to
appear or were unavailable. 61 Additionally, this would shift
the State's burden to present its witnesses to the
defendant. 6
2
The last argument the State asked the Court to
consider was the effect this ruling would have on the
already strained criminal justice system. 63  The State
predicted that defense attorneys, who are zealously
advocating for their clients, would always request that
analysts come to court. 6 4 That, in turn, would increase
costs for the government and place an undue burden on the
analysts. 65  The Court responded to this argument by
analogizing this potential burden with the burden of a jury
trial and the privilege against self-incrimination: although
burdensome, "they are constitutional protections that we
cannot disregard." 66
The Court also discussed notice-and-demand
statutes that require a defendant to give notice of intent to
use the analyst's report. 67 In his dissent, Justice Kennedy
argued that these statutes face invalidation in light of the
59 id.
6 Id. at 2540.
61 id.
62 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2540.
63 Id. at 2540-41.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 id.
67 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541-42.
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Court's decision because they are burden-shifting
statutes. Similar to the State, this argument is still
emphasizing the burden that this rule will place on the
criminal justice system. Again, the argument failed to
move a majority of the Court.69 The Court explained that
"the defendant always has the burden" to raise the
Confrontation Clause objection.70 If the defendant ever
fails to raise this burden, the issue is lost on appeal. 7' The
Court further explained that the simplest form of notice-
and-demand statutes only govern the period within which a
defendant must respond, and that is constitutional.72 The
Court noted that it was only opining on the legality of
notice-and-demand statutes similar to the one described.73
Despite the State's many arguments, the Court
maintained that the forensic certificates were testimonial.7"
As such, the trial court should not have admitted the
evidence without the analyst's trial testimony or a
defendant having a previous opportunity to cross-
examine. 75 The Court's decisions in Crawford and Davis
dictate that the inability to cross-examine an adverse
witness is a violation of the defendant's constitutional
rights, and the Court adhered to that precedent.
IV. Analysis
Although the State and Justice Kennedy had
compelling arguments, the Court's decision in Melendez-
Diaz was directly in line with precedent. In Crawford and
68 Id. at 2957.
69 Id. at 2541-42
70 id.
71 id.
72 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541-42.
73 id.
74 Id. at 2532.
75 id.
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Davis, the Court set precedent that the Court has an interest
in following, absent overwhelming policy concerns. These
cases posed the most daunting obstacles to the State's
arguments because if the holdings applied, there was no
question of whether the certificates were testimonial and
subject to the Confrontation Clause. Realizing this, the
State tried to distinguish Crawford and Davis from
Melendez-Diaz, but offered only one distinguishable fact:
that the questionable testimony in Melendez-Diaz was a
certificate, as opposed to the verbal testimony at issue in
Crawford and Davis.76 The Court rightfully rejected this
argument, explaining that the Confrontation Clause only
anticipates two classes of witnesses: beneficial and
adverse. 77  The certificates were clearly adverse to the
defendant because this was the only evidence the
prosecution had that proved the substance in question was
cocaine.78
Additionally, the factual distinction that the State
and Justice Kennedy asserted is not supported by case law.
In Crawford, the Court explicitly stated that "various
formulations of . . . affidavits" are in the "core class of
testimonial statements." 79 However, the State argued that
the forensic analyst's certificate was not an affidavit and
should not be subject to the confrontation requirement. 80
The problem with this argument is twofold. First, the Court
in Crawford explained that affidavits come in various
forms. 81 Calling the document a certificate does not
dispose of the issue. Second, the State neglected to address
the fact that it is the content that determines whether the
76 Id. at 2534.
77 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2534.
78 Id. at 2531.
79 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
80 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532.
8 Id. at 2531-21.
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82
certificate is testimonial. Deferring to Crawford, the
Court held that the certificates were the functional
equivalent of affidavits because they were adverse to the
defendant and were made in anticipation of litigation.
83
Because of the well-established precedent, the Court had
little choice other than to render this class of evidence
subject to the Confrontation Clause. To rule otherwise
would question the status of those decisions and further
complicate the law in this area.
Nevertheless, the State brought up two persuasive
issues that the Court will likely see again: notice-and-
demand statutes and emergence of "the Melendez-Diaz
objection., 84 The Court implied that very basic notice-and-
demand statutes are constitutional, although this is likely
85dicta. However, the Court explicitly stated that this
opinion only extended to the simplest type of notice-and-
demand statutes, refusing to express an opinion on the
actual "burden-shifting" statutes. This suggests that the
Court would find that statutes imposing more than simple,
procedural requirements are unconstitutional. If the precise
issue on notice-and-demand statutes ever comes before the
Supreme Court, the Melendez-Diaz decision will
undoubtedly inform the Court's decision.
Justice Kennedy warned that the Court's holding
was too expansive and unnecessarily gave defendants an
unwarranted windfall.87 He predicted that once defense
attorneys were aware of Melendez-Diaz's implications,
upon objection, forensic analysts would have to testify
82 Id.
83 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52.
84 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2541.
85 Id. at 2541 ("[W]hat we have referred to as the 'simplest form of
notice and demand statutes,'.., is constitutional").
86 id.
87 Id. at 2557.
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because the attorneys would relentlessly use it as a tactic.
88
This would become known as the Melendez-Diaz
objection. 89 This point is valid, and the situation is likely to
come about. Although the majority dismissed this
argument, it is highly likely that at least the great defense
attorneys will take advantage of this requirement, forcing
the prosecution to produce its witnesses. However, it is an
overarching public concern that mandates this risk: the
constitutional right of a defendant to have a fair trial.
Requiring all forensic analysts to come to court would
undoubtedly place a strain on the system, but that concern
is markedly insufficient to warrant divesting a defendant of
his constitutional rights.
V. Conclusion
The Court's ruling in Melendez-Diaz made it clear
that in criminal trials the admission of forensic analysts'
certificates into evidence is subject to the Confrontation
Clause. Pre-Melendez-Diaz, the analysts' certificates had
generally been admitted into evidence with little or no
objection in states across the United States. Because the
Court determined that forensic analysts' certificates are
subject to Confrontation Clause scrutiny, the analysts will
now be required to give direct testimony. If the Court
follows the dicta in Melendez-Diaz regarding notice-and-
demand statutes when deciding future cases, it is very
possible that notice-and-demand statutes that go beyond
simple, procedural requirements will be found
unconstitutional. In balancing the constitutional rights of
the criminal defendant with the need of efficiency in the
judicial system, the Court must err on the side of the
defendant who risks the loss of life and liberty.
88 Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2557.
89 Id. at 2556-57.
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STUDENT CASE COMMENTARY
POST-CONVICTION ACCESS TO A STATE'S FORENSIC DNA
EVIDENCE FOR PROBATIVE TESTING:
NOT A FREESTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
District Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S.Ct. 2308
(2009).
Dorothea Thompson'
I. Summary
In District Attorney's Office v. Osborne, the United
States Supreme Court addressed the central issue of
whether Respondent William Osborne should have a
"freestanding and far-reaching constitutional right of
access" to the State's deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA")
evidence for the purpose of post-conviction relief.
2
Osborne asserted this constitutional right of access under
the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 3 rather
than proceeding through a writ of habeas corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254.4 The United States District Court for the
1 J.D., pending 2012, Univ. of Tennessee; M.A., English, Pennsylvania
State Univ.; Ph.D., Molecular Biology, Ohio State Univ. Prior to
attending law school, Dr. Thompson was an Assistant Professor of
Microbiology at Purdue Univ. and a research scientist.
2 District Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S.Ct. 2308, 2312 (2009)
(5-4 decision) (Alito, J., concurring) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Souter,
J., dissenting).
3 This federal statute allows any United States citizen or "other person
within the jurisdiction thereof' to pursue a civil action for the
"deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2002).
4 Habeas corpus is a writ through which a person can petition for relief
from unlawful custody. A federal court will not grant a writ of habeas
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District of Alaska initially dismissed the respondent's
claims, holding that an application for habeas corpus
constituted the proper mechanism for applicants attempting
to invalidate their criminal conviction. In its decision to
reverse, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit concluded that Osborne was procedurally warranted
in invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under the specific
circumstances of his case.5 On remand, the district court
granted Osborne summary judgment, stating that the
respondent had "a very limited constitutional right" to
access the State's forensic DNA evidence for new testing.
6
The district court based its decision on three factors: (1)
the unavailability of the more precise technique of short-
tandem-repeat ("STR") DNA analysis at the time of
Osborne's criminal trial; (2) the low cost to the State of
permitting such testing; and (3) the likelihood that the
results from such an analysis would be material to
Osborne's conviction.
7
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the
precedent established under Brady v. Maryland8 of a
prosecutor's pretrial duty to disclose material exculpatory
evidence also extended to the "government's duty to
disclose (or the defendant's right of access) to post-
corpus to a state prisoner "unless it appears that (A) the applicant has
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or (B)(i)
there is an absence of available State corrective process; or (ii)
circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the
rights of the applicant." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(l)(A)-(B)(ii) (2000).
5 Osborne v. District Attorney's Office, 423 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir.
2005).
6 Osborne v. District Attorney's Office, 445 F. Supp. 2d 1079, 1081
(D. Alaska 2006).
7 Id. at 1081-82.
8 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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conviction proceedings." 9 Granting certiorari, the Supreme
Court ultimately reversed this decision, holding that
Osborne had no freestanding substantive right under the
Due Process Clause' ° to obtain post-conviction access to
the State's biological evidence for DNA testing. A
dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens argued that principles
of fundamental fairness and justice dictate that convicted
persons such as Osborne should have a limited federal right
to potentially dispositive DNA evidence, and that such a
right would serve as a necessary and appropriate safeguard
against a State's arbitrary refusal to permit post-conviction
access. I I
II. Background
Osborne, who is an African-American male, and
another man were convicted by an Alaska state jury of
sexual assault and other crimes, which were perpetrated
against a female prostitute in March 1993.12 At the time of
Osborne's trial, polymerase chain reaction ("PCR")-based
DQ Alpha testing and the more discriminating restriction-
fragment-length-polymorphism ("RFLP") DNA testing
were typically employed for forensic DNA testing. 13 In the
instant case, the State performed DQ Alpha testing on
semen found in a condom at the crime scene, and the
results matched Osborne's genotypic profile, which is
found in approximately 16% of the black population. 4 The
DNA results conclusively excluded the victim and two
9 District Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S.Ct. 2308, 2315 (2009)
(citing Osborne v. District Attorney's Office, 521 F.3d 1118, 1128 (9th
Cir. 2008)) (emphasis in original).
1o U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
11 Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2335.
12 Id. at 2313.
"3 Id. at 2314.
14 Id. at 2313.
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additional suspects in the crime.' 5  Osborne's defense
attorney stated that RFLP DNA testing was not performed
for tactical reasons.' 6 Other incriminating evidence against
Osborne existed and most notably included his
identification by the victim as her attacker.'
7
After failing to get his conviction vacated or his
sentence mitigated at the appeal stage, Osborne then sought
post-conviction relief in the Alaska state court.1 8 At the
time of the Supreme Court's decision in this case, forty-six
states, in addition to the District of Columbia and the
Federal government, had enacted statutory laws directly
addressing post-conviction access to DNA evidence for
probative testing.' 9 However, Alaska only had a general
post-conviction relief statute, Alaska Statutes section
12.72.010 (2008), which the petitioner could invoke if
"there exist[ed] evidence of material facts, not previously
presented and heard by the court, that require[d] vacation of
the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice., 20 To
ensure further protections of a prisoner's due process
rights, the Alaska Court of Appeals, through judicial
decision, invokes a three-pronged test to determine the
prisoner's right to DNA testing under the State
21Constitution. Osborne stepped outside the procedural
15 Id.
16 Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2314.
17 Id. at2313.
'8 Id. at2314.
I9 d. at 2316.
20 Id. at 2317 (citing Alaska's general post-conviction relief provision
?rovided in ALASKA STAT. § 12.72.010(4) (2008)).
To be entitled to post-conviction DNA testing, a defendant must
show that "(1) that the conviction rested primarily on eyewitness
identification evidence, (2) that there was a demonstrable doubt
concerning the defendant's identification as the perpetrator, and (3) that
scientific testing would likely be conclusive on this issue." Id. at 2317-
18 (quoting Osborne v. State, 110 P.3d 986, 995 (Alaska Ct. App.
2005)).
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framework of the state criminal justice system and filed his
lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,22 thus raising federal
constitutional questions with respect to post-conviction
access to DNA evidence. This action ultimately required
resolution by the Supreme Court.
III. Court's Conclusions and Rationale
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
whether § 1983 was the proper statutory vehicle for
asserting Osborne's claim and whether Osborne was
entitled by right under the Due Process Clause to access the
State's evidence for DNA testing after criminal
conviction. 23  Chief Justice Roberts, who delivered the
majority opinion of the Court, dismissed the first issue for
resolution. 24 The Court assumed that the Alaska Court of
Appeals was correct in its conclusion that the applicable
law does not bar Osborne's § 1983 claim because
permitting Osborne access to the DNA evidence that he
seeks would not automatically result in the invalidity of his
conviction and his release from custody.25
After declining to resolve the procedural question, the
Court turned next to the substantive issue of whether state
prisoners have a cognizable constitutional right to access
forensic DNA evidence. 6 Acknowledging that Osborne
has "a liberty interest in demonstrating his innocence with
new evidence under state law," the Court proceeded by
examining "this asserted liberty interest to determine what
process (if any) is due.",27 In Brady, the Court held that a
prosecutor has a due process duty to disclose any
22 Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2318.
23 Id. at 2316.
24 Id. at 2319.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 2319-23.
27 Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2319.
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exculpatory evidence to the defendant prior to the trial
proceedings.28 Distinguishing Osborne from Brady, Chief
Justice Roberts stated that the Court of Appeals "went too
far" in extrapolating pre-conviction due process rights to
safeguard Osborne's post-conviction liberty interest.
The presumption of innocence is removed when a
defendant is convicted of a crime through a fair trial
process.30  The Court concluded that a valid conviction
creates "only a limited interest in post-conviction relief.",31
Therefore, as Chief Justice Roberts reasoned, the State
justifiably has a degree of latitude in imposing procedural
requirements for obtaining post-conviction relief (for
example, that the DNA analytical technology requested was
not available at trial or that eyewitness identification
32
evidence constituted the basis for conviction). Chief
Justice Roberts asserted the State's authority on such
matters by stating that the "federal courts may upset a
State's post-conviction relief procedures only if they are
fundamentally inadequate to vindicate the substantive
rights provided. In dicta, the Court concluded that
Alaska's procedures for post-conviction relief were
adequate on their face and the burden was on Osborne to
prove otherwise.34
Finally, the Court rejected Osborne's contention that
he has a freestanding constitutional right to access DNA
evidence. As the Court stressed, decisions regarding post-
conviction rights of access to a State's genetic evidence are
best left in the hands of the state courts and legislatures:
"The elected governments of the States are actively
28 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
29 Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2319.
30 Id. at 2320 (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 399 (1993)).
31 Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2320.
32 Id. at 2318, 2320-21.
33 Id. at 2320 (emphasis added).
31 Id. at 2321.
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confronting the challenges DNA technology poses to our
criminal justice systems and our traditional notions of
finality .... To suddenly constitutionalize this area would
short-circuit what looks to be a prompt and considered
legislative response.,
35
In concurrence, Justice Alito raised two additional
and independent reasons for why the respondent's
36
constitutional claim should fail. First, an application for a
writ of habeas corpus, not § 1983, is the proper legal
mechanism by which a state convict should aver a federal
constitutional right to access DNA evidence for discovery
testing. In such a case, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) requires
the applicant to have "exhausted the remedies available in
the courts of the State,"37 which Osborne had not done.
Second, Justice Alito concluded that, regardless of the
exhaustion provision in § 2254, Osborne's claim can be
rejected on the merits based on § 2254(b)(2), because "a
defendant who declines the opportunity to perform DNA
testing at trial for tactical reasons has no constitutional right
to perform such testing after conviction."
38
In dissent, Justice Stevens (joined in part by Justice
Souter and fully by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer) argued
that Osborne has a constitutional right to obtain post-
conviction access to physical evidence for DNA testing,
which Justice Stevens considers as dispositive. 39  State-
governed procedures for post-conviction relief must
comport with due process principles in order to provide
those persons petitioning for such relief with "fair
opportunity to assert their state-created rights." 40 Justice
Stevens directly questioned the adequacy of Alaska
35 Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2322.
36 Id. at 2324.
" 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2000).
38 Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2324.
39 Id. at 2331, 2333.
40 Id. at 2332.
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Statutes section 12.72.010(4) in providing procedural
protections to state prisoners seeking access to DNA
evidence for exculpatory testing. 41 According to Justice
Stevens, Alaska's refusal to allow Osborne access to the
State's DNA evidence constituted an arbitrary state
42government action. Arguing primarily from the principle
of fundamental fairness, Justice Stevens reasoned that the
fact that most states sanction a "post-conviction right to
DNA evidence makes it more, not less, appropriate to
recognize a limited federal right to such evidence in cases
where litigants are unfairly barred from obtaining relief in
state court. 43
IV. Analysis
The Court narrowly interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause within the context of
post-conviction access to the State's forensic DNA
evidence. The Court analyzed the question at issue from a
traditional and originalist perspective, properly restricting
post-conviction access to a state-created entitlement, which
has both statutory and judicially afforded protections. Two
arguments are posited in support of this decision. First, the
appellate court's attempt to analogize the precedent
established in Brady to the post-conviction context is
invalid.44 Second, the state government and courts, not the
federal judiciary, are more adequately equipped to address
the evolving issues created by the application of modem
DNA technology to post-conviction relief in the criminal
justice system.45 Ultimately, the Court's decision preserves
the states' sovereignty in this area of law and will reduce
41 ld. at 2334.
42 Id. at 2336.
43 Osborne, 129 S.Ct. at 2335.
44 id. at 2320.
41 Id. at 2323.
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the stream of non-meritorious litigation emanating from the
state prisons.
From a substantive viewpoint, the Court correctly
rejected the premise that a defendant's due process rights to
pretrial disclosure of exculpatory evidence logically
extends ipsofacto to a convicted person's right of access to
the State's DNA evidence. While the Court stated that the
due process protections afforded to defendants before a
final judgment are not (and should not) be the same as for
individuals convicted at a fair trial, it recognized the need
for corrective measures in certain instances where the
incriminating evidence is weak and relies largely on
eyewitness identification. Such redress, however, is not
precluded by the lack of a freestanding constitutional right
to post-conviction DNA testing; such relief is simply
limited in a post-conviction context.
In the instant case, Alaska provided both statutory and
judicial procedures for accessing post-conviction relief,
including providing a substantive right to those inmates
seeking to obtain DNA evidence for testing purposes. 46 At
the crux of the disagreement between the majority and the
dissent is that these state-created rights are not released
without condition of a "sufficiently compelling showing of
new evidence that establishes [the convicted person's]
innocence." 47 Policy concerns of judicial economy and
efficient administration dictate the necessity for placement
of such state limitations on an inmate's access to post-
conviction relief. To constitutionalize post-conviction
access to DNA evidence would engender an unmanageable
influx of litigation in this area, eventually leading to an
erosion of notions of finality in the criminal justice system.
46 Id. at 2317-18.
47 Id. at 2320.
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V. Conclusion
In District Attorney's Office v. Osborne, the United
States Supreme Court took a crucial step in defining the
boundaries of substantive due process rights within the
context of post-conviction relief. The Court held that a
state prisoner is not entitled to a freestanding constitutional
right to access the State's DNA evidence for exculpatory
testing purposes. While the Court's decision appears to
foreclose the vindication of wrongfully convicted
individuals, state legislatures and courts have provided
adequate procedural remedies, which permit post-
conviction relief in meritorious cases. In the instant case,
the Court saw no compelling reason to interfere with a
State's post-conviction relief procedures in light of the
respondent's failure to demonstrate such state law remedies
as insufficient.
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STUDENT CASE COMMENTARY
THE SCOPE OF THE ECONOMIC Loss DOCTRINE IN
TENNESSEE
Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Detroit Diesel Corp., 293 S.W.3d
487 (Tenn. 2009).
Kasey Washburn1
I. Summary
In Lincoln General Insurance Co. v. Detroit Diesel
Corp., the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that Tennessee
law does not allow recovery in tort for a defective product
that causes damage only to itself, regardless of the manner
2in which the damage occurs. The United States District
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee brought this
issue before the Tennessee Supreme Court through a
certified question of law. 3  The district court sought to
establish the scope of the economic loss doctrine 4 under
Tennessee law, focusing specifically on cases where the
damage to the defective product resulted from a sudden,
calamitous event.
5
1 J.D., pending 2012, Univ. of Tennessee; B.S., Political Science,
Univ. of Tennessee. Prior to attending law school, Ms. Washburn
interned with United States Senator Lamar Alexander of Tennessee.
2 293 S.W.3d 487, 488 (Tenn. 2009).
3id.
4 The economic loss doctrine applies in products liability cases where a
defective product damages itself without causing personal injury or
damage to other property; the resulting harm is purely economic
because the commercial consumer has lost the value of the product
and/or lost profits from its failure to operate in the manner intended.
Id. at 489.
' Id. at 488.
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II. Background
The action in Lincoln General arose on May 8,
2006, when a bus owned by Senators Rental caught fire due
to an alleged engine defect while traveling south on
Interstate 65 near Goodlettsville, Tennessee. 6 Although the
engine defect had the potential to cause personal injury or
damage to other property, the damage was confined to the
bus. 7 Prevost Car manufactured the bus, whereas Detroit
Diesel solely manufactured the engine. 8 Lincoln General
insured Senators Rental and paid $405,250 for the fire
damage to the bus pursuant to its insurance policy.
9
Following the incident, Lincoln General filed a
complaint against both Prevost and Detroit Diesel on
numerous counts, including strict products liability.'
0
Prevost argued that Lincoln General's tort claims were
barred by the economic loss doctrine because the resulting
harm was confined to the bus itself. In contrast, Lincoln
General argued that the manner in which the damage to the
bus occurred established that the defective engine was
unreasonably dangerous and therefore should allow a tort
claim under products liability."
III. Court's Conclusions and Rationale
Prior to Lincoln General, the United States Supreme
Court established a bright-line rule in East River Steamship
Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., which precludes
recovery in tort when a product damages itself without
6 Lincoln General, 293 S.W.3d at 488.
7 id.
8 id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Lincoln General, at 490.
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causing personal injury or damage to other property.12 In
East River, the United States Supreme Court examined
three distinct approaches ("minority," "intermediate," and
"majority") to the economic loss doctrine that have been
applied in various state and federal courts.1 3  The
Tennessee Supreme Court evaluated the three approaches
in Lincoln General and supported the determinations and
rationales of the United States Supreme Court concerning
the minority and intermediate approaches. 14
One of the approaches rejected by the United States
Supreme Court, as well as the Tennessee Supreme Court, is
the minority approach, which permits tort recovery for
purely economic loss.15 Courts following this approach
argue that the distinction between economic loss and
personal injury or property damage is arbitrary because in
12 Id. at 489 (citing E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.,
476 U.S. 858, 871 (1986)).
13 Lincoln General, 293 S.W.3d at 489.
14 Id. at 491. The United States Supreme Court's jurisdiction is limited
to cases that possess an ingrained federal issue as provided in Article
III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. Thus, in the absence of
a federal issue, the individual state supreme courts have the final word
on matters of state law that are outside the jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court. Therefore, the state tort law claim presented in
Lincoln General is within the sole jurisdiction of the Tennessee
Supreme Court; the United States Supreme Court's decision in East
River is only persuasive authority. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See also
U.S. CONST. amend. X; Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, AFL-CIO v.
Davis, 476 U.S. 380 (1986) (explaining the limitations placed on the
United States Supreme Court's ability to review matters of state law);
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 566 (1977)
("Our only power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent
that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights. And our power is to correct
wrong judgments, not to revise opinions. We are not permitted to
render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would be
rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal laws,
our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion."
(quoting Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-126 (1945))).
15 Lincoln General, 293 S.W.3d at 490.
183
et al.: Vol 6 No 2
Published by Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange, 2014
6:2 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 320
either case the defendant's conduct caused the harm;
therefore, he should be liable for all harm caused by his
defective product.16 The United States Supreme Court
rejected this argument in East River because "'it fails to
account for the need to keep products liability and contract
law in separate spheres and to maintain a realistic limitation
on damages." '  Without a limitation on damages for
economic loss, such as a contractual agreement, a
manufacturer could be held liable for a claim of economic
loss that extends further than the manufacturer intended
with its initial agreement.
The other rejected approach is the intermediate
approach, which permits tort recovery for damage to the
defective product in situations that "'turn on the nature of
the defect, the tpe of risk, and the manner in which the
injury arose."" The intermediate approach seeks to
establish tort liability when injury to the defective product
alone results from a sudden, calamitous event that renders
the defective product unreasonably dangerous.' 9  The
Tennessee Supreme Court rejected this approach because it
would require courts to differentiate between products that
expose the owner to an unreasonable risk of harm and those
that simply fail to meet the owner's expectations. 20 "The
East River Court rejected the dichotomy between
disappointed and endangered product owners as 'too
indeterminate to enable manufacturers easily to structure
their business behavior.' 2 1 The Supreme Court clarified
16 Id. (citing East River, 476 U.S. at 869).
17 Lincoln General, 293 S.W.3d at 490 (quoting East River, 476 U.S. at
870-71).
18 id.
19 Lincoln General, 293 S.W.3d at 490.
20 Id. (citing East River, 476 U.S. at 869-70).
21 Lincoln General, 293 S.W.3d at 491 (quoting East River, 476 U.S. at
870).
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its disinclination to accept the intermediate approach by
stating:
We realize that the damage may be qualitative,
occurring through gradual deterioration or internal
breakage. Or it may be calamitous. But either
way, since by definition no person or other
property is damaged, the resulting loss is purely
economic. Even when the harm to the product
itself occurs through an abrupt, accident-like
event, the resulting loss due to repair costs,
decreased value, and lost profits is essentially the
failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of
its bargain-traditionally the core concern of
contract law.22
The Tennessee Supreme Court similarly rejected the
intermediate approach. The court established that "the
owner of a defective product that creates a risk of injury
and was damaged during a fire, a crash, or other similar
occurrence is in the same position as the owner of a
defective product that malfunctions and simply does not
work.",23  The court also rejected Lincoln General's
argument that by not permitting tort recovery in cases
where the damage occurs in a sudden, calamitous event, the
manufacturer will have less of an incentive to create a safe
and effective product.24 Deterrence will continue to be
effectuated through the current products liability law that
allows for a tort claim when personal injury or damage to
25
other property results. The manufacturer will continue to
entertain a threat of liability "'because no manufacturer can
22 id.
23 Lincoln General, 293 S.W. 3d at 491.
24 Id.
25 Id.
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predict with any certainty that the damage his unsafe
product causes will be confined to the product itself.'
26
The Tennessee Supreme Court's holding in Lincoln
General is in accordance with the Tennessee Products
Liability Act of 1978 that limits products liability to those
"'actions brought for or on account of personal injury,
death, or property damage.' 27 Additionally, the Tennessee
Supreme Court's holding is supported by the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability (1998), which under
section 21 "specifically excludes harm to 'the defective
product itself' from the definition of 'harm to persons or
property' for which economic loss is recoverable." 28 The
United States Supreme Court in East River discussed the
policy rationales that drive a cause of action under products
liability and stated that "products liability grew out of a
public policy judgment that people need more protection
from dangerous products than is afforded by the law of
warranty., 29 Thus, under East River, a defective product
that causes harm solely to itself is excluded from the
protection of a products liability action in tort.
30
IV. Analysis
The Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in Lincoln
General is beneficial to Tennessee in multiple ways. First,
the ruling provides attorneys with a bright-line rule for
initiating products liability claims. The prerequisite that a
defective product must have caused personal injury or
26 Id. at 491 (quoting Trans States Airlines v. Pratt & Whitney Can.,
Inc., 682 N.E.2d 45, 53 ( I11. 1997).
27 Lincoln General, 293 S.W.3d at 491-92 (quoting Tennessee
Products Liability Act, TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(6) (2000)).
28 Id. at 493 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 21 (1998)).
29 East River, 476 U.S. at 866.
30 Lincoln General, 293 S.W.3d at 489.
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damage to other property provides the attorney with a clear
path to follow in preparing the appropriate claim under
either warranty or products liability. Attorneys will be
aware of limitations on damages and against whom their
complaints should be filed. This will save the attorney,
client, and court money by enhancing efficiency in
pleadings, discovery, and at trial.
Second, the ruling allows manufacturers to be aware
of their potential liability. Manufacturers will continue to
be threatened with a products liability claim if their
products cause personal injury or damage to other property,
thereby maintaining the incentive for manufacturers to
create safe and effective products. However,
manufacturers will not be on the hook for economic loss
that is outside the scope of their contract with commercial
consumers. Therefore, without the threat of unlimited
liability, manufacturers can focus their attention on creating
safe products at an affordable price.
Third, the everyday consumer will benefit because
necessary products that may pose some danger, such as
lawn mowers, will continue to be available and affordable.
If manufacturers had to cover their potential liability for
economic loss without a contract limitation, the price of
everyday goods would skyrocket in order for manufacturers
to stay in business. Additionally, manufacturers may chose
to stop producing goods that pose too great a risk of
liability. The Tennessee Supreme Court's ruling
establishes a limitation on liability that provides consumers
with affordable goods and allows Tennessee's economy to
grow by encouraging manufacturers to produce and sell.
Finally, the ruling in Lincoln General maintains the
important distinctions between contract law and tort law.
The principles of contract law and tort law, although
similar in some respects, have distinct approaches toward
damages. Allowing tort law to encroach on contract law
would result in creating more liability and would inhibit
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contracting between parties. There would be no need for
an "assumption of the risk" doctrine because the breaching
party would always be open to liability under tort. Contract
law encourages parties to work together to accomplish an
end result without the fear of liability outside that which
has been bargained for in the contract, while tort law seeks
to remedy an injustice that was unexpected and one that the
innocent party could not have prevented or been insured
against.
V. Conclusion
The Tennessee Supreme Court's ruling in Lincoln
General permits recovery in tort under products liability for
personal injury or damage to other property. Damages that
result in injury solely to the defective product are limited to
a cause of action under warranty. The Tennessee Supreme
Court's holding protects contract law principles from being
engulfed by tort liability, thereby encouraging
manufacturers to contract and produce products to
commercial consumers without the fear of unlimited
liability. Manufacturers will continue to remain liable for
harm to persons or other property, thus retaining the
incentive for manufacturers to produce products that are
safe and effective. The Tennessee Supreme Court's ruling
will also benefit Tennessee through greater efficiency in
initiating and preparing for lawsuits, as well as encouraging
growth in the economy by allowing consumers to purchase
necessary products that are both available and affordable.
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STUDENT CASE COMMENTARY
PARASOMNIA ACTIVITY
Tennessee v. Scott, 275 S.W. 3d 395 (Tenn. 2009).
Rashida Davis'
I. Summary
Due to the lack of uniformity among trial courts, the
Supreme Court of Tennessee granted an interlocutory
appeal in Tennessee v. Scott to resolve a dispute regarding
the admission of expert witness testimony. 2 Traditionally,
trial courts used a broad theme of "relevance and
reliability" when considering expert testimony. 3 The Court
replaced that general theme with a four-prong test that
included a "qualifications assessment, analytical cohesion,
methodological reliability, and fundamental reliability.",
4
The Court ruled that the trial court erred in excluding the
expert witness testimony without this analysis.5
II. Background
The defendant, Leroy Scott, was charged with three
counts of sexual battery and two counts of rape of his
stepdaughter, who was a minor.6 He appealed from the
1 J.D., pending 2012, Univ. of Tennessee; B.A., Political Science,
Georgia State Univ. Prior to attending law school, Ms. Davis worked
as a flight attendant.
2 State v. Scott, 275 S.W.3d 395, 401 (Tenn. 2009).
3 id.
4 id.
5 Id. at 402.
6 id.
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decision of the trial court to exclude his expert witness
testimony, which would have explained his behavior. The
trial court held that the expert's "methodology and
principles underlying the scientific evidence [were] not
sufficiently trustworthy and reliable to be presented to the
trier of fact." 7 Mr. Scott contended that he was unaware of
what he was doing because he was asleep, and his expert
witness was a crucial part of explaining this theory.
8
Mr. Scott's expert witness, Dr. J. Brevard Haynes,
diagnosed Mr. Scott with "sleep parasomnia with sexual
behavior." 9  Sleep parasomnia is a clinical disorder
involving arousal during sleep. 10 When Mr. Scott notified
the State of this defense, the State moved to exclude the
expert testimony." I The trial court granted the State's
motion, and the resulting appeal ensued. 12
III. Court's Conclusions and Rationale
The Tennessee Supreme Court identified the
important role that trial courts play as "gatekeepers when it
comes to admissibility of expert witness testimony."'
' 3
Tennessee Rule of Evidence 702 states:
"[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will substantially assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
7 Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 400.
8 Id. at 399.
9 Id. at 406.
10 THE INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF SLEEP DISORDERS:
DIAGNOSTIC & CODING MANUAL (2d ed. 2005).
" Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 399.
12 Id.
13 State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 300-301 (Tenn. 2007); Johnson
v. John Hancock Funds, 217 S.W.3d 414, 425 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006).
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knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify in the form of an opinion or
otherwise."
Trial courts must ensure that the "opinions are based on
relevant scientific methods, processes, and data, and not
upon an expert's mere speculation."' 4 When the trial court
excluded Dr. Haynes's expert testimony without any
explanation, the Court criticized the trial court for its lack
of "appropriate inquiry" and conclusory ruling.' 5  The
Court created a template for trial courts to follow when
deciding whether to admit expert testimony: "a
qualifications assessment, analytical cohesion,
methodological reliability, and fundamental reliability."'
6
With regard to the qualifications assessment, an
expert witness must have specialized knowledge, skill, and
experience that provide the jury with an informed
decision.' 7 In this instance, Dr. Haynes was a graduate of
Vanderbilt University School of Medicine. 8 He was board
certified in internal, pulmonary, and sleep medicine.'
9
Doctor Haynes testified that he spent twenty years studying
sleep medicine. He was an Assistant Clinical Professor at
Vanderbilt University School of Medicine and the Director
of the Saint Thomas Health Services Center for Sleep.
20
If the expert is qualified, then the court must
evaluate the analytical cohesion of the expert testimony.
To admit the evidence, the court must find that the expert's
research supports his or her conclusion. 21 If there is an
14 McDaniel v. CSX Transp. Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 265 (Tenn. 1997).
'5 Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 399.
16 Id. at 402.
17 Id.
8 Id. at 405.
'9 Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 405.
20 Id.
21 1_1
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"analytical gap" between the research and the opinion, the
court may exclude the expert. 22 In this case, Dr. Haynes
diagnosed Mr. Scott with sleep parasomnia with sexual
activity. Doctor Haynes concluded that Mr. Scott's
disorder caused him to "inappropriate[ly] touch [his] step
daughter." 2
3
Doctor Haynes's opinion was based on the physical
examination, multiple sleep latency test, medical literature,
and interview with Mr. Scott, who had a history of "night
terrors and sleep walking., 24 Mr. Scott's wife claimed that
he touched her sexually while he was asleep. 25 Also, his
behavior was similar to others diagnosed with sleep
parasomnia with sexual activity.26
Trial courts next must evaluate the methodological
reliability of the expert, which explores the expert's method• 2 7
for obtaining information. For example, Dr. Haynes
primarily relied on Mr. Scott's statements as a basis for his
opinion. Doctor Haynes testified that this method of "self-
reporting" was "consistent with accepted practices utilized
by physicians and psychologists. 28
Trial courts also must consider foundational
reliability, which "assess[es] the expert's field or discipline
... the reliability of the field.. . and the underlying facts
upon which the expert's opinion is predicated.,
29
Foundational and methodological reliability share some
overlapping concepts; however, the key difference is that
22 Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 402; State v. Stevens, 78 S.W.3d 817, 834-835
(Tenn. 2002).
23 Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 405.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 406.
27 Id. at 407.
28 Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 406.
29 Id. at 407.
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foundational reliability deals with the expert's area of
expertise as a whole.
30
Doctor Haynes "provided the trial court with a 2007
article that provide[d] analysis of the literature related to
sexual behavior as a sleep parasomnia." 31  He "relied
upon...peer-reviewed" literature "having been assessed by
experts in the field."32 Literature that was not "sufficiently
supported... [was] rejected for publication." 33  Based
on the Court's prescribed rules of the qualifications
assessment, analytical cohesion, methodological reliability,
and foundational reliability, the Court held that Dr.
Haynes's testimony should have been admitted.34 Doctor
Haynes was a qualified medical expert who used valid
methods and sound medical theory to form his
conclusion. 35 He used valid methods to obtain the data for
his conclusion. 36 Lastly, sleep parasomnia is a recognized
and valid area of psychology.
37
IV. Analysis
Although the traditional rule of "relevance and
reliability 38 is too broad, the Court's four-prong test of "a
qualifications assessment, analytical cohesion,
methodological reliability, and fundamental reliability" is
too narrow. To understand the implications of this change,
30 Id.
31 id.
32 Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 407; see generally Carlos H. Schenck, Isabelle
Arnulf, Mark W. Mahowald, Sleep and Sex: What Can Go Wrong? A
Review of the Literature on Sleep Related Disorders and Abnormal
Sexual Behaviors and Experiences, 683 SLEEP (June 1, 2007).
33 Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 407.
14 Id. at411.
35 Id. at 405.
36 Id. at 407.
37 Id.
38 Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 401.
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one must consider what types of experts would not fit this
regimen. The four-prong test is likely best for experts in
academia, as in the case of Tennessee v. Scott, but problems
may arise when the individual's expertise cannot be
quantified or measured, for example, experts in "drug
jargon ' 39 or drug culture. n
The rigid application of rules might prevent the very
goal the Court seeks to attain, which is the inclusion of
testimony for qualified experts. Perhaps "[n]o framework
exists that provides for simple and practical application in
every case; the complexity and diversity of potential
scientific evidence is simply too vast for the application of
a simple test."4 1 Ideally, the evidentiary analysis should
retain a structured system for considering expert testimony
while still allowing room for flexibility.
The rules regarding the inclusion of expert
testimony should encompass uniformity, the requirement of
a credible witness and field, and only limited restriction on
the trial court's discretion. The Tennessee Supreme Court
makes an interesting point that "expert testimony need not
establish that the expert testimony is correct, only that it
rests upon good grounds.' 42 This theme of "good grounds"
39 Tennesee v. Elliot, No. M2008-02686-CCA-R3-CD, 2010
WL1425452, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 9, 2010) (affirming the trial
court's admission of a police officer as an expert witness on drug
jargon).
40 Tennessee v. Rodriguez, No. M2005-00951-CCA-R3-CD, 2006
WL2310666, at *16 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 7, 2006) (affirming the
trial court's decision not to admit a police officer as expert witness on
drug culture).
41 McDaniel, 955 S.W.2d at 265 (Birch, J., concurring); see
Developments in the Law - Confronting the New Challenges of
Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1513-1516 (1995).
42 Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 404; Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of P.R.
Bottling Co., 161 F.3d 77, 85 (Ist Cir. 1998) (quoting Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993); see also In re
Paoli R. R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3rd Cir. 1994); Burley
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should be the overarching context to which expert witness
testimony should be included.43 The method for ensuring
that indeed an expert does possess this quality is through
the adversarial system.44 Even the Court acknowledges
that expert testimony "should be tested by the adversary
process-competing expert testimony and active cross-
examination-rather than excluded from juror's
scrutiny. 4
5
V. Conclusion
By creating a formulaic guideline for expert
testimony, the Court stepped away from the traditional
approach and created a new uniform system. The
traditional rules regarding expert testimony relied upon the
vague principles of relevance and reliability. These
principles allowed trial courts to exclude testimony
arbitrarily. The Court responded by restricting trial courts'
discretion. Now, trial courts must follow the prescribed
analysis for determining the admission of expert witness
testimony. The prescribed rules will ultimately lead to a
more uniform approach to the decisional process of trial
courts; however, the rules leave little room for discretion.
A more flexible approach to the admission of expert
testimony would allow the adversarial system to do the
work. The adversarial system allows opposing parties to
proffer reasons why the expert witness should or should not
be admitted and even cross-examine the expert witness.
Allowing opposing counsel to make a case for or against an
expert will preserve judicial discretion and will provide
flexibility for the admission of expert testimony. The
v. Kytec Innovative Sports Equip. Inc., 737 N.W.2d 397, 406 (S.D.
2007).
" Scott, 275 S.W.3d at 404.
44 id.
45 Ruiz-Troche, 161 F.3d at 85.
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zealous representation by counsel is the most appropriate
mechanism that the court system has to offer for the
admission of a qualified expert witness.
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